]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
x86/bugs: Clean up SRSO microcode handling
authorDavid Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Wed, 25 Jun 2025 15:58:05 +0000 (10:58 -0500)
committerBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Thu, 26 Jun 2025 11:32:31 +0000 (13:32 +0200)
SRSO microcode only exists for Zen3/Zen4 CPUs.  For those CPUs, the microcode
is required for any mitigation other than Safe-RET to be effective.  Safe-RET
can still protect user->kernel and guest->host attacks without microcode.

Clarify this in the code and ensure that SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED is
selected for any mitigation besides Safe-RET if the required microcode isn't
present.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250625155805.600376-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

index b2634198323040a9a6dea7c79341de440b59b2a1..e2a8a21efb10089424d345c0bf6118a4d4ec62bb 100644 (file)
@@ -2902,8 +2902,6 @@ early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
 
 static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-       bool has_microcode;
-
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
                srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
 
@@ -2913,23 +2911,30 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
        if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO)
                srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
 
-       has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
-       if (has_microcode) {
-               /*
-                * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
-                * IBPB microcode has been applied.
-                */
-               if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
-                       srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT;
-                       return;
-               }
-       } else {
+       /* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable to SRSO. */
+       if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
+               srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT;
+               return;
+       }
+
+       if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {
                pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
                pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+
+               /*
+                * Safe-RET provides partial mitigation without microcode, but
+                * other mitigations require microcode to provide any
+                * mitigations.
+                */
+               if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET)
+                       srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
+               else
+                       srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
        }
 
        switch (srso_mitigation) {
        case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET:
+       case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED:
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)) {
                        srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
                        goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
@@ -2939,9 +2944,6 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
                        pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
                        srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
                }
-
-               if (!has_microcode)
-                       srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
                break;
 ibpb_on_vmexit:
        case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
@@ -2956,9 +2958,6 @@ ibpb_on_vmexit:
                        pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
                        srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
                }
-
-               if (!has_microcode)
-                       srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
                break;
        default:
                break;