Bugfix (introduced: Postfix 2.3): static maps did not free
their casefolding buffer. File: util/dict_static.c.
+
+20210116
+
+ Feature: when a Postfix program makes a DNS query that
+ requests DNSSEC validation (usually for Postfix DANE support)
+ but the DNS response is not DNSSEC validated, Postfix will
+ send a DNS query configured with the "dnssec_probe" parameter
+ to determine if DNSSEC support is available, and logs a
+ warning if it is not. By default, the probe has type "ns"
+ and domain name ".". The probe is sent once per process
+ lifetime. Files: dns/dns.h, dns/dns_lookup.c, dns/dns_sec.c,
+ test_dns_lookup.c, global/mail_params.[hc], mantools/postlink.
+
+ The makedefs script no longer disables DNSSEC when Postfix
+ is built with libc-musl. Instead Postfix will rely on the
+ new dnssec_probe feature, and will log a warning when Postfix
+ requests DNSSEC validation, but the infrastructure does not
+ validate DNSSEC signatures. File: makedefs.
+
+ The default "smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy = dane" was
+ causing unnecessary dnssec_probe activity. The default is now
+ "dane" when smtp_tls_security_level is "dane", otherwise it is
+ "may". File: global/mail_params.h.
+
If you upgrade from Postfix 3.0 or earlier, read RELEASE_NOTES-3.1
before proceeding.
+Runtime detection of DNSSEC support
+-----------------------------------
+
+The Postfix build system will no longer automatically disable DNSSEC
+support when it determines that Postfix will use libc-musl. This removes
+the earlier libc-musl workaround for Postfix 3.2.15, 3.3.10, 3.4.12,
+and 3.5.2.
+
+Now, when a Postfix process requests DNSSEC support (typically, for
+Postfix DANE support), the process may do a runtime test to determine if
+DNSSEC validation is available. DNSSEC support may be broken because of
+local configuration, libc incompatibility, or other infrastructure issues.
+
+Background: DNSSEC validation is needed for Postfix DANE support;
+this ensures that Postfix receives TLSA records with secure TLS
+server certificate info. When DNSSEC validation is unavailable,
+mail deliveries using opportunistic DANE will not be protected by
+server certificate info in TLSA records, and mail deliveries using
+mandatory DANE will not be made at all.
+
+The dnssec_probe parameter specifies the DNS query type (default:
+"ns") and DNS query name (default: ".") that Postfix may use to
+determine whether DNSSEC validation is available. Specify an empty
+value to disable this feature.
+
+By default, a Postfix process will send a DNSSEC probe after 1) the
+process made a DNS query that requested DNSSEC validation, 2) the
+process did not receive a DNSSEC validated response to this query
+or to an earlier query, and 3) the process did not already send a
+DNSSEC probe.
+
+When the DNSSEC probe has no response, or when the response is not
+DNSSEC validated, Postfix logs a warning that DNSSEC validation may
+be unavailable. Examples:
+
+warning: DNSSEC validation may be unavailable
+warning: reason: dnssec_probe 'ns:.' received a response that is not DNSSEC validated
+warning: reason: dnssec_probe 'ns:.' received no response: Server failure
+
+This feature was backported from Postfix 3.6.
+
libc-musl workaround for Postfix 3.2.15, 3.3.10, 3.4.12, and 3.5.2
------------------------------------------------------------------
<b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_dns_reply_filter">smtp_dns_reply_filter</a> (empty)</b>
Optional filter for Postfix SMTP client DNS lookup results.
+ Available in Postfix 3.2.21 and later:
+
+ <b><a href="postconf.5.html#dnssec_probe">dnssec_probe</a> (ns:.)</b>
+ The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+ ".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+ is available.
+
<b>MIME PROCESSING CONTROLS</b>
Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later:
<p> This feature is available in Postfix 2.8 and later. </p>
+</DD>
+
+<DT><b><a name="dnssec_probe">dnssec_probe</a>
+(default: ns:.)</b></DT><DD>
+
+<p> The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+is available.
+</p>
+
+<p> Background: DNSSEC validation is needed for Postfix DANE support;
+this ensures that Postfix receives TLSA records with secure TLS
+server certificate info. When DNSSEC validation is unavailable,
+mail deliveries using <i>opportunistic</i> DANE will not be protected
+by server certificate info in TLSA records, and mail deliveries
+using <i>mandatory</i> DANE will not be made at all. </p>
+
+<p> By default, a Postfix process will send a DNSSEC probe after
+1) the process made a DNS query that requested DNSSEC validation,
+2) the process did not receive a DNSSEC validated response to this
+query or to an earlier query, and 3) the process did not already
+send a DNSSEC probe. <p>
+
+<p> When the DNSSEC probe has no response, or when the response is
+not DNSSEC validated, Postfix logs a warning that DNSSEC validation
+may be unavailable. </p>
+
+<p> Example: </p>
+
+<pre>
+warning: DNSSEC validation may be unavailable
+warning: reason: <a href="postconf.5.html#dnssec_probe">dnssec_probe</a> 'ns:.' received a response that is not DNSSEC validated
+warning: reason: <a href="postconf.5.html#dnssec_probe">dnssec_probe</a> 'ns:.' received no response: Server failure
+</pre>
+
+<p> Possible reasons why DNSSEC validation may be unavailable: </p>
+
+<ul>
+
+<li> The local /etc/resolv.conf file specifies a DNS resolver that
+does not validate DNSSEC signatures (that's
+$<a href="postconf.5.html#queue_directory">queue_directory</a>/etc/resolv.conf when a Postfix daemon runs in a
+chroot jail).
+
+<li> The local system library does not pass on the "DNSSEC validated"
+bit to Postfix, or Postfix does not know how to ask the library to
+do that.
+
+</ul>
+
+<p> By default, the DNSSEC probe asks for the DNS root zone NS
+records, because resolvers should always have that information
+cached. If Postfix runs on a network where the DNS root zone is not
+reachable, specify a different probe, or specify an empty <a href="postconf.5.html#dnssec_probe">dnssec_probe</a>
+value to disable the feature. </p>
+
+<p> This feature was backported from Postfix 3.6 to Postfix versions
+3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21. </p>
+
+
</DD>
<DT><b><a name="dont_remove">dont_remove</a>
</DD>
<DT><b><a name="smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy">smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy</a>
-(default: dane)</b></DT><DD>
+(default: see "postconf -d" output)</b></DT><DD>
<p> The TLS policy for MX hosts with "secure" TLSA records when the
nexthop destination security level is <b>dane</b>, but the MX
"Verified", because the MX host name could have been forged. </dd>
</dl>
+<p> The default setting for Postfix ≥ 3.6 is "dane" with
+"<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_security_level">smtp_tls_security_level</a> = dane", otherwise "may". This behavior
+was backported to Postfix versions 3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21.
+With earlier
+Postfix versions the default setting was always "dane". </p>
+
<p> Though with "insecure" MX records an active attacker can
compromise SMTP transport security by returning forged MX records,
such attacks are "tamper-evident" since any forged MX hostnames
<b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_dns_reply_filter">smtp_dns_reply_filter</a> (empty)</b>
Optional filter for Postfix SMTP client DNS lookup results.
+ Available in Postfix 3.2.21 and later:
+
+ <b><a href="postconf.5.html#dnssec_probe">dnssec_probe</a> (ns:.)</b>
+ The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+ ".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+ is available.
+
<b>MIME PROCESSING CONTROLS</b>
Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later:
*) echo usage: $0 [system release] 1>&2; exit 1;;
esac
-case "$SYSTEM" in
- Linux)
- case "`PATH=/bin:/usr/bin ldd /bin/sh`" in
- *-musl-*)
- case "$CCARGS" in
- *-DNO_DNSSEC*) ;;
- *) echo Warning: libc-musl breaks DANE/TLSA security. 1>&2
- echo This build will not support DANE/TLSA. 1>&2
- CCARGS="$CCARGS -DNO_DNSSEC";;
- esac;;
- esac;;
-esac
-
case "$SYSTEM.$RELEASE" in
SCO_SV.3.2) SYSTYPE=SCO5
# Use the native compiler by default
service performs DNS white/blacklist lookups.
