]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tue, 8 Jun 2021 17:12:21 +0000 (10:12 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 16 Jun 2021 09:34:51 +0000 (11:34 +0200)
commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.

Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)

Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/proc/base.c

index 2166f24af37e4012b7bb5c5f070e0a2d008f0836..d2428d20d5a9db0200eac0069904d42d73eb28be 100644 (file)
@@ -2384,6 +2384,11 @@ out:
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+       return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
+}
+
 static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
                                  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -2414,7 +2419,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
        struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
 
        /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
-       if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
+       if (file->private_data != current->mm)
                return -EPERM;
 
        length = -ESRCH;
@@ -2455,9 +2460,11 @@ out_no_task:
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {
+       .open           = proc_pid_attr_open,
        .read           = proc_pid_attr_read,
        .write          = proc_pid_attr_write,
        .llseek         = generic_file_llseek,
+       .release        = mem_release,
 };
 
 static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {