perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check

It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security
checks since it was first introduced by:

commit da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")

so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 8f78b0c900ef4be904d7bab4c46720400a4933dd..485a09d61adf9818eb639a1500b9e0746d2bbe7f 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
         * to the user in a zero-copy fashion.
         */
        if (event->attr.exclude_kernel) {
-               ret = perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+               ret = perf_allow_kernel();
                if (ret)
                        return ret;
        }

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 7601196d1d18e824863f4a84b5e1c0f2e4cce569..0e5ff0f025e0e71ad93bc10d30e85a50839b8843 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -4168,7 +4168,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
        if (x86_pmu.version < 3)
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       ret = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+       ret = perf_allow_cpu();
        if (ret)
                return ret;
 

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
index 844bc4fc4724d75417c73e829fe7f3987141aff8..78d78b8a15300becd1758959e54dfd9928acf1e5 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event)
         * the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
         */
        if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
-               v = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+               v = perf_allow_cpu();
                if (v)
                        return v;
        }

diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
index f5e6878db9d62ff6e90247a7494a2d5c33e4c846..3efed8839a4ec5604eba242cb620327cd2a6a87d 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
+++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static_assert((PERF_EVENT_FLAG_ARCH & SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX) == SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_C
 
 static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr))
+       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel())
                event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX;
 }
 
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
        set_spe_event_has_cx(event);
        reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
        if (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))
-               return perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+               return perf_allow_kernel();
 
        return 0;
 }

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 9eb313bd0c93f82d2f2a2ddc8cbdbe6d6bf875eb..2bf909fa339485eccfd0620c21331d237c381872 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, int type)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_alloc, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_read, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 8333f132f4a96cffda6f7c8eb4b105915f9d9d97..5d2ec4283ebf09cc2b1503c86213e41835c0dd8e 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1672,22 +1672,22 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
        return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
 }
 
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr);
+int perf_allow_kernel(void);
 
-static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+static inline int perf_allow_cpu(void)
 {
        if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
                return -EACCES;
 
-       return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
+       return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
 }
 
-static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(void)
 {
        if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
                return -EPERM;
 
-       return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
+       return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
 }
 
 extern int perf_exclude_event(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs);

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 27f64a9747f8fdf9420927cf26c6468edb0fc94e..1545d515a66b4656e8e187c0c9628127f08f515e 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2324,14 +2324,13 @@ struct perf_event_attr;
 struct perf_event;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-extern int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+extern int security_perf_event_open(int type);
 extern int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event);
 extern void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event);
 extern int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event);
 extern int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event);
 #else
-static inline int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr,
-                                          int type)
+static inline int security_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
        return 0;
 }

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index bcb09e011e9e112787edcb52b4523e50352115d0..1a965c0fb8af63ed2c5fb49166a8ebec72365056 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4883,7 +4883,7 @@ find_get_context(struct task_struct *task, struct perf_event *event)
 
        if (!task) {
                /* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
-               err = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+               err = perf_allow_cpu();
                if (err)
                        return ERR_PTR(err);
 
@@ -12532,7 +12532,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
                }
                /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
                if (mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) {
-                       ret = perf_allow_kernel(attr);
+                       ret = perf_allow_kernel();
                        if (ret)
                                return ret;
                }
@@ -12789,12 +12789,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
                return err;
 
        /* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
-       err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+       err = security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
        if (err)
                return err;
 
        if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
-               err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+               err = perf_allow_kernel();
                if (err)
                        return err;
        }
@@ -12814,7 +12814,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
        /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
        if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) {
-               err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+               err = perf_allow_kernel();
                if (err)
                        return err;
        }
@@ -13647,12 +13647,12 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event)
        return &event->attr;
 }
 
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+int perf_allow_kernel(void)
 {
        if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
                return -EACCES;
 
-       return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
+       return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel);
 

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index 3ff9caa4a71bbdb42e2b31326a17df3ac6e73077..a6bb7577e8c596f4753ae7a05a7598497a037c9e 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
 
        /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
        if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
-               ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+               ret = perf_allow_tracepoint();
                if (ret)
                        return ret;
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
         * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
         * only allow root to have these.
         */
-       ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+       ret = perf_allow_tracepoint();
        if (ret)
                return ret;
 

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c9fae447327e9c9449b8aca49426256b87e28940..8aa839232c73fdfe82670305b490bce0ae463fcb 100644 (file)
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5883,16 +5883,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
 /**
  * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed
- * @attr: perf event attribute
  * @type: type of event
  *
  * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+int security_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
-       return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
+       return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, type);
 }
 
 /**

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fb37e87df2262a8662c78a2cc60a8faef64dca4f..6780425cc7e047c2c54e30702043b297d6f7c1b2 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7040,7 +7040,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
        u32 requested, sid = current_sid();