.PP
This feature is available in Postfix 2.8 and later.
+.SH dnssec_probe (default: ns:.)
+The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+is available.
+.PP
+Background: DNSSEC validation is needed for Postfix DANE support;
+this ensures that Postfix receives TLSA records with secure TLS
+server certificate info. When DNSSEC validation is unavailable,
+mail deliveries using \fIopportunistic\fR DANE will not be protected
+by server certificate info in TLSA records, and mail deliveries
+using \fImandatory\fR DANE will not be made at all.
+.PP
+By default, a Postfix process will send a DNSSEC probe after
+1) the process made a DNS query that requested DNSSEC validation,
+2) the process did not receive a DNSSEC validated response to this
+query or to an earlier query, and 3) the process did not already
+send a DNSSEC probe.
+.PP
+When the DNSSEC probe has no response, or when the response is
+not DNSSEC validated, Postfix logs a warning that DNSSEC validation
+may be unavailable.
+.PP
+Example:
+.PP
+.nf
+.na
+.ft C
+warning: DNSSEC validation may be unavailable
+warning: reason: dnssec_probe 'ns:.' received a response that is not DNSSEC validated
+warning: reason: dnssec_probe 'ns:.' received no response: Server failure
+.fi
+.ad
+.ft R
+.PP
+Possible reasons why DNSSEC validation may be unavailable:
+.IP \(bu
+The local /etc/resolv.conf file specifies a DNS resolver that
+does not validate DNSSEC signatures (that's
+$queue_directory/etc/resolv.conf when a Postfix daemon runs in a
+chroot jail).
+.IP \(bu
+The local system library does not pass on the "DNSSEC validated"
+bit to Postfix, or Postfix does not know how to ask the library to
+do that.
+.br
+.PP
+By default, the DNSSEC probe asks for the DNS root zone NS
+records, because resolvers should always have that information
+cached. If Postfix runs on a network where the DNS root zone is not
+reachable, specify a different probe, or specify an empty dnssec_probe
+value to disable the feature.
+.PP
+This feature was backported from Postfix 3.6 to Postfix versions
+3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21.
.SH dont_remove (default: 0)
Don't remove queue files and save them to the "saved" mail queue.
This is a debugging aid. To inspect the envelope information and
This feature is available in Postfix 2.6 and later. With earlier Postfix
releases only the smtp_tls_mandatory_ciphers parameter is implemented,
and opportunistic TLS always uses "export" or better (i.e. all) ciphers.
-.SH smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy (default: dane)
+.SH smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy (default: see "postconf \-d" output)
The TLS policy for MX hosts with "secure" TLSA records when the
nexthop destination security level is \fBdane\fR, but the MX
record was found via an "insecure" MX lookup. The choices are:
"Verified", because the MX host name could have been forged.
.br
.br
+The default setting for Postfix >= 3.6 is "dane" with
+"smtp_tls_security_level = dane", otherwise "may". This behavior
+was backported to Postfix versions 3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21.
+With earlier
+Postfix versions the default setting was always "dane".
+.PP
Though with "insecure" MX records an active attacker can
compromise SMTP transport security by returning forged MX records,
such attacks are "tamper\-evident" since any forged MX hostnames
deliveries.
.IP "\fBsmtp_dns_reply_filter (empty)\fR"
Optional filter for Postfix SMTP client DNS lookup results.
+.PP
+Available in Postfix 3.2.21 and later:
+.IP "\fBdnssec_probe (ns:.)\fR"
+The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+is available.
.SH "MIME PROCESSING CONTROLS"
.na
.nf
s;\bsmtp_address_preference\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_address_preference">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtp_per_record_deadline\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_per_record_deadline">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtp_send_dummy_mail_auth\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_send_dummy_mail_auth">$&</a>;g;
+ s;\bdnssec_probe\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#dnssec_probe">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtpd_enforce_tls\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_enforce_tls">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtpd_sasl_tls_security_options\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_tls_security_options">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtpd_sasl_type\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_type">$&</a>;g;
This feature is available in Postfix 3.1 and later.
