<a href="../ko/misc/security_tips.html" hreflang="ko" rel="alternate" title="Korean"> ko </a></p>
</div>
- <p>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server.
+ <p>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server.
Some of the suggestions will be general, others specific to Apache.</p>
</div>
<div id="quickview"><ul id="toc"><li><img alt="" src="../images/down.gif" /> <a href="#uptodate">Keep up to Date</a></li>
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="serverroot" id="serverroot">Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</a></h2>
-
-
-
- <p>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root user, and it
- switches to the user defined by the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mpm_common.html#user">User</a></code> directive to serve hits. As is the
- case with any command that root executes, you must take care that it is
- protected from modification by non-root users. Not only must the files
- themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the directories, and
- parents of all directories. For example, if you choose to place
- ServerRoot in /usr/local/apache then it is suggested that you create
- that directory as root, with commands like these:</p>
+
+
+ <p>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root user, and it
+ switches to the user defined by the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mpm_common.html#user">User</a></code> directive to serve hits. As is the
+ case with any command that root executes, you must take care that it is
+ protected from modification by non-root users. Not only must the files
+ themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the directories, and
+ parents of all directories. For example, if you choose to place
+ ServerRoot in <code>/usr/local/apache</code> then it is suggested that
+ you create that directory as root, with commands like these:</p>
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
mkdir /usr/local/apache <br />
cd /usr/local/apache <br />
chgrp 0 . bin conf logs <br />
chmod 755 . bin conf logs
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>It is assumed that /, /usr, and /usr/local are only modifiable by
- root. When you install the <code class="program"><a href="../programs/httpd.html">httpd</a></code> executable, you
- should ensure that it is similarly protected:</p>
-
+
+ <p>It is assumed that <code>/</code>, <code>/usr</code>, and
+ <code>/usr/local</code> are only modifiable by root. When you install the
+ <code class="program"><a href="../programs/httpd.html">httpd</a></code> executable, you should ensure that it is
+ similarly protected:</p>
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
cp httpd /usr/local/apache/bin <br />
chown 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd <br />
chgrp 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd <br />
chmod 511 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other
- users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't
+
+ <p>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other
+ users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't
be creating files in there.</p>
-
- <p>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either
- executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises.
+
+ <p>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either
+ executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises.
For example, someone could replace the <code class="program"><a href="../programs/httpd.html">httpd</a></code> binary so
that the next time you start it, it will execute some arbitrary code. If
the logs directory is writeable (by a non-root user), someone could replace
- a log file with a symlink to some other system file, and then root
- might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the log files
- themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone may be
+ a log file with a symlink to some other system file, and then root
+ might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the log files
+ themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone may be
able to overwrite the log itself with bogus data.</p>
-
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="ssi" id="ssi">Server Side Includes</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>Server Side Includes (SSI) present a server administrator with
+
+ <p>Server Side Includes (SSI) present a server administrator with
several potential security risks.</p>
-
- <p>The first risk is the increased load on the server. All
- SSI-enabled files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not
- there are any SSI directives included within the files. While this
- load increase is minor, in a shared server environment it can become
+
+ <p>The first risk is the increased load on the server. All
+ SSI-enabled files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not
+ there are any SSI directives included within the files. While this
+ load increase is minor, in a shared server environment it can become
significant.</p>
-
- <p>SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI
- scripts in general. Using the "exec cmd" element, SSI-enabled files
- can execute any CGI script or program under the permissions of the
- user and group Apache runs as, as configured in httpd.conf.</p>
-
- <p>There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files while still
+
+ <p>SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI
+ scripts in general. Using the <code>exec cmd</code> element, SSI-enabled
+ files can execute any CGI script or program under the permissions of the
+ user and group Apache runs as, as configured in <code>httpd.conf</code>.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files while still
taking advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
-
- <p>To isolate the damage a wayward SSI file can cause, a server
- administrator can enable <a href="../suexec.html">suexec</a> as
+
+ <p>To isolate the damage a wayward SSI file can cause, a server
+ administrator can enable <a href="../suexec.html">suexec</a> as
described in the <a href="#cgi">CGI in General</a> section.</p>
-
- <p>Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm extensions can be
- dangerous. This is especially true in a shared, or high traffic,
- server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate extension,
