#include "ssl_private.h"
static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s);
+#endif
/*
* Post Read Request Handler
int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
{
SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ const char *servername;
+#endif
SSL *ssl;
if (!sslconn) {
if (!ssl) {
return DECLINED;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name))) {
+ char *host, *scope_id;
+ apr_port_t port;
+ apr_status_t rv;
+
+ /*
+ * The SNI extension supplied a hostname. So don't accept requests
+ * with either no hostname or a different hostname.
+ */
+ if (!r->hostname) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
+ "Hostname %s provided via SNI, but no hostname"
+ " provided in HTTP request", servername);
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
+ rv = apr_parse_addr_port(&host, &scope_id, &port, r->hostname, r->pool);
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS || scope_id) {
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(host, servername)) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
+ "Hostname %s provided via SNI and hostname %s provided"
+ " via HTTP are different", servername, host);
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((((mySrvConfig(r->server))->strict_sni_vhost_check
+ == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE)
+ || (mySrvConfig(sslconn->server))->strict_sni_vhost_check
+ == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE)
+ && r->connection->vhost_lookup_data) {
+ /*
+ * We are using a name based configuration here, but no hostname was
+ * provided via SNI. Don't allow that if are requested to do strict
+ * checking. Check wether this strict checking was setup either in the
+ * server config we used for handshaking or in our current server.
+ * This should avoid insecure configuration by accident.
+ */
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
+ "No hostname was provided via SNI for a name based"
+ " virtual host");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
+#endif
SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, r);
/*
*/
int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r)
{
- SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
- SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
- SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
- SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
+ SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
+ SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
+ SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
+ server_rec *handshakeserver = sslconn ? sslconn->server : NULL;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
apr_array_header_t *requires;
ssl_require_t *ssl_requires;
* has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no
* implicit optimizations.
*/
- if (dc->szCipherSuite) {
+ if (dc->szCipherSuite || (r->server != handshakeserver)) {
/* remember old state */
if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
}
/* configure new state */
- if (!modssl_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite)) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0,
- r->server,
- "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) "
- "permitted SSL ciphers");
+ if ((dc->szCipherSuite || sc->server->auth.cipher_suite) &&
+ !modssl_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite ?
+ dc->szCipherSuite :
+ sc->server->auth.cipher_suite)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r,
+ "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) "
+ "permitted SSL ciphers");
ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
if (cipher_list_old) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
}
- /* tracing */
if (renegotiate) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
+#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+ if (sc->cipher_server_pref == TRUE) {
+ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+ }
+#endif
+ /* tracing */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
"Reconfigured cipher suite will force renegotiation");
}
}
* function and not by OpenSSL internally (and our function is aware of
* both the per-server and per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask
* OpenSSL about the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our
- * ap_ctx attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL. We've to force the
+ * SSLConnRec attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL. We've to force the
* renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is less than the
* currently active/remembered verify depth (because this means more
* restriction on the certificate chain).
*/
- if (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) {
- /* XXX: doesnt look like sslconn->verify_depth is actually used */
- if (!(n = sslconn->verify_depth)) {
- sslconn->verify_depth = n = sc->server->auth.verify_depth;
- }
-
- /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
- if (dc->nVerifyDepth < n) {
- renegotiate = TRUE;
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
- "Reduced client verification depth will force "
- "renegotiation");
- }
+ n = sslconn->verify_depth ?
+ sslconn->verify_depth :
+ (mySrvConfig(handshakeserver))->server->auth.verify_depth;
+ /* determine the new depth */
+ sslconn->verify_depth = (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) ?
+ dc->nVerifyDepth : sc->server->auth.verify_depth;
+ if (sslconn->verify_depth < n) {
+ renegotiate = TRUE;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
+ "Reduced client verification depth will force "
+ "renegotiation");
}
/*
* verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotation
* handshake.
*/
- if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) {
+ if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) ||
+ (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) {
/* remember old state */
verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl);
/* configure new state */
verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
- if (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) {
+ if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) ||
+ (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE)) {
verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT;
}
if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) ||
- (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
+ (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA) ||
+ (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) ||
+ (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
{
verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
}
X509_free(peercert);
}
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0,
- r->server,
- "Changed client verification type will force "
- "%srenegotiation",
- renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : "");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
+ "Changed client verification type will force "
+ "%srenegotiation",
+ renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : "");
}
}
+ /* If we're handling a request for a vhost other than the default one,
+ * then we need to make sure that client authentication is properly
+ * enforced. For clients supplying an SNI extension, the peer
+ * certificate verification has happened in the handshake already
+ * (and r->server == handshakeserver). For non-SNI requests,
+ * an additional check is needed here. If client authentication
+ * is configured as mandatory, then we can only proceed if the
+ * CA list doesn't have to be changed (OpenSSL doesn't provide
+ * an option to change the list for an existing session).