</p>
-%PARAM smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy dane
+%PARAM smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy see "postconf -d" output
<p> The TLS policy for MX hosts with "secure" TLSA records when the
nexthop destination security level is <b>dane</b>, but the MX
"Verified", because the MX host name could have been forged. </dd>
</dl>
+<p> The default setting for Postfix ≥ 3.6 is "dane" with
+"smtp_tls_security_level = dane", otherwise "may". This behavior
+was backported to Postfix versions 3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21.
+With earlier
+Postfix versions the default setting was always "dane". </p>
+
<p> Though with "insecure" MX records an active attacker can
compromise SMTP transport security by returning forged MX records,
such attacks are "tamper-evident" since any forged MX hostnames
</p>
<p> This feature is available in Postfix 3.2 and later. </p>
+
+%PARAM dnssec_probe ns:.
+
+<p> The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+is available.
+</p>
+
+<p> Background: DNSSEC validation is needed for Postfix DANE support;
+this ensures that Postfix receives TLSA records with secure TLS
+server certificate info. When DNSSEC validation is unavailable,
+mail deliveries using <i>opportunistic</i> DANE will not be protected
+by server certificate info in TLSA records, and mail deliveries
+using <i>mandatory</i> DANE will not be made at all. </p>
+
+<p> By default, a Postfix process will send a DNSSEC probe after
+1) the process made a DNS query that requested DNSSEC validation,
+2) the process did not receive a DNSSEC validated response to this
+query or to an earlier query, and 3) the process did not already
+send a DNSSEC probe. <p>
+
+<p> When the DNSSEC probe has no response, or when the response is
+not DNSSEC validated, Postfix logs a warning that DNSSEC validation
+may be unavailable. </p>
+
+<p> Example: </p>
+
+<pre>
+warning: DNSSEC validation may be unavailable
+warning: reason: dnssec_probe 'ns:.' received a response that is not DNSSEC validated
+warning: reason: dnssec_probe 'ns:.' received no response: Server failure
+</pre>
+
+<p> Possible reasons why DNSSEC validation may be unavailable: </p>
+
+<ul>
+
+<li> The local /etc/resolv.conf file specifies a DNS resolver that
+does not validate DNSSEC signatures (that's
+$queue_directory/etc/resolv.conf when a Postfix daemon runs in a
+chroot jail).
+
+<li> The local system library does not pass on the "DNSSEC validated"
+bit to Postfix, or Postfix does not know how to ask the library to
+do that.
+
+</ul>
+
+<p> By default, the DNSSEC probe asks for the DNS root zone NS
+records, because resolvers should always have that information
+cached. If Postfix runs on a network where the DNS root zone is not
+reachable, specify a different probe, or specify an empty dnssec_probe
+value to disable the feature. </p>
+
+<p> This feature was backported from Postfix 3.6 to Postfix versions
+3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21. </p>
SHELL = /bin/sh
SRCS = dns_lookup.c dns_rr.c dns_strerror.c dns_strtype.c dns_rr_to_pa.c \
dns_sa_to_rr.c dns_rr_eq_sa.c dns_rr_to_sa.c dns_strrecord.c \
- dns_rr_filter.c dns_str_resflags.c
+ dns_rr_filter.c dns_str_resflags.c dns_sec.c
OBJS = dns_lookup.o dns_rr.o dns_strerror.o dns_strtype.o dns_rr_to_pa.o \
dns_sa_to_rr.o dns_rr_eq_sa.o dns_rr_to_sa.o dns_strrecord.o \
- dns_rr_filter.o dns_str_resflags.o
+ dns_rr_filter.o dns_str_resflags.o dns_sec.o
HDRS = dns.h
TESTSRC = test_dns_lookup.c test_alias_token.c
DEFS = -I. -I$(INC_DIR) -D$(SYSTYPE)
done
cd $(INC_DIR); chmod 644 $(HDRS)
-test_dns_lookup: test_dns_lookup.c $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+test_dns_lookup: test_dns_lookup.c all $(LIB) $(LIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $@.c $(LIB) $(LIBS) $(SYSLIBS)
dns_rr_to_pa: $(LIB) $(LIBS)
dns_sa_to_rr.o: ../../include/vstring.h
dns_sa_to_rr.o: dns.h
dns_sa_to_rr.o: dns_sa_to_rr.c
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/check_arg.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/msg.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/myaddrinfo.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/split_at.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
+dns_sec.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+dns_sec.o: dns.h
+dns_sec.o: dns_sec.c
dns_str_resflags.o: ../../include/check_arg.h
dns_str_resflags.o: ../../include/myaddrinfo.h
dns_str_resflags.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
(lflags), (ltype))
/*
- * Request flags.
