A logic flaw in __smc_setsockopt() allows a local unprivileged user to
cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by holding the socket lock indefinitely.
The function __smc_setsockopt() calls copy_from_sockptr() while holding
lock_sock(sk). By passing a userfaultfd-monitored memory page (or
FUSE-backed memory on systems where unprivileged userfaultfd is disabled)
as the optval, an attacker can halt execution during the copy operation,
keeping the lock held.
Combined with asynchronous tear-down operations like shutdown(), this
exhausts the kernel wq (kworkers) and triggers the hung task watchdog.
[ 240.123456] INFO: task kworker/u8:2 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 240.123489] Call Trace:
[ 240.123501] smc_shutdown+...
[ 240.123512] lock_sock_nested+...
This patch moves the user-space copy outside the lock_sock() critical
section to prevent the issue.
Fixes: a6a6fe27bab4 ("net/smc: Dynamic control handshake limitation by socket options")
Signed-off-by: Nicolò Coccia <n.coccia96@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
smc = smc_sk(sk);
+ /* pre-fetch user data outside the lock */
+ if (optname == SMC_LIMIT_HS) {
+ if (optlen < sizeof(int))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_sockptr(&val, optval, sizeof(int)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SMC_LIMIT_HS:
- if (optlen < sizeof(int)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
- if (copy_from_sockptr(&val, optval, sizeof(int))) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- break;
- }
-
smc->limit_smc_hs = !!val;
rc = 0;
break;