pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream.

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 7724fbdf443f58d29852331ee8b4dc7595a4b687..1db8ce0086ed275311cb6596c38d3bfd301ecba0 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -1230,6 +1230,9 @@ out:
 
 static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+       /* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
        pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about "
                        "to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the "
                        "linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n");