Add side-channel silent pkcs1 decoding function

Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>

diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 9c5694cfb07148c244061231a6d2ae1c95da8014..6f2e03e237570b4e5a0599859de9935c3dd844e9 100644 (file)
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ hogweed_SOURCES = sexp.c sexp-format.c \
                  bignum.c bignum-random.c bignum-random-prime.c \
                  sexp2bignum.c \
                  pkcs1.c pkcs1-encrypt.c pkcs1-decrypt.c \
+                 pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c \
                  pkcs1-rsa-digest.c pkcs1-rsa-md5.c pkcs1-rsa-sha1.c \
                  pkcs1-rsa-sha256.c pkcs1-rsa-sha512.c \
                  pss.c pss-mgf1.c \

diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3ab4a48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+
+   The RSA publickey algorithm. Side channel resistant PKCS#1 decryption.
+
+   Copyright (C) 2001, 2012 Niels Möller
+   Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+
+   This file is part of GNU Nettle.
+
+   GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
+   modify it under the terms of either:
+
+     * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
+       Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your
+       option) any later version.
+
+   or
+
+     * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+       Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+       option) any later version.
+
+   or both in parallel, as here.
+
+   GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+   General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and
+   the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program.  If
+   not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
+*/
+
+#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "memops.h"
+
+#include "gmp-glue.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "rsa-internal.h"
+
+/* Inputs are always cast to uint32_t values. But all values used in this
+ * function should never exceed the maximum value of a uint32_t anyway.
+ * these macros returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */
+#define NOT_EQUAL(a, b) \
+    ((0U - ((uint32_t)(a) ^ (uint32_t)(b))) >> 31)
+#define EQUAL(a, b) \
+    ((((uint32_t)(a) ^ (uint32_t)(b)) - 1U) >> 31)
+
+int
+_pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
+                    size_t padded_message_length,
+                    const volatile uint8_t *padded_message)
+{
+  volatile int ok;
+  size_t i, t;
+
+  assert (padded_message_length >= length);
+
+  t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
+
+  /* Check format, padding, message_size */
+  ok = EQUAL(padded_message[0], 0);       /* ok if padded_message[0] == 0 */
+  ok &= EQUAL(padded_message[1], 2);      /* ok if padded_message[1] == 2 */
+  for (i = 2; i < t; i++)      /* check padding has no zeros */
+    {
+      ok &= NOT_EQUAL(padded_message[i], 0);
+    }
+  ok &= EQUAL(padded_message[t], 0);      /* ok if terminator == 0 */
+
+  /* fill destination buffer regardless of outcome */
+  cnd_memcpy(ok, message, padded_message + t + 1, length);
+
+  return ok;
+}

diff --git a/rsa-internal.h b/rsa-internal.h
index 4930bb90163fa038e091c62b5926ebff5b18c822..537ce5c4f0d532fdc7021a1fd0275ef680b1a458 100644 (file)
--- a/rsa-internal.h
+++ b/rsa-internal.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 
 #define _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch _nettle_rsa_sec_compute_root_itch
 #define _rsa_sec_compute_root _nettle_rsa_sec_compute_root
+#define _pkcs1_sec_decrypt _nettle_pkcs1_sec_decrypt
 
 /* side-channel silent root computation */
 mp_size_t
@@ -47,4 +48,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
                       mp_limb_t *rp, const mp_limb_t *mp,
                       mp_limb_t *scratch);
 
+/* additional resistance to memory access side-channel attacks.
+ * Note: message buffer is returned unchanged on error */
+int
+_pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
+                    size_t padded_message_length,
+                    const volatile uint8_t *padded_message);
+
 #endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */