Without this patch, peer-info pushed by clients in the TLS handshake
is only visible on the management interface, and only if
--management-client-auth is enabled.
With this patch, received records are sanitized and put into the normal
"multi instance" environment, where it can be evaluated by --client-connect
or --auth-user-pass-verify scripts and plugins, etc. Only records matching
a fairly strict "name=value" format are accepted, and only names starting
with IV_ or UV_ are exported, to avoid clients sending funny stuff and
playing havoc with script/plugin environments on the server. In the
"value" part, spaces, non-printable characters and shell metacharacters
are replaced by '_'.
The change is somewhat invasive as reception of the peer_info string was
only done when username+password are expected from the client, but the
data is always there (if the client sends no username/password, it will
send 0-length strings, so always extracting 3 strings is safe). Also,
the sanitation function validate_peer_info_line() and the opts->peer_info
field were only compiled in #ifdef MANGEMENT_DEF_AUTH...
Patch v3: do not call the old man_output_peer_info_env() anymore, unless
a management env-filter has been set (= ensure IV_ and UV_ stuff is sent
at most *once*, and exactly the way OpenVPN AS expects it). Add
substituting of "bad" characters in the environment values.
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <
1367757373-31637-1-git-send-email-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/7582
#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
-static bool
-validate_peer_info_line(const char *line)
-{
- uint8_t c;
- int state = 0;
- while ((c=*line++))
- {
- switch (state)
- {
- case 0:
- case 1:
- if (c == '=' && state == 1)
- state = 2;
- else if (isalnum(c) || c == '_')
- state = 1;
- else
- return false;
- case 2:
- if (isprint(c))
- ;
- else
- return false;
- }
- }
- return (state == 2);
-}
-
static void
man_output_peer_info_env (struct management *man, struct man_def_auth_context *mdac)
{
mode = "REAUTH";
msg (M_CLIENT, ">CLIENT:%s,%lu,%u", mode, mdac->cid, mda_key_id);
man_output_extra_env (management, "CLIENT");
- man_output_peer_info_env(management, mdac);
+ if (management->connection.env_filter_level>0)
+ man_output_peer_info_env(management, mdac);
man_output_env (es, true, management->connection.env_filter_level, "CLIENT");
mdac->flags |= DAF_INITIAL_AUTH;
}
#endif
+/* helper to parse peer_info received from multi client, validate
+ * (this is untrusted data) and put into environment
+ */
+bool
+validate_peer_info_line(char *line)
+{
+ uint8_t c;
+ int state = 0;
+ while (*line)
+ {
+ c = *line;
+ switch (state)
+ {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ if (c == '=' && state == 1)
+ state = 2;
+ else if (isalnum(c) || c == '_')
+ state = 1;
+ else
+ return false;
+ case 2:
+ /* after the '=', replace non-printable or shell meta with '_' */
+ if (!isprint(c) || isspace(c) ||
+ c == '$' || c == '(' || c == '`' )
+ *line = '_';
+ }
+ line++;
+ }
+ return (state == 2);
+}
+
+void
+multi_output_peer_info_env (struct env_set *es, const char * peer_info)
+{
+ char line[256];
+ struct buffer buf;
+ buf_set_read (&buf, (const uint8_t *) peer_info, strlen(peer_info));
+ while (buf_parse (&buf, '\n', line, sizeof (line)))
+ {
+ chomp (line);
+ if (validate_peer_info_line(line) &&
+ (strncmp(line, "IV_", 3) == 0 || strncmp(line, "UV_", 3) == 0) )
+ {
+ msg (M_INFO, "peer info: %s", line);
+ env_set_add(es, line);
+ }
+ else
+ msg (M_WARN, "validation failed on peer_info line received from client");
+ }
+}
+
static void
multi_client_connect_setenv (struct multi_context *m,
struct multi_instance *mi)
void init_management_callback_multi (struct multi_context *m);
void uninit_management_callback_multi (struct multi_context *m);
+bool validate_peer_info_line(char *line);
+void multi_output_peer_info_env (struct env_set *es, const char * peer_info);
+
/*
* Return true if our output queue is not full
*/
#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
man_def_auth_set_client_reason(multi, NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef P2MP_SERVER
free (multi->peer_info);
#endif
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
char *options;
+ struct user_pass *up;
/* allocate temporary objects */
ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (options, char, TLS_OPTIONS_LEN, &gc);
ks->authenticated = false;
+ /* always extract username + password fields from buf, even if not
+ * authenticating for it, because otherwise we can't get at the
+ * peer_info data which follows behind
+ */
+ ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (up, struct user_pass, &gc);
+ username_status = read_string (buf, up->username, USER_PASS_LEN);
+ password_status = read_string (buf, up->password, USER_PASS_LEN);
+
+#ifdef P2MP_SERVER
+ /* get peer info from control channel */
+ free (multi->peer_info);
+ multi->peer_info = read_string_alloc (buf);
+ if ( multi->peer_info )
+ multi_output_peer_info_env (session->opt->es, multi->peer_info);
+#endif
+
if (verify_user_pass_enabled(session))
{
/* Perform username/password authentication */
- struct user_pass *up;
-
- ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (up, struct user_pass, &gc);
- username_status = read_string (buf, up->username, USER_PASS_LEN);
- password_status = read_string (buf, up->password, USER_PASS_LEN);
-
if (!username_status || !password_status)
{
CLEAR (*up);
}
}
-#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
- /* get peer info from control channel */
- free (multi->peer_info);
- multi->peer_info = read_string_alloc (buf);
-#endif
-
verify_user_pass(up, multi, session);
- CLEAR (*up);
}
else
{
ks->authenticated = true;
}
+ /* clear username and password from memory */
+ CLEAR (*up);
+
/* Perform final authentication checks */
if (ks->authenticated)
{
*/
char *client_reason;
+ /* Time of last call to tls_authentication_status */
+ time_t tas_last;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef P2MP_SERVER
/*
* A multi-line string of general-purpose info received from peer
* over control channel.
*/
char *peer_info;
-
- /* Time of last call to tls_authentication_status */
- time_t tas_last;
#endif
/*
projects / thirdparty / openvpn.git / commitdiff
