~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If there remain legacy services which do not support non-DES enctypes
-(such as AFS), **allow_weak_crypto** must remain enabled on the KDC.
-Client machines need not have this setting, though---applications
-which require DES can use API calls to allow weak crypto on a per-request
-basis, overriding the system krb5.conf. However, having **allow_weak_crypto**
-set on the KDC means that any principals which have a DES key in the database
-could still use those keys. To minimize the use of DES in the realm and
-restrict it to just legacy services which require DES, it is necessary
-to remove all other DES keys. The realm has been configured such that
-at password and keytab change, no DES keys will be generated by default.
-The task then reduces to requiring user password changes and having
-server administrators update their service keytabs. Administrative
-outreach will be necessary, and if the desire to eliminate DES is
-sufficiently strong, the KDC administrators may choose to randkey
-any principals which have not been rekeyed after some timeout period,
-forcing the user to contact the helpdesk for access.
+(such as older versions of AFS), **allow_weak_crypto** must remain
+enabled on the KDC. Client machines need not have this setting,
+though---applications which require DES can use API calls to allow
+weak crypto on a per-request basis, overriding the system krb5.conf.
+However, having **allow_weak_crypto** set on the KDC means that any
+principals which have a DES key in the database could still use those
+keys. To minimize the use of DES in the realm and restrict it to just
+legacy services which require DES, it is necessary to remove all other
+DES keys. The realm has been configured such that at password and
+keytab change, no DES keys will be generated by default. The task
+then reduces to requiring user password changes and having server
+administrators update their service keytabs. Administrative outreach
+will be necessary, and if the desire to eliminate DES is sufficiently
+strong, the KDC administrators may choose to randkey any principals
+which have not been rekeyed after some timeout period, forcing the
+user to contact the helpdesk for access.
The Database Master Key
-----------------------