rpki_validator_SOURCES = main.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += address.h address.c
+rpki_validator_SOURCES += algorithm.h algorithm.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += array_list.h
rpki_validator_SOURCES += certificate_refs.h certificate_refs.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += common.h common.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += config.h config.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += debug.h debug.c
+rpki_validator_SOURCES += extension.h extension.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += file.h file.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += line_file.h line_file.c
rpki_validator_SOURCES += log.h log.c
--- /dev/null
+#include "algorithm.h"
+
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+
+int
+rpki_signature_algorithm(void)
+{
+ return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption;
+}
+
+int
+rpki_public_key_algorithm(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO Everyone uses this algorithm, but at a quick glance, it doesn't
+ * seem to match RFC 7935's public key algorithm. Wtf?
+ */
+ return NID_rsaEncryption;
+}
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef SRC_ALGORITHM_H_
+#define SRC_ALGORITHM_H_
+
+/**
+ * This file is an implementation of RFC 7935 (previously 6485) and its update,
+ * 8208.
+ *
+ * It's just a bunch of functions that return the NIDs of the algorithms RPKI
+ * validations are supposed to employ.
+ */
+
+int rpki_signature_algorithm(void);
+int rpki_public_key_algorithm(void);
+
+#endif /* SRC_ALGORITHM_H_ */
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "log.h"
+#include "thread_var.h"
int NID_rpkiManifest;
int NID_signedObject;
int NID_certPolicyRpki;
int NID_certPolicyRpkiV2;
+/**
+ * Does not assume that @string is NULL-terminated.
+ */
int
string_clone(void const *string, size_t size, char **clone)
{
? pr_err("CRL URI IA5String has unused bits.")
: string_clone(ia5->data, ia5->length, result);
}
+
+/**
+ * Only prints error message if the result is not 0 nor -ESRCH.
+ */
+int
+x509_name_decode(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char **_result)
+{
+ char *result;
+ int len1, len2;
+
+ len1 = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(name, nid, NULL, 0);
+ if (len1 < 0)
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ if (_result == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ result = calloc(len1 + 1, sizeof(char));
+ if (result == NULL)
+ return pr_enomem();
+
+ len2 = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(name, nid, result, len1 + 1);
+ if (len1 != len2) {
+ free(result);
+ return pr_err("Likely programming error: X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() returned inconsistent lengths: %d,%d",
+ len1, len2);
+ }
+
+ *_result = result;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct rfc5280_names {
+ char *commonName;
+ char *serialNumber;
+};
+
+static int
+get_names(X509_NAME *name, char *what, struct rfc5280_names *result)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ error = x509_name_decode(name, NID_commonName, &result->commonName);
+ if (error == -ESRCH)
+ return pr_err("The '%s' name lacks a commonName attribute.");
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ error = x509_name_decode(name, NID_serialNumber, &result->serialNumber);
+ if (error == -ESRCH) {
+ result->serialNumber = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (error) {
+ free(result->commonName);
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Also checks NULL.
+ *
+ * Does assume that @str1 and @str2 are NULL-terminated.
+ */
+static bool str_equals(char const *str1, char const *str2)
+{
+ if (str1 == str2)
+ return true;
+ if (str1 == NULL || str2 == NULL)
+ return false;
+ return strcmp(str1, str2) == 0;
+}
+
+int
+validate_issuer_name(char const *container, X509_NAME *issuer)
+{
+ struct validation *state;
+ X509 *parent;
+ struct rfc5280_names parent_subject = { 0 };
+ struct rfc5280_names child_issuer = { 0 };
+ int error;
+
+ /*
+ * Not sure whether "the CRL issuer is the CA" means that the issuer
+ * name should equal the parent's subject name or not, because that's
+ * very much not what rfc6487#section-4.4 is asking us to check.
+ * But let's check it anyway.