- such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep server load at a
- minimum and allows for easier management of risk.</p>
-
- <p>Another solution is to disable the ability to run scripts and
+
+ <p>Enabling SSI for files with <code>.html</code> or <code>.htm</code>
+ extensions can be dangerous. This is especially true in a shared, or high
+ traffic, server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate
+ extension, such as the conventional <code>.shtml.</code> This helps keep
+ server load at a minimum and allows for easier management of risk.</p>
+
+ <p>Another solution is to disable the ability to run scripts and
programs from SSI pages. To do this replace <code>Includes</code>
- with <code>IncludesNOEXEC</code> in the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a></code> directive. Note that users may
- still use <--#include virtual="..." --> to execute CGI scripts if
- these scripts are in directories designated by a <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_alias.html#scriptalias">ScriptAlias</a></code> directive.</p>
-
+ with <code>IncludesNOEXEC</code> in the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a></code> directive. Note that users may
+ still use <code><--#include virtual="..." --></code> to execute CGI
+
scripts if these scripts are in directories designated by a <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_alias.html#scriptalias">ScriptAlias</a></code> directive.</p>
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="cgi" id="cgi">CGI in General</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>First of all, you always have to remember that you must trust the
- writers of the CGI scripts/programs or your ability to spot potential
- security holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental. CGI
- scripts can run essentially arbitrary commands on your system with the
- permissions of the web server user and can therefore be extremely
+
+ <p>First of all, you always have to remember that you must trust the
+ writers of the CGI scripts/programs or your ability to spot potential
+ security holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental. CGI
+ scripts can run essentially arbitrary commands on your system with the
+ permissions of the web server user and can therefore be extremely
dangerous if they are not carefully checked.</p>
-
- <p>All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential
- to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts e.g. User
- A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI database. One
+
+ <p>All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential
+ to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts e.g. User
+ A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI database. One
program which can be used to allow scripts to run as different users is
- <a href="../suexec.html">suEXEC</a> which is included with Apache as of
- 1.2 and is called from special hooks in the Apache server code. Another
- popular way of doing this is with
+ <a href="../suexec.html">suEXEC</a> which is included with Apache as of
+ 1.2 and is called from special hooks in the Apache server code. Another
+ popular way of doing this is with
<a href="http://cgiwrap.unixtools.org/">CGIWrap</a>.</p>
-
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="nsaliasedcgi" id="nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased CGI</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>Allowing users to execute CGI scripts in any directory should only be
+
+ <p>Allowing users to execute CGI scripts in any directory should only be
considered if:</p>
-
+
<ul>
- <li>You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately
+ <li>You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately
or accidentally expose your system to an attack.</li>
- <li>You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas,
+ <li>You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas,
as to make one more potential hole irrelevant.</li>
<li>You have no users, and nobody ever visits your server.</li>
</ul>
-
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="saliasedcgi" id="saliasedcgi">Script Aliased CGI</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>Limiting CGI to special directories gives the admin control over what
- goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than non
- script aliased CGI, but only if users with write access to the
- directories are trusted or the admin is willing to test each
+
+ <p>Limiting CGI to special directories gives the admin control over what
+ goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than non
+ script aliased CGI, but only if users with write access to the
+ directories are trusted or the admin is willing to test each
new CGI script/program for potential security holes.</p>
-
- <p>Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI
+
+ <p>Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI
approach.</p>
-
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="dynamic" id="dynamic">Other sources of dynamic content</a></h2>
<p>
Embedded scripting options which run as part of the server itself,
- such as mod_php, mod_perl, mod_tcl, and mod_python, run under the
- identity of the server itself (see the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mpm_common.html#user">User</a></code> directive), and therefore
- scripts executed by these engines potentially can access anything the
- server user can. Some scripting engines may provide restrictions, but
+ such as <code>mod_php</code>, <code>mod_perl</code>, <code>mod_tcl</code>,
+ and <code>mod_python</code>, run under the identity of the server itself
+ (see the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mpm_common.html#user">User</a></code> directive), and
+ therefore scripts executed by these engines potentially can access anything
+ the server user can. Some scripting engines may provide restrictions, but
it is better to be safe and assume not.</p>
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="systemsettings" id="systemsettings">Protecting System Settings</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting
- up <code>.htaccess</code> files which can override security features
+
+ <p>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting
+ up <code>.htaccess</code> files which can override security features
you've configured. Here's one way to do it.</p>
-