+ * The dns_lookup() rflag that requests DNSSEC validation.
+ */
+#define DNS_WANT_DNSSEC_VALIDATION(rflags) ((rflags) & RES_USE_DNSSEC)
+
+ /*
+ * lflags.
*/
#define DNS_REQ_FLAG_STOP_OK (1<<0)
#define DNS_REQ_FLAG_STOP_INVAL (1<<1)
*/
const char *dns_str_resflags(unsigned long);
+ /*
+ * dns_sec.c.
+ */
+#define DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE (1<<0) /* got some DNSSEC validated reply */
+#define DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE (1<<1) /* probe already sent, or disabled */
+
+#define DNS_SEC_STATS_SET(flags) (dns_sec_stats |= (flags))
+#define DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(flags) (dns_sec_stats & (flags))
+
+extern int dns_sec_stats; /* See DNS_SEC_FLAG_XXX above */
+extern void dns_sec_probe(int);
+
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Pointer to storage for the reply RCODE value. This gives
/* more detailed information than DNS_FAIL, DNS_RETRY, etc.
/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/* If DNSSEC validation is requested but the response is not
+/* DNSSEC validated, dns_lookup() will send a one-time probe
+/* query as configured with the \fBdnssec_probe\fR configuration
+/* parameter, and will log a warning when the probe response
+/* was not DNSSEC validated.
+/* .PP
/* dns_lookup() returns one of the following codes and sets the
/* \fIwhy\fR argument accordingly:
/* .IP DNS_OK
*/
#define XTRA_FLAGS (RES_USE_EDNS0 | RES_TRUSTAD)
- if (flags & RES_USE_DNSSEC)
+ if (DNS_WANT_DNSSEC_VALIDATION(flags))
flags |= (RES_USE_EDNS0 | RES_TRUSTAD);
/*
_res.options |= saved_options;
reply_header = (HEADER *) reply->buf;
reply->rcode = reply_header->rcode;
+ if ((reply->dnssec_ad = !!reply_header->ad) != 0)
+ DNS_SEC_STATS_SET(DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE);
if (h_errno != 0) {
if (why)
vstring_sprintf(why, "Host or domain name not found. "
/*
* Initialize the reply structure. Some structure members are filled on
- * the fly while the reply is being parsed. Coerce AD bit to boolean.
+ * the fly while the reply is being parsed.
*/
-#if RES_USE_DNSSEC != 0
- reply->dnssec_ad = (flags & RES_USE_DNSSEC) ? !!reply_header->ad : 0;
-#else
- reply->dnssec_ad = 0;
-#endif
SET_HAVE_DNS_REPLY_PACKET(reply, len);
reply->query_start = reply->buf + sizeof(HEADER);
reply->answer_start = 0;
CORRUPT(DNS_RETRY);
if ((status = dns_get_fixed(pos, &fixed)) != DNS_OK)
CORRUPT(status);
- if (!valid_rr_name(rr_name, "resource name", fixed.type, reply))
+ if (strcmp(orig_name, ".") == 0 && *rr_name == 0)
+ /* Allow empty response name for root queries. */ ;
+ else if (!valid_rr_name(rr_name, "resource name", fixed.type, reply))
CORRUPT(DNS_INVAL);
if (fqdn)
vstring_strcpy(fqdn, rr_name);
/*
* The Linux resolver misbehaves when given an invalid domain name.