+ */
+
+ state = state_retrieve();
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ parent = validation_peek_cert(state);
+ if (parent == NULL) {
+ return pr_err("%s appears to have no parent certificate.",
+ container);
+ }
+
+ error = get_names(X509_get_subject_name(parent), "subject",
+ &parent_subject);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = get_names(issuer, "issuer", &child_issuer);
+ if (error)
+ goto end2;
+
+ if (strcmp(parent_subject.commonName, child_issuer.commonName) != 0) {
+ error = pr_err("%s's issuer commonName ('%s') does not equal issuer certificate's commonName ('%s').",
+ container, parent_subject.commonName,
+ child_issuer.commonName);
+ goto end1;
+ }
+
+ if (!str_equals(parent_subject.serialNumber,
+ child_issuer.serialNumber)) {
+ error = pr_err("%s's issuer serialNumber ('%s') does not equal issuer certificate's serialNumber ('%s').",
+ container, parent_subject.serialNumber,
+ child_issuer.serialNumber);
+ goto end1;
+ }
+
+end1:
+ free(child_issuer.commonName);
+ free(child_issuer.serialNumber);
+end2:
+ free(parent_subject.commonName);
+ free(parent_subject.serialNumber);
+ return error;
+}
int string_clone(void const *, size_t, char **);
int ia5s2string(ASN1_IA5STRING *, char **);
+int x509_name_decode(X509_NAME *, int, char **);
+int validate_issuer_name(char const *, X509_NAME *);
+
#endif /* SRC_RTR_COMMON_H_ */
--- /dev/null
+#include "extension.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "log.h"
+#include "thread_var.h"
+#include "crypto/hash.h"
+
+const struct extension_metadata BC = {
+ "Basic Constraints",
+ NID_basic_constraints,
+ true,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata SKI = {
+ "Subject Key Identifier",
+ NID_subject_key_identifier,
+ false,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata AKI = {
+ "Authority Key Identifier",
+ NID_authority_key_identifier,
+ false,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata KU = {
+ "Key Usage",
+ NID_key_usage,
+ true,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata CDP = {
+ "CRL Distribution Points",
+ NID_crl_distribution_points,
+ false,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata AIA = {
+ "Authority Information Access",
+ NID_info_access,
+ false,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata SIA = {
+ "Subject Information Access",
+ NID_sinfo_access ,
+ false,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata CP = {
+ "Certificate Policies",
+ NID_certificate_policies,
+ true,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata IR = {
+ "IP Resources",
+ NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock,
+ true,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata AR = {
+ "AS Resources",
+ NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
+ true,
+};
+const struct extension_metadata CN = {
+ "CRL Number",
+ NID_crl_number,
+ false,
+};
+
+static int
+handle_extension(struct extension_handler *handlers, X509_EXTENSION *ext)
+{
+ struct extension_handler *handler;
+ int nid;
+
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext));
+
+ for (handler = handlers; handler->meta != NULL; handler++) {
+ if (handler->meta->nid == nid) {
+ if (handler->found)
+ goto dupe;
+ handler->found = true;
+
+ if (handler->meta->critical) {
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+ goto not_critical;
+ } else {
+ if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+ goto critical;
+ }
+
+ return handler->cb(ext, handler->arg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+ return 0; /* Unknown and not critical; ignore it. */
+
+ return pr_err("Certificate has unknown extension. (Extension NID: %d)",
+ nid);
+dupe:
+ return pr_err("Certificate has more than one '%s' extension.",
+ handler->meta->name);
+not_critical:
+ return pr_err("Extension '%s' is supposed to be marked critical.",
+ handler->meta->name);
+critical:
+ return pr_err("Extension '%s' is not supposed to be marked critical.",
+ handler->meta->name);
+}
+
+int
+handle_extensions(struct extension_handler *handlers,
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) const *extensions)
+{
+ struct extension_handler *handler;
+ int e;
+ int error;
+
+ /* TODO check that no other extensions are present? */
+
+ for (e = 0; e < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(extensions); e++) {
+ error = handle_extension(handlers,
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(extensions, e));
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ for (handler = handlers; handler->meta != NULL; handler++) {
+ if (handler->mandatory && !handler->found)
+ return pr_err("Certificate is missing the '%s' extension.",
+ handler->meta->name);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+cannot_decode(struct extension_metadata const *meta)
+{
+ return pr_err("Extension '%s' seems to be malformed. Cannot decode.",
+ meta->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns 0 if the identifier (ie. SHA-1 hash) of @cert's public key is @hash.
