]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/linux.git/commitdiff
rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check
authorKeenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Wed, 8 Apr 2026 12:12:41 +0000 (13:12 +0100)
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Thu, 9 Apr 2026 01:44:33 +0000 (18:44 -0700)
rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).

Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:

RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
  [net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
 skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
 rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
 rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
 rxrpc_process_connection()
   [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
    net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
 process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
 worker_thread()
   [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
 kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
 ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]

Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-14-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c

index 01dbdf0b5cf2e40cfffc7ddeb87ea3e8e201b8f3..9e4a4ff28913c48995ca483ff4344ad4f97a66da 100644 (file)
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
 
        auth_offset     = offset;
        auth_len        = ntohl(xauth_len);
-       if (auth_len < len)
+       if (auth_len > len)
                goto short_packet;
        if (auth_len & 3)
                goto inconsistent;