*/
- if (!valid_hostname(name, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+ if (strcmp(name, ".") && !valid_hostname(name, DONT_GRIPE)) {
if (why)
vstring_sprintf(why,
"Name service error for %s: invalid host or domain name",
(void) dns_get_answer(orig_name, &reply, T_SOA, rrlist, fqdn,
cname, c_len, &maybe_secure);
}
+ if (DNS_WANT_DNSSEC_VALIDATION(flags)
+ && !DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE | \
+ DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE))
+ dns_sec_probe(flags); /* XXX Clobbers 'reply' */
return (status);
}
*/
status = dns_get_answer(orig_name, &reply, type, rrlist, fqdn,
cname, c_len, &maybe_secure);
+ if (DNS_WANT_DNSSEC_VALIDATION(flags)
+ && !DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE | \
+ DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE))
+ dns_sec_probe(flags); /* XXX Clobbers 'reply' */
switch (status) {
default:
if (why)
--- /dev/null
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* dns_sec 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/* DNSSEC validation availability
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* #include <dns.h>
+/*
+/* DNS_SEC_STATS_SET(
+/* int flags)
+/*
+/* DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(
+/* int flags)
+/*
+/* void dns_sec_probe(
+/* int rflags)
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* This module maintains information about the availability of
+/* DNSSEC validation, in global flags that summarize
+/* process-lifetime history.
+/* .IP DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE
+/* The process has received at least one DNSSEC validated
+/* response to a query that requested DNSSEC validation.
+/* .IP DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE
+/* The process has sent a DNSSEC probe (see below), or DNSSEC
+/* probing is disabled by configuration.
+/* .PP
+/* DNS_SEC_STATS_SET() sets one or more DNS_SEC_FLAG_* flags,
+/* and DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST() returns non-zero if any of the
+/* specified flags is set.
+/*
+/* dns_sec_probe() generates a query to the target specified
+/* with the \fBdnssec_probe\fR configuration parameter. It
+/* sets the DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE flag, and it calls
+/* dns_lookup() which sets DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE if it receives
+/* a DNSSEC validated response. Preconditions:
+/* .IP \(bu
+/* The rflags argument must request DNSSEC validation (in the
+/* same manner as dns_lookup() rflags argument).
+/* .IP \(bu
+/* The DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE and DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE
+/* flags must be false.
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/* Wietse Venema
+/* Google, Inc.
+/* 111 8th Avenue
+/* New York, NY 10011, USA
+/*--*/
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Utility library.
+ */
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <split_at.h>
+#include <vstring.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Global library.
+ */
+#include <mail_params.h>
+
+ /*
+ * DNS library.
+ */
+#include <dns.h>
+
+int dns_sec_stats;
+
+/* dns_sec_probe - send a probe to establish DNSSEC viability */
+
+void dns_sec_probe(int rflags)
+{
+ const char myname[] = "dns_sec_probe";
+ char *saved_dnssec_probe;
+ char *qname;
+ int qtype;
+ DNS_RR *rrlist = 0;
+ int dns_status;
+ VSTRING *why;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity checks.
+ */
+ if (!DNS_WANT_DNSSEC_VALIDATION(rflags))
+ msg_panic("%s: DNSSEC is not requested", myname);
+ if (DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE))
+ msg_panic("%s: DNSSEC probe was already sent, or probing is disabled",
+ myname);
+ if (DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE))
+ msg_panic("%s: already have validated DNS response", myname);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't recurse.
+ */
+ DNS_SEC_STATS_SET(DNS_SEC_FLAG_DONT_PROBE);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't probe.
+ */
+ if (*var_dnssec_probe == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Parse the probe spec. Format is type:resource.
