/* This not according to RFC, this is 30 days, but the RFC demands
* MAX(30days, TTL expire time of first DNSKEY set with this key),
* The value may be too small if a very large TTL was used. */
- int exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->add_holddown);
+ time_t exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->add_holddown);
if (exceeded && anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_ADDPEND) {
verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "add-holddown time exceeded "
- "%d seconds ago, and pending-count %d", exceeded,
- anchor->pending_count);
+ "%lld seconds ago, and pending-count %d",
+ (long long)exceeded, anchor->pending_count);
if(anchor->pending_count >= MIN_PENDINGCOUNT) {
set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, c, AUTR_STATE_VALID);
anchor->pending_count = 0;
static void
do_remtime(struct module_env* env, struct autr_ta* anchor, int* c)
{
- int exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->del_holddown);
+ time_t exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->del_holddown);
if(exceeded && anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_REVOKED) {
verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "del-holddown time exceeded "
- "%d seconds ago", exceeded);
+ "%lld seconds ago", (long long)exceeded);
set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, c, AUTR_STATE_REMOVED);
}
}
int* changed)
{
struct autr_ta* anchor;
- int exceeded;
+ time_t exceeded;
int valid = 0;
/* see if we have anchors that are valid */
for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
* one valid KSK: remove missing trust anchor */
if (exceeded && valid > 0) {
verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "keep-missing time "
- "exceeded %d seconds ago, [%d key(s) VALID]",
- exceeded, valid);
+ "exceeded %lld seconds ago, [%d key(s) VALID]",
+ (long long)exceeded, valid);
set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed,
AUTR_STATE_REMOVED);
}