+ * Otherwise returns error code.
+ */
+int
+validate_public_key_hash(X509 *cert, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hash)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey;
+ const unsigned char *spk;
+ int spk_len;
+ int ok;
+ int error;
+
+ /*
+ * I really can't tell if this validation needs to be performed.
+ * Probably not.
+ *
+ * "Applications are not required to verify that key identifiers match
+ * when performing certification path validation."
+ * (rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2)
+ *
+ * From its context, my reading is that the quote refers to the
+ * "parent's SKI must equal the children's AKI" requirement, not the
+ * "child's SKI must equal the SHA-1 of its own's SPK" requirement. So
+ * I think that we're only supposed to check the SHA-1. Or nothing at
+ * all, because we only care about the keys, not their identifiers.
+ *
+ * But the two requirements actually have a lot in common:
+ *
+ * The quote is from 5280, not 6487. 6487 chooses to enforce the SKI's
+ * "SHA-1 as identifier" option, even for the AKI. And if I'm validating
+ * the AKI's SHA-1, then I'm also indirectly checking the children vs
+ * parent relationship.
+ *
+ * Also, what's with using a hash as identifier? That's an accident
+ * waiting to happen...
+ *
+ * Bottom line, I don't know. But better be safe than sorry, so here's
+ * the validation.
+ *
+ * Shit. I feel like I'm losing so much performance because the RFCs
+ * are so wishy-washy about what is our realm and what is not.
+ */
+
+ /* Get the SPK (ask libcrypto) */
+ pubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert);
+ if (pubkey == NULL)
+ return crypto_err("X509_get_X509_PUBKEY() returned NULL");
+
+ ok = X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &spk, &spk_len, NULL, pubkey);
+ if (!ok)
+ return crypto_err("X509_PUBKEY_get0_param() returned %d", ok);
+
+ /* Hash the SPK, compare SPK hash with the SKI */
+ if (hash->length < 0 || SIZE_MAX < hash->length) {
+ return pr_err("%s length (%d) is out of bounds. (0-%zu)",
+ SKI.name, hash->length, SIZE_MAX);
+ }
+ if (spk_len < 0 || SIZE_MAX < spk_len) {
+ return pr_err("Subject Public Key length (%d) is out of bounds. (0-%zu)",
+ spk_len, SIZE_MAX);
+ }
+
+ error = hash_validate("sha1", hash->data, hash->length, spk, spk_len);
+ if (error) {
+ pr_err("The Subject Public Key's hash does not match the %s.",
+ SKI.name);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int
+handle_aki(X509_EXTENSION *ext, void *arg)
+{
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID *aki;
+ struct validation *state;
+ X509 *parent;
+ int error;
+
+ aki = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext);
+ if (aki == NULL)
+ return cannot_decode(&AKI);
+
+ if (aki->issuer != NULL) {
+ error = pr_err("%s extension contains an authorityCertIssuer.",
+ AKI.name);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (aki->serial != NULL) {
+ error = pr_err("%s extension contains an authorityCertSerialNumber.",
+ AKI.name);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ state = state_retrieve();
+ if (state == NULL) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ parent = validation_peek_cert(state);
+ if (parent == NULL) {
+ error = pr_err("Certificate has no parent.");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ error = validate_public_key_hash(parent, aki->keyid);
+
+end:
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(aki);
+ return error;
+}
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef SRC_EXTENSION_H_
+#define SRC_EXTENSION_H_
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+struct extension_metadata {
+ char *name;
+ int nid;
+ bool critical;
+};
+
+struct extension_handler {
+ struct extension_metadata const *meta;
+ bool mandatory;
+ int (*cb)(X509_EXTENSION *, void *);
+ void *arg;
+
+ void (*free)(void *);
+
+ /* For internal use */
+ bool found;
+};
+
+extern const struct extension_metadata BC;
+extern const struct extension_metadata SKI;
+extern const struct extension_metadata AKI;
+extern const struct extension_metadata KU;
+extern const struct extension_metadata CDP;
+extern const struct extension_metadata AIA;
+extern const struct extension_metadata SIA;
+extern const struct extension_metadata CP;
+extern const struct extension_metadata IR;
+extern const struct extension_metadata AR;
+extern const struct extension_metadata CN;
+
+int handle_extensions(struct extension_handler *,
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) const *);
+
+int cannot_decode(struct extension_metadata const *);
+int validate_public_key_hash(X509 *, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *);