+ */
+ if ((r->server != handshakeserver)
+ && renegotiate
+ && ((verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *hssc = mySrvConfig(handshakeserver);
+
+#define MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(f, sc1, sc2) \
+ (sc1->server->auth.f && \
+ (!sc2->server->auth.f || \
+ strNE(sc1->server->auth.f, sc2->server->auth.f)))
+
+ if (MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(ca_cert_file, sc, hssc) ||
+ MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(ca_cert_path, sc, hssc)) {
+ if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
+ "Non-default virtual host with SSLVerify set to "
+ "'require' and VirtualHost-specific CA certificate "
+ "list is only available to clients with TLS server "
+ "name indication (SNI) support");
+ modssl_set_verify(ssl, verify_old, NULL);
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ } else
+ /* let it pass, possibly with an "incorrect" peer cert,
+ * so make sure the SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY environment variable
+ * will indicate partial success only, later on.
+ */
+ sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS";
+ }
+ }
}
/*
cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store, ca_file, ca_path)) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Unable to reconfigure verify locations "
- "for client authentication");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Unable to reconfigure verify locations "
+ "for client authentication");
ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
X509_STORE_free(cert_store);
SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, ca_list);
renegotiate = TRUE;
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
- "Changed client verification locations will force "
- "renegotiation");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
+ "Changed client verification locations will force "
+ "renegotiation");
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE */
* here because it resets too much of the connection. So we set the
* state explicitly and continue the handshake manually.
*/
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
- "Requesting connection re-negotiation");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
+ "Requesting connection re-negotiation");
if (renegotiate_quick) {
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack;
/* perform just a manual re-verification of the peer */
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
"Performing quick renegotiation: "
"just re-verifying the peer");
}
if (!cert_stack || (sk_X509_num(cert_stack) == 0)) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Cannot find peer certificate chain");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Cannot find peer certificate chain");
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
if (!(cert_store ||
(cert_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))))
{
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Cannot find certificate storage");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Cannot find certificate storage");
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
(char *)ssl);
if (!modssl_X509_verify_cert(&cert_store_ctx)) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Re-negotiation verification step failed");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Re-negotiation verification step failed");
ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
}
request_rec *id = r->main ? r->main : r;
/* do a full renegotiation */
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
- "Performing full renegotiation: "
- "complete handshake protocol");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
+ "Performing full renegotiation: "
+ "complete handshake protocol");
SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl,
(unsigned char *)&id,
SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Re-negotiation request failed");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Re-negotiation request failed");
r->connection->aborted = 1;
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
- "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
+ "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake");
/* XXX: Should replace SSL_set_state with SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
* However, this causes failures in perl-framework currently,
SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
- "Not accepted by client!?");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
+ "Not accepted by client!?");
r->connection->aborted = 1;
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
/*
* Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results
*/
- if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
- BOOL do_verify = (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE);
+ if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) ||
+ (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE)) {
+ BOOL do_verify = ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) ||
+ (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE));
if (do_verify && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK)) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
- "Client verification failed");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
+ "Client verification failed");
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
if (do_verify) {
if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) == NULL) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
- "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
- "Client certificate missing");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
+ "Client certificate missing");
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
}
if (ok != 1) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
- "Access to %s denied for %s "
- "(requirement expression not fulfilled)",
- r->filename, r->connection->remote_ip);
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
+ "Access to %s denied for %s "
+ "(requirement expression not fulfilled)",
+ r->filename, r->connection->remote_ip);
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
- "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr);
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
+ "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr);
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"access to %s failed, reason: %s",
NULL);
apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", auth_line);
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
- "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"",
- auth_line);
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
+ "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"",
+ auth_line);
return DECLINED;
}
SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
apr_table_t *env = r->subprocess_env;
char *var, *val = "";
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ const char *servername;
+#endif
STACK_OF(X509) *peer_certs;
SSL *ssl;
int i;
/* the always present HTTPS (=HTTP over SSL) flag! */
apr_table_setn(env, "HTTPS", "on");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* add content of SNI TLS extension (if supplied with ClientHello) */
+ if ((servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name))) {
+ apr_table_set(env, "SSL_TLS_SNI", servername);
+ }
+#endif
+
/* standard SSL environment variables */
if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) {
for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) {
RSA *ssl_callback_TmpRSA(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
{
conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
+ SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfigFromConn(c);
int idx;
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c,
DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
