]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation
authorJosh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
Sun, 8 Mar 2026 20:20:28 +0000 (20:20 +0000)
committerAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Sat, 28 Mar 2026 04:19:44 +0000 (21:19 -0700)
The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single
allocation sized from the pattern length.  If the prefix_tbl[] size
calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers
before calculating the combined allocation size.

This fixes a potential heap overflow.  The pattern length calculation can
wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation.
Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's
xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS
kernels.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260308202028.2889285-2-objecting@objecting.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
lib/ts_kmp.c

index 5520dc28255a8593a77b64bdf70c7e08381eb053..29466c1803c91b94a8953fe3137ceab1b645a986 100644 (file)
@@ -94,8 +94,22 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
        struct ts_config *conf;
        struct ts_kmp *kmp;
        int i;
-       unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
-       size_t priv_size = sizeof(*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
+       unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
+       size_t priv_size;
+
+       /* Zero-length patterns would make kmp_find() read beyond kmp->pattern. */
+       if (unlikely(!len))
+               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+       /*
+        * kmp->pattern is stored immediately after the prefix_tbl[] table.
+        * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region.
+        */
+       if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*kmp->prefix_tbl),
+                                       &prefix_tbl_len) ||
+                    check_add_overflow(sizeof(*kmp), (size_t)len, &priv_size) ||
+                    check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size)))
+               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
        conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
        if (IS_ERR(conf))