+int handle_aki(X509_EXTENSION *, void *);
+
+#endif /* SRC_EXTENSION_H_ */
if (config_get_shuffle_uris())
tal_shuffle_uris(tal);
error = foreach_uri(tal, handle_tal_uri);
+ /* TODO error on no uris were valid. */
error = (error >= 0) ? 0 : error;
tal_destroy(tal);
}
#include <libcmscodec/SubjectPublicKeyInfo.h>
#include <libcmscodec/IPAddrBlocks.h>
+#include "algorithm.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "config.h"
+#include "extension.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "manifest.h"
#include "thread_var.h"
*/
typedef AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS SIGNATURE_INFO_ACCESS;
-struct extension_metadata {
- char *name;
- int nid;
- bool critical;
-};
-
-static const struct extension_metadata BC = {
- "Basic Constraints",
- NID_basic_constraints,
- true,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata SKI = {
- "Subject Key Identifier",
- NID_subject_key_identifier,
- false,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata AKI = {
- "Authority Key Identifier",
- NID_authority_key_identifier,
- false,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata KU = {
- "Key Usage",
- NID_key_usage,
- true,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata CDP = {
- "CRL Distribution Points",
- NID_crl_distribution_points,
- false,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata AIA = {
- "Authority Information Access",
- NID_info_access,
- false,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata SIA = {
- "Subject Information Access",
- NID_sinfo_access ,
- false,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata CP = {
- "Certificate Policies",
- NID_certificate_policies,
- true,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata IR = {
- "IP Resources",
- NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock,
- true,
-};
-static const struct extension_metadata AR = {
- "AS Resources",
- NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
- true,
-};
-
-struct extension_handler {
- struct extension_metadata const *meta;
- bool mandatory;
- int (*cb)(X509_EXTENSION *, void *);
- void *arg;
-
- void (*free)(void *);
-
- /* For internal use */
- bool found;
-};
-
struct ski_arguments {
X509 *cert;
OCTET_STRING_t *sid;
int nid;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(cert)->algorithm);
- if (nid != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption)
+ if (nid != rpki_signature_algorithm())
return pr_err("Certificate's Signature Algorithm is not RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.");
return 0;
}
static int
-validate_name(X509_NAME *name, char *what)
+validate_issuer(X509 *cert, bool is_ta)
{
-#ifdef DEBUG
- char *str;
-#endif
- int str_len;
-
- str_len = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, NULL, 0);
- if (str_len < 0) {
- pr_err("Certificate's %s lacks the CommonName atribute.", what);
- return -ESRCH;
- }
+ X509_NAME *issuer;
+ int error;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- str = calloc(str_len + 1, sizeof(char));
- if (str == NULL) {
- pr_err("Out of memory.");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
- X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, str, str_len + 1);
+ if (!is_ta)
+ return validate_issuer_name("Certificate", issuer);
- pr_debug("%s: %s", what, str);
- free(str);
-#endif
+ error = x509_name_decode(issuer, NID_commonName, NULL);
+ if (error == -ESRCH)
+ pr_err("The 'issuer' name lacks a commonName attribute.");
- return 0;
+ return error;
}
static int
-validate_subject(X509_NAME *name, char *what)
+validate_subject(X509 *cert)
{
struct validation *state;
char *subject;
- int error, sub_len;
-
- error = validate_name(name, what);
- if (error)
- return error;
+ int error;
state = state_retrieve();
if (state == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- sub_len = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, NULL, 0);
- subject = calloc(sub_len + 1, sizeof(char));
- if (subject == NULL) {
- pr_err("Out of memory.");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, subject, sub_len + 1);
+ error = x509_name_decode(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NID_commonName,
+ &subject);
+ if (error == -ESRCH)
+ pr_err("Certificate's subject lacks the CommonName atribute.");
+ if (error)
+ return error;
error = validation_store_subject(state, subject);
- if (error)
- free(subject);
+ free(subject);
return error;
}
return crypto_err("X509_PUBKEY_get0_param() returned %d", ok);
alg_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg);
- /*
- * TODO Everyone uses this algorithm, but at a quick glance, it doesn't
- * seem to match RFC 7935's public key algorithm. Wtf?
