Calling perf_allow_kernel() from the NMI context is unsafe and could be
fatal. Capture the permission at event-initialization time by storing it
in event->hw.flags, and have the NMI handler rely on that cached flag
instead of making the call directly.
Fixes: 50a53b60e141d ("perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace")
Reported-by: Sadasivan Shaiju <sadasivan.shaiju2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216042216.1440-5-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
if (ret)
return ret;
+ if (perf_allow_kernel())
+ hwc->flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_UNPRIVILEGED;
+
if (hwc->sample_period) {
if (config & perf_ibs->cnt_mask)
/* raw max_cnt may not be set */
* unprivileged users.
*/
if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
- perf_allow_kernel()) {
+ (hwc->flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_UNPRIVILEGED)) {
perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(perf_ibs, &ibs_data);
}
PERF_ARCH(NEEDS_BRANCH_STACK, 0x0040000) /* require branch stack setup */
PERF_ARCH(BRANCH_COUNTERS, 0x0080000) /* logs the counters in the extra space of each branch */
PERF_ARCH(ACR, 0x0100000) /* Auto counter reload */
+PERF_ARCH(UNPRIVILEGED, 0x0200000) /* Unprivileged event (wrt perf_allow_kernel()) */