{
conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
+ SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfigFromConn(c);
int idx;
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c,
SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- server_rec *s = conn->base_server;
request_rec *r = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl);
+ server_rec *s = r ? r->server : mySrvFromConn(conn);
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : NULL;
char *sname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0);
char *iname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
- "Certificate Verification: "
- "depth: %d, subject: %s, issuer: %s",
- errdepth,
- sname ? sname : "-unknown-",
- iname ? iname : "-unknown-");
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, conn,
+ "Certificate Verification: "
+ "depth: %d, subject: %s, issuer: %s",
+ errdepth,
+ sname ? sname : "-unknown-",
+ iname ? iname : "-unknown-");
if (sname) {
modssl_free(sname);
if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum) &&
(verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
{
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
- "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is "
- "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting "
- "the certificate");
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, conn,
+ "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is "
+ "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting "
+ "the certificate");
sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS";
ok = TRUE;
* If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason
*/
if (!ok) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
- "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s",
- errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum));
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn,
+ "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s",
+ errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum));
if (sslconn->client_cert) {
X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
}
if (errdepth > depth) {
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
- "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long "
- "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are "
- "only %d)",
- errdepth, depth);
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn,
+ "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long "
+ "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are "
+ "only %d)",
+ errdepth, depth);
errnum = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
int ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, conn_rec *c)
{
- server_rec *s = c->base_server;
+ SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
+ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ request_rec *r = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl);
+ server_rec *s = r ? r->server : mySrvFromConn(c);
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c);
modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
int ssl_callback_proxy_cert(SSL *ssl, MODSSL_CLIENT_CERT_CB_ARG_TYPE **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- server_rec *s = c->base_server;
+ server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(c);
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
X509_NAME *ca_name, *issuer;
X509_INFO *info;
{
/* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- server_rec *s = conn->base_server;
+ server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(conn);
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
long timeout = sc->session_cache_timeout;
BOOL rc;
{
/* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- server_rec *s = conn->base_server;
+ server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(conn);
SSL_SESSION *session;
/*
return;
}
- s = c->base_server;
+ s = mySrvFromConn(c);
if (!(sc = mySrvConfig(s))) {
return;
}
}
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * This callback function is executed when OpenSSL encounters an extended
+ * client hello with a server name indication extension ("SNI", cf. RFC 4366).
+ */
+int ssl_callback_ServerNameIndication(SSL *ssl, int *al, modssl_ctx_t *mctx)
+{
+ const char *servername =
+ SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+
+ if (servername) {
+ conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
+ if (c) {
+ if (ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn(c, ssl_find_vhost,
+ (void *)servername)) {
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c,
+ "SSL virtual host for servername %s found",
+ servername);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c,
+ "No matching SSL virtual host for servername "
+ "%s found (using default/first virtual host)",
+ servername);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a (name-based) SSL virtual host where either the ServerName
+ * or one of the ServerAliases matches the supplied name (to be used
+ * with ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn())
+ */
+static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s)
+{
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BOOL found = FALSE;
+ apr_array_header_t *names;
+ int i;
+ SSLConnRec *sslcon;
+
+ /* check ServerName */
+ if (!strcasecmp(servername, s->server_hostname)) {
+ found = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if not matched yet, check ServerAlias entries
+ * (adapted from vhost.c:matches_aliases())
+ */
+ if (!found) {
+ names = s->names;
+ if (names) {
+ char **name = (char **)names->elts;
+ for (i = 0; i < names->nelts; ++i) {
+ if (!name[i])
+ continue;
+ if (!strcasecmp(servername, name[i])) {
+ found = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if still no match, check ServerAlias entries with wildcards */
+ if (!found) {
+ names = s->wild_names;
+ if (names) {
+ char **name = (char **)names->elts;
+ for (i = 0; i < names->nelts; ++i) {
+ if (!name[i])
+ continue;
+ if (!ap_strcasecmp_match(servername, name[i])) {
+ found = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* set SSL_CTX (if matched) */
+ sslcon = myConnConfig(c);
+ if (found && (ssl = sslcon->ssl) &&
+ (sc = mySrvConfig(s))) {
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, sc->server->ssl_ctx);
+ /*
+ * SSL_set_SSL_CTX() only deals with the server cert,
+ * so we need to duplicate a few additional settings
+ * from the ctx by hand
+ */
+ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_options(ssl->ctx));
+ if ((SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl) == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) ||
+ (SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) == 0)) {
+ /*
+ * Only initialize the verification settings from the ctx
+ * if they are not yet set, or if we're called when a new
+ * SSL connection is set up (num_renegotiations == 0).
+ * Otherwise, we would possibly reset a per-directory
+ * configuration which was put into effect by ssl_hook_Access.
+ */
+ SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(ssl->ctx),
+ SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ssl->ctx));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Save the found server into our SSLConnRec for later
+ * retrieval
+ */
+ sslcon->server = s;
+
+ /*
+ * There is one special filter callback, which is set
+ * very early depending on the base_server's log level.
+ * If this is not the first vhost we're now selecting
+ * (and the first vhost doesn't use APLOG_DEBUG), then
+ * we need to set that callback here.
+ */
+ if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
+ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), ssl_io_data_cb);
+ BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), (void *)ssl);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
projects / thirdparty / apache / httpd.git / commitdiff