- */
- if (alg_nid != NID_rsaEncryption) {
+ if (alg_nid != rpki_public_key_algorithm()) {
return pr_err("Certificate's public key format is %d, not RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256.",
alg_nid);
}
return error;
/* rfc6487#section-4.4 */
- error = validate_name(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), "issuer");
+ error = validate_issuer(cert, is_root);
if (error)
return error;
* "An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject's
* key pair has changed" (it's a SHOULD, so [for now] avoid validation)
*/
- error = validate_subject(X509_get_subject_name(cert), "subject");
+ error = validate_subject(cert);
if (error)
return error;
return 0;
}
-static int
-cannot_decode(struct extension_metadata const *meta)
-{
- return pr_err("Extension '%s' seems to be malformed. Cannot decode.",
- meta->name);
-}
-
static bool
is_rsync(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri)
{
return error;
}
-/**
- * Returns 0 if the identifier (ie. SHA-1 hash) of @cert's public key is @hash.
- * Otherwise returns error code.
- */
-static int
-validate_public_key_hash(X509 *cert, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hash)
-{
- X509_PUBKEY *pubkey;
- const unsigned char *spk;
- int spk_len;
- int ok;
- int error;
-
- /*
- * I really can't tell if this validation needs to be performed.
- * Probably not.
- *
- * "Applications are not required to verify that key identifiers match
- * when performing certification path validation."
- * (rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2)
- *
- * From its context, my reading is that the quote refers to the
- * "parent's SKI must equal the children's AKI" requirement, not the
- * "child's SKI must equal the SHA-1 of its own's SPK" requirement. So
- * I think that we're only supposed to check the SHA-1. Or nothing at
- * all, because we only care about the keys, not their identifiers.
- *
- * But the two requirements actually have a lot in common:
- *
- * The quote is from 5280, not 6487. 6487 chooses to enforce the SKI's
- * "SHA-1 as identifier" option, even for the AKI. And if I'm validating
- * the AKI's SHA-1, then I'm also indirectly checking the children vs
- * parent relationship.
- *
- * Also, what's with using a hash as identifier? That's an accident
- * waiting to happen...
- *
- * Bottom line, I don't know. But better be safe than sorry, so here's
- * the validation.
- *
- * Shit. I feel like I'm losing so much performance because the RFCs
- * are so wishy-washy about what is our realm and what is not.