+ */
+ saved_dnssec_probe = mystrdup(var_dnssec_probe);
+ if ((qname = split_at(saved_dnssec_probe, ':')) == 0 || *qname == 0
+ || (qtype = dns_type(saved_dnssec_probe)) == 0)
+ msg_fatal("malformed %s value: %s format is qtype:qname",
+ VAR_DNSSEC_PROBE, var_dnssec_probe);
+
+ why = vstring_alloc(100);
+ dns_status = dns_lookup(qname, qtype, rflags, &rrlist, (VSTRING *) 0, why);
+ if (!DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE))
+ msg_warn("DNSSEC validation may be unavailable");
+ else if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info(VAR_DNSSEC_PROBE
+ " '%s' received a response that is DNSSEC validated",
+ var_dnssec_probe);
+ switch (dns_status) {
+ default:
+ if (!DNS_SEC_STATS_TEST(DNS_SEC_FLAG_AVAILABLE))
+ msg_warn("reason: " VAR_DNSSEC_PROBE
+ " '%s' received a response that is not DNSSEC validated",
+ var_dnssec_probe);
+ if (rrlist)
+ dns_rr_free(rrlist);
+ break;
+ case DNS_RETRY:
+ case DNS_FAIL:
+ msg_warn("reason: " VAR_DNSSEC_PROBE " '%s' received no response: %s",
+ var_dnssec_probe, vstring_str(why));
+ break;
+ }
+ myfree(saved_dnssec_probe);
+ vstring_free(why);
+}
int ch;
int lflags = DNS_REQ_FLAG_NONE;
+ if (var_dnssec_probe == 0)
+ var_dnssec_probe = mystrdup(DEF_DNSSEC_PROBE);
+
msg_vstream_init(argv[0], VSTREAM_ERR);
while ((ch = GETOPT(argc, argv, "f:npv")) > 0) {
switch (ch) {
/* int warn_compat_break_relay_domains;
/* int warn_compat_break_flush_domains;
/* int warn_compat_break_mynetworks_style;
+/*
+/* char *var_dnssec_probe;
/* DESCRIPTION
/* This module (actually the associated include file) defines
/* the names and defaults of all mail configuration parameters.
int var_compat_level;
char *var_drop_hdrs;
+char *var_dnssec_probe;
+
const char null_format_string[1] = "";
/*
/* multi_instance_wrapper may have dependencies but not dependents. */
VAR_MULTI_GROUP, DEF_MULTI_GROUP, &var_multi_group, 0, 0,
VAR_MULTI_NAME, DEF_MULTI_NAME, &var_multi_name, 0, 0,
+ VAR_DNSSEC_PROBE, DEF_DNSSEC_PROBE, &var_dnssec_probe, 0, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_BOOL_TABLE first_bool_defaults[] = {
/* SMTP only */
#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_INSECURE_MX_POLICY "smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy"
-#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_INSECURE_MX_POLICY "dane"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_INSECURE_MX_POLICY "${{$smtp_tls_security_level} == {dane} ? {dane} : {may}}"
extern char *var_smtp_tls_insecure_mx_policy;
/*
#define DEF_DNS_NCACHE_TTL_FIX 0
extern bool var_dns_ncache_ttl_fix;
+ /*
+ * DNSSEC probing, to find out if DNSSEC validation is available.
+ */
+#define VAR_DNSSEC_PROBE "dnssec_probe"
+#define DEF_DNSSEC_PROBE "ns:."
+extern char *var_dnssec_probe;
+
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
* Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
* patchlevel; they change the release date only.
*/
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20201107"
-#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.2.20"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20210117"
+#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.2.21"
#ifdef SNAPSHOT
#define MAIL_VERSION_DATE "-" MAIL_RELEASE_DATE
/* deliveries.
/* .IP "\fBsmtp_dns_reply_filter (empty)\fR"
/* Optional filter for Postfix SMTP client DNS lookup results.
+/* .PP
+/* Available in Postfix 3.2.21 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBdnssec_probe (ns:.)\fR"
+/* The DNS query type (default: "ns") and DNS query name (default:
+/* ".") that Postfix may use to determine whether DNSSEC validation
+/* is available.
/* MIME PROCESSING CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
projects / thirdparty / postfix.git / commitdiff
