This commit fixes a security issue where BPF_PROG_DETACH on tcx or
netkit devices could be executed by any user when no program fd was
provided, bypassing permission checks. The fix adds a capability
check for CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in this case.
Fixes: e420bed02507 ("bpf: Add fd-based tcx multi-prog infra with link support")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Gonnet <ggonnet.linux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260127160200.10395-1-ggonnet.linux@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+static inline bool bpf_net_capable(void)
+{
+ return capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
static __always_inline int
bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
{
return false;
}
}
+
+static inline bool bpf_mprog_detach_empty(enum bpf_prog_type type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
+ return bpf_net_capable();
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
#endif /* __BPF_MPROG_H */
return ret;
}
-static bool bpf_net_capable(void)
-{
- return capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
-}
-
#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD excl_prog_hash_size
/* called via syscall */
static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)
prog = bpf_prog_get_type(attr->attach_bpf_fd, ptype);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return PTR_ERR(prog);
+ } else if (!bpf_mprog_detach_empty(ptype)) {
+ return -EPERM;
}
} else if (is_cgroup_prog_type(ptype, 0, false)) {
if (attr->attach_flags || attr->relative_fd)