- */
-
- /* Get the SPK (ask libcrypto) */
- pubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert);
- if (pubkey == NULL)
- return crypto_err("X509_get_X509_PUBKEY() returned NULL");
-
- ok = X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &spk, &spk_len, NULL, pubkey);
- if (!ok)
- return crypto_err("X509_PUBKEY_get0_param() returned %d", ok);
-
- /* Hash the SPK, compare SPK hash with the SKI */
- if (hash->length < 0 || SIZE_MAX < hash->length) {
- return pr_err("%s length (%d) is out of bounds. (0-%zu)",
- SKI.name, hash->length, SIZE_MAX);
- }
- if (spk_len < 0 || SIZE_MAX < spk_len) {
- return pr_err("Subject Public Key length (%d) is out of bounds. (0-%zu)",
- spk_len, SIZE_MAX);
- }
-
- error = hash_validate("sha1", hash->data, hash->length, spk, spk_len);
- if (error) {
- pr_err("The Subject Public Key's hash does not match the %s.",
- SKI.name);
- }
-
- return error;
-}
-
static int
handle_ski_ca(X509_EXTENSION *ext, void *arg)
{
return -ESRCH;
}
-static int
-handle_aki(X509_EXTENSION *ext, void *arg)
-{
- AUTHORITY_KEYID *aki;
- struct validation *state;
- X509 *parent;
- int error;
-
- aki = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext);
- if (aki == NULL)
- return cannot_decode(&AKI);
-
- if (aki->issuer != NULL) {
- error = pr_err("%s extension contains an authorityCertIssuer.",
- AKI.name);
- goto end;
- }
- if (aki->serial != NULL) {
- error = pr_err("%s extension contains an authorityCertSerialNumber.",
- AKI.name);
- goto end;
- }
-
- state = state_retrieve();
- if (state == NULL) {
- error = -EINVAL;
- goto end;
- }
-
- parent = validation_peek_cert(state);
- if (parent == NULL) {
- error = pr_err("Certificate has no parent.");
- goto end;
- }
-
- error = validate_public_key_hash(parent, aki->keyid);
-
-end:
- AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(aki);
- return error;
-}
-
static int
handle_ku(X509_EXTENSION *ext, unsigned char byte1)
{
return 0; /* Handled in certificate_get_resources(). */
}
-static int
-handle_extension(struct extension_handler *handlers, X509_EXTENSION *ext)
-{
- struct extension_handler *handler;
- int nid;
-
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext));
-
- for (handler = handlers; handler->meta != NULL; handler++) {
- if (handler->meta->nid == nid) {
- if (handler->found)
- goto dupe;
- handler->found = true;
-
- if (handler->meta->critical) {
- if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
- goto not_critical;
- } else {
- if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
- goto critical;
- }
-
- return handler->cb(ext, handler->arg);
- }
- }
-
- if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
- return 0; /* Unknown and not critical; ignore it. */
-
- return pr_err("Certificate has unknown extension. (Extension NID: %d)",
- nid);
-dupe:
- return pr_err("Certificate has more than one '%s' extension.",
- handler->meta->name);
-not_critical:
- return pr_err("Extension '%s' is supposed to be marked critical.",
- handler->meta->name);
-critical:
- return pr_err("Extension '%s' is not supposed to be marked critical.",
- handler->meta->name);
-}
-
-static int
-handle_cert_extensions(struct extension_handler *handlers, X509 *cert)
-{
- struct extension_handler *handler;
- int e;
- int error;
-
- for (e = 0; e < X509_get_ext_count(cert); e++) {
- error = handle_extension(handlers, X509_get_ext(cert, e));
- if (error)
- return error;
- }
-
- for (handler = handlers; handler->meta != NULL; handler++) {
- if (handler->mandatory && !handler->found)
- return pr_err("Certificate is missing the '%s' extension.",
- handler->meta->name);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
int
certificate_validate_extensions_ta(X509 *cert, struct rpki_uri *mft)
{
{ NULL },
};
- return handle_cert_extensions(handlers, cert);
+ return handle_extensions(handlers, X509_get0_extensions(cert));
}
int
{ NULL },
};
- return handle_cert_extensions(handlers, cert);
+ return handle_extensions(handlers, X509_get0_extensions(cert));
}
int
ski_args.cert = cert;
ski_args.sid = sid;
- return handle_cert_extensions(handlers, cert);
+ return handle_extensions(handlers, X509_get0_extensions(cert));
}
/* Boilerplate code for CA certificate validation and recursive traversal. */
#include "crl.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "algorithm.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "extension.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "thread_var.h"
-static void
-print_serials(X509_CRL *crl)
+static int
+__crl_load(struct rpki_uri const *uri, X509_CRL **result)
