(st->m.type == rpz_type &&
0 >= dns_name_compare(p_name, st->p_name))))
continue;
-#if 0
- /*
- * This code would block a customer reported information
- * leak of rpz rules by rewriting requests in the
- * rpz-ip, rpz-nsip, rpz-nsdname,and rpz-passthru TLDs.
- * Without this code, a bad guy could request
- * 24.0.3.2.10.rpz-ip. to find the policy rule for
- * 10.2.3.0/14. It is an insignificant leak and this
- * code is not worth its cost, because the bad guy
- * could publish "evil.com A 10.2.3.4" and request
- * evil.com to get the same information.
- * Keep code with "#if 0" in case customer demand
- * is irresistible.
- *
- * We have the less frequent case of a triggered
- * policy. Check that we have not trigger on one
- * of the pretend RPZ TLDs.
- * This test would make it impossible to rewrite
- * names in TLDs that start with "rpz-" should
- * ICANN ever allow such TLDs.
- */
- unsigned int labels;
- labels = dns_name_countlabels(trig_name);
- if (labels >= 2) {
- dns_label_t label;
-
- dns_name_getlabel(trig_name, labels-2, &label);
- if (label.length >= sizeof(DNS_RPZ_PREFIX)-1 &&
- strncasecmp((const char *)label.base+1,
- DNS_RPZ_PREFIX,
- sizeof(DNS_RPZ_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
- continue;
- }
-#endif
+
if (rpz->policy != DNS_RPZ_POLICY_DISABLED) {
CTRACE(ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
"rpz_rewrite_name: rpz_save_p");