+
<p>In the server configuration file, put</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
<Directory /> <br />
AllowOverride None <br />
</Directory>
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>This prevents the use of <code>.htaccess</code> files in all
+
+ <p>This prevents the use of <code>.htaccess</code> files in all
directories apart from those specifically enabled.</p>
-
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="protectserverfiles" id="protectserverfiles">Protect Server Files by Default</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the
- feature of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it,
- if the server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping
+
+ <p>One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the
+ feature of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it,
+ if the server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping
rules, it can serve it to clients.</p>
-
+
<p>For instance, consider the following example:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
# cd /; ln -s / public_html <br />
Accessing <code>http://localhost/~root/</code>
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To
- work around this, add the following block to your server's
+
+ <p>This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To
+ work around this, add the following block to your server's
configuration:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
<Directory /> <br />
Order Deny,Allow <br />
Deny from all <br />
</Directory>
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add
- appropriate <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#directory">Directory</a></code> blocks to
+
+ <p>This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add
+ appropriate <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#directory">Directory</a></code> blocks to
allow access only in those areas you wish. For example,</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
<Directory /usr/users/*/public_html> <br />
Order Deny,Allow <br />
Allow from all <br />
</Directory>
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>Pay particular attention to the interactions of <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#location">Location</a></code> and <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#directory">Directory</a></code> directives; for instance, even
+
+ <p>Pay particular attention to the interactions of <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#location">Location</a></code> and <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#directory">Directory</a></code> directives; for instance, even
if <code><Directory /></code> denies access, a <code>
<Location /></code> directive might overturn it.</p>
-
- <p>Also be wary of playing games with the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_userdir.html#userdir">UserDir</a></code> directive; setting it to
- something like "./" would have the same effect, for root, as the first
- example above. If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly
- recommend that you include the following line in your server
+
+ <p>Also be wary of playing games with the <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_userdir.html#userdir">UserDir</a></code> directive; setting it to
+ something like <code>./</code> would have the same effect, for root, as
+ the first example above. If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly
+ recommend that you include the following line in your server
configuration files:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
UserDir disabled root
</code></p></div>
-
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="watchyourlogs" id="watchyourlogs">Watching Your Logs</a></h2>
-
-
+
- <p>To keep up-to-date with what is actually going on against your server
- you have to check the <a href="../logs.html">Log Files</a>. Even though
- the log files only reports what has already happened, they will give you
- some understanding of what attacks is thrown against the server and
+
+ <p>To keep up-to-date with what is actually going on against your server
+ you have to check the <a href="../logs.html">Log Files</a>. Even though
+ the log files only reports what has already happened, they will give you
+ some understanding of what attacks is thrown against the server and
allow you to check if the necessary level of security is present.</p>
-
+
<p>A couple of examples:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
grep -c "/jsp/source.jsp?/jsp/ /jsp/source.jsp??" access_log <br />
grep "client denied" error_log | tail -n 10
</code></p></div>
-
+
<p>The first example will list the number of attacks trying to exploit the
- <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/4876/info/">Apache Tomcat
- Source.JSP Malformed Request Information Disclosure Vulnerability</a>,
+ <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/4876/info/">Apache Tomcat
+ Source.JSP Malformed Request Information Disclosure Vulnerability</a>,
the second example will list the ten last denied clients, for example:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
- [Thu Jul 11 17:18:39 2002] [error] [client foo.example.com] client denied
+ [Thu Jul 11 17:18:39 2002] [error] [client foo.example.com] client denied
by server configuration: /usr/local/apache/htdocs/.htpasswd
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>As you can see, the log files only report what already has happened, so
- if the client had been able to access the <code>.htpasswd</code> file you
+
+ <p>As you can see, the log files only report what already has happened, so
+ if the client had been able to access the <code>.htpasswd</code> file you
would have seen something similar to:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
foo.example.com - - [12/Jul/2002:01:59:13 +0200] "GET /.htpasswd HTTP/1.1"
</code></p></div>
-
- <p>in your <a href="../logs.html#accesslog">Access Log</a>. This means
- you probably commented out the following in your server configuration
+
+ <p>in your <a href="../logs.html#accesslog">Access Log</a>. This means
+ you probably commented out the following in your server configuration
file:</p>
-
+
<div class="example"><p><code>
<Files ~ "^\.ht"> <br />
Order allow,deny <br />
Deny from all <br />
</Files>
</code></p></div>
-
+
</div></div>
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