]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks
authorJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Fri, 2 Jan 2026 02:45:19 +0000 (21:45 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 8 Jan 2026 09:14:58 +0000 (10:14 +0100)
[ Upstream commit bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 ]

tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does
not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA
payload.

Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return
name and name size for all handle types back to the caller.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
[ different semantics around u8 name_size() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c

index 2bc716fbf2157b15051a08b193ab813be6dbb57b..b58a8a7e156464cf566ab0e97f830fab244c8929 100644 (file)
  * used by the kernel internally.
  */
 
+#include "linux/dev_printk.h"
+#include "linux/tpm.h"
 #include "tpm.h"
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
 
 static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
 module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
index cf0b8315404479328106ace0eeebfed4dd3ea8ac..a10db4a4aceda9e53d78b2d9984695f93a9ecc84 100644 (file)
@@ -156,47 +156,60 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
        return size_map[alg] + 2;
 }
 
-static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
 {
-       struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+       u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
        off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-       u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
-       u32 val;
-
-       /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
-       tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-
-       /* skip public */
-       val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
-       if (val > tot_len)
-               return -EINVAL;
-       offset += val;
-       /* name */
-       val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
-       if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
-               return -EINVAL;
-       memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
-       /* forget the rest */
-       return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
-{
-       struct tpm_buf buf;
        int rc;
+       u8 name_size_alg;
+       struct tpm_buf buf;
+
+       if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
+           mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
+               memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
+               return sizeof(u32);
+       }
 
        rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
        if (rc)
                return rc;
 
        tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
-       rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
-       if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
-               rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
 
-       tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+       rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic");
+       if (rc) {
+               tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+               return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+       }
 
-       return rc;
+       /* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
+       offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+
+       /*
+        * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
+        * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes).
+        */
+       if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
+               tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+               return -EIO;
+       }
+
+       rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+       name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]);
+
+       if (rc != name_size_alg) {
+               tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+               return -EIO;
+       }
+
+       if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) {
+               tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+               return -EIO;
+       }
+
+       memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc);
+       tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+       return name_size_alg;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
 
@@ -229,6 +242,7 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
        enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
        struct tpm2_auth *auth;
        int slot;
+       int ret;
 #endif
 
        if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
@@ -251,8 +265,11 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
        if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
            mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
            mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
-               if (!name)
-                       tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
+               if (!name) {
+                       ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
+                       if (ret < 0)
+                               goto err;
+               }
        } else {
                if (name)
                        dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
@@ -261,6 +278,10 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
        auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
        if (name)
                memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
+       return;
+
+err:
+       tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
 #endif
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);