{
-#ifdef DEBUG
- STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revokeds;
+ X509_CRL *crl;
+ BIO *bio;
+ int error;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ return crypto_err("BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) returned NULL");
+ if (BIO_read_filename(bio, uri->local) <= 0) {
+ error = crypto_err("Error reading CRL '%s'", uri->local);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ crl = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(bio, NULL);
+ if (crl == NULL) {
+ error = crypto_err("Error parsing CRL '%s'", uri->local);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ *result = crl;
+ error = 0;
+
+end:
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int
+validate_revoked(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked_stack;
X509_REVOKED *revoked;
ASN1_INTEGER const *serial_int;
+#ifdef DEBUG
BIGNUM *serial_bn;
+#endif
int i;
- revokeds = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
+ revoked_stack = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
+ if (revoked_stack == NULL)
+ return pr_err("Likely programming error: CRL revoked stack is NULL.");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revokeds); i++) {
- revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revokeds, i);
- if (revoked == NULL) {
- pr_err("??");
- continue;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked_stack); i++) {
+ revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked_stack, i);
serial_int = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked);
if (serial_int == NULL) {
- pr_err("??");
- continue;
+ return pr_err("CRL's revoked entry #%d lacks a serial number.",
+ i + 1);
}
+#ifdef DEBUG
serial_bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial_int, NULL);
if (serial_bn == NULL) {
crypto_err("Could not parse revoked serial number");
BN_print_fp(stdout, serial_bn);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
BN_free(serial_bn);
- }
#endif
+
+ if (X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(revoked) == NULL) {
+ return pr_err("CRL's revoked entry #%d lacks a revocation date.",
+ i + 1);
+ }
+ if (X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(revoked) != NULL) {
+ return pr_err("CRL's revoked entry #%d has extensions.",
+ i + 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
static int
-__crl_load(struct rpki_uri const *uri, X509_CRL **result)
+handle_crlnum(X509_EXTENSION *ext, void *arg)
{
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
- BIO *bio;
+ /*
+ * We're allowing only one CRL per RPP, so there's nothing to do here I
+ * think.
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+validate_extensions(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ struct extension_handler handlers[] = {
+ /* ext reqd handler arg */
+ { &AKI, true, handle_aki, },
+ { &CN, true, handle_crlnum, },
+ { NULL },
+ };
+
+ return handle_extensions(handlers, X509_CRL_get0_extensions(crl));
+}
+
+static int
+crl_validate(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ long version;
int error;
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if (bio == NULL)
- return crypto_err("BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) returned NULL");
- if (BIO_read_filename(bio, uri->local) <= 0) {
- error = crypto_err("Error reading CRL '%s'", uri->local);
- goto end;
+ version = X509_CRL_get_version(crl);
+ if (version != 1) {
+ return pr_err("CRL version (0x%lx) is not 2 (0x%x).",
+ version, 1);
}
- crl = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(bio, NULL);
- if (crl == NULL) {
- error = crypto_err("Error parsing CRL '%s'", uri->local);
- goto end;
- }
+ if (X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(crl) != rpki_signature_algorithm())
+ return pr_err("CRL's signature algorithm is not RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.");
- print_serials(crl);
+ error = validate_issuer_name("CRL", X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+ if (error)
+ return error;
- *result = crl;
- error = 0;
+ error = validate_revoked(crl);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
-end:
- BIO_free(bio);
- return error;
+ return validate_extensions(crl);
}
int
crl_load(struct rpki_uri const *uri, X509_CRL **result)
{
int error;
-
pr_debug_add("CRL %s {", uri->global);
+
error = __crl_load(uri, result);
- pr_debug_rm("}");
+ if (!error)
+ error = crl_validate(*result);
+ pr_debug_rm("}");
return error;
}
projects / thirdparty / FORT-validator.git / commitdiff
