--- /dev/null
+From 1b6f292cb94d95c9bc22e1efe592daf62c60bc2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasanna Kumar T S M <ptsm@linux.microsoft.com>
+Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2026 06:11:39 -0700
+Subject: EDAC/versalnet: Fix memory leak in remove and probe error paths
+
+From: Prasanna Kumar T S M <ptsm@linux.microsoft.com>
+
+commit 1b6f292cb94d95c9bc22e1efe592daf62c60bc2e upstream.
+
+The mcdi object allocated using kzalloc() in the setup_mcdi() is not freed in
+the remove path or in probe's error handling path leading to a memory leak.
+Fix it by freeing the allocated memory.
+
+Fixes: d5fe2fec6c40d ("EDAC: Add a driver for the AMD Versal NET DDR controller")
+Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar T S M <ptsm@linux.microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260322131139.1684716-1-ptsm@linux.microsoft.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c
++++ b/drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c
+@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static int mc_probe(struct platform_devi
+
+ err_init:
+ cdx_mcdi_finish(priv->mcdi);
++ kfree(priv->mcdi);
+
+ err_unreg:
+ unregister_rpmsg_driver(&amd_rpmsg_driver);
+@@ -938,6 +939,7 @@ static void mc_remove(struct platform_de
+ remove_versalnet(priv);
+ rproc_shutdown(priv->mcdi->r5_rproc);
+ cdx_mcdi_finish(priv->mcdi);
++ kfree(priv->mcdi);
+ }
+
+ static const struct of_device_id amd_edac_match[] = {
--- /dev/null
+From e159f05e12cc1111a3103b99375ddf0dfd0e7d63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jiawen Wu <jiawenwu@trustnetic.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 17:40:41 +0800
+Subject: net: txgbe: fix RTNL assertion warning when remove module
+
+From: Jiawen Wu <jiawenwu@trustnetic.com>
+
+commit e159f05e12cc1111a3103b99375ddf0dfd0e7d63 upstream.
+
+For the copper NIC with external PHY, the driver called
+phylink_connect_phy() during probe and phylink_disconnect_phy() during
+remove. It caused an RTNL assertion warning in phylink_disconnect_phy()
+upon module remove.
+
+To fix this, add rtnl_lock() and rtnl_unlock() around the
+phylink_disconnect_phy() in remove function.
+
+ ------------[ cut here ]------------
+ RTNL: assertion failed at drivers/net/phy/phylink.c (2351)
+ WARNING: drivers/net/phy/phylink.c:2351 at
+phylink_disconnect_phy+0xd8/0xf0 [phylink], CPU#0: rmmod/4464
+ Modules linked in: ...
+ CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4464 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4+
+ Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7E16/X670E GAMING
+PLUS WIFI (MS-7E16), BIOS 1.90 12/31/2024
+ RIP: 0010:phylink_disconnect_phy+0xe4/0xf0 [phylink]
+ Code: 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff e9 3a 38 8f e7
+48 8d 3d 48 87 e2 ff ba 2f 09 00 00 48 c7 c6 c1 22 24 c0 <67> 48 0f b9 3a
+e9 34 ff ff ff 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
+ RSP: 0018:ffffce7288363ac0 EFLAGS: 00010246
+ RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff89654b2a1a00 RCX: 0000000000000000
+ RDX: 000000000000092f RSI: ffffffffc02422c1 RDI: ffffffffc0239020
+ RBP: ffffce7288363ae8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+ R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8964c4022000
+ R13: ffff89654fce3028 R14: ffff89654ebb4000 R15: ffffffffc0226348
+ FS: 0000795e80d93780(0000) GS:ffff896c52857000(0000)
+knlGS:0000000000000000
+ CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+ CR2: 00005b528b592000 CR3: 0000000170d0f000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
+ PKRU: 55555554
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ txgbe_remove_phy+0xbb/0xd0 [txgbe]
+ txgbe_remove+0x4c/0xb0 [txgbe]
+ pci_device_remove+0x41/0xb0
+ device_remove+0x43/0x80
+ device_release_driver_internal+0x206/0x270
+ driver_detach+0x4a/0xa0
+ bus_remove_driver+0x83/0x120
+ driver_unregister+0x2f/0x60
+ pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90
+ txgbe_driver_exit+0x10/0x850 [txgbe]
+ __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x1c3/0x2f0
+ __x64_sys_delete_module+0x12/0x20
+ x64_sys_call+0x20c3/0x2390
+ do_syscall_64+0x11c/0x1500
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? do_syscall_64+0x15a/0x1500
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? do_fault+0x312/0x580
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? __handle_mm_fault+0x9d5/0x1040
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? count_memcg_events+0x101/0x1d0
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? handle_mm_fault+0x1e8/0x2f0
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2f8/0x820
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x600
+ ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
+ ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1c0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+
+Fixes: 02b2a6f91b90 ("net: txgbe: support copper NIC with external PHY")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jiawen Wu <jiawenwu@trustnetic.com>
+Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8B47A5872884147D+20260407094041.4646-1-jiawenwu@trustnetic.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_phy.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_phy.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_phy.c
+@@ -657,7 +657,9 @@ void txgbe_remove_phy(struct txgbe *txgb
+ return;
+ case wx_mac_sp:
+ if (txgbe->wx->media_type == wx_media_copper) {
++ rtnl_lock();
+ phylink_disconnect_phy(txgbe->wx->phylink);
++ rtnl_unlock();
+ phylink_destroy(txgbe->wx->phylink);
+ return;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 24481a7f573305706054c59e275371f8d0fe919f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:14:33 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix conn-level packet handling to unshare RESPONSE packets
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 24481a7f573305706054c59e275371f8d0fe919f upstream.
+
+The security operations that verify the RESPONSE packets decrypt bits of it
+in place - however, the sk_buff may be shared with a packet sniffer, which
+would lead to the sniffer seeing an apparently corrupt packet (actually
+decrypted).
+
+Fix this by handing a copy of the packet off to the specific security
+handler if the packet was cloned.
+
+Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-5-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
+@@ -240,6 +240,33 @@ static void rxrpc_call_is_secure(struct
+ rxrpc_notify_socket(call);
+ }
+
++static int rxrpc_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
++ struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++ int ret;
++
++ if (skb_cloned(skb)) {
++ /* Copy the packet if shared so that we can do in-place
++ * decryption.
++ */
++ struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_NOFS);
++
++ if (nskb) {
++ rxrpc_new_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared);
++ ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, nskb);
++ rxrpc_free_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_response_copy);
++ } else {
++ /* OOM - Drop the packet. */
++ rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem);
++ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ }
++ } else {
++ ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb);
++ }
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * connection-level Rx packet processor
+ */
+@@ -270,7 +297,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rx
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+
+- ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb);
++ ret = rxrpc_verify_response(conn, skb);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3476c8bb960f48e49355d6f93fb7673211e0163f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 21:09:08 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix error handling in rxgk_extract_token()
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 3476c8bb960f48e49355d6f93fb7673211e0163f upstream.
+
+Fix a missing bit of error handling in rxgk_extract_token(): in the event
+that rxgk_decrypt_skb() returns -ENOMEM, it should just return that rather
+than continuing on (for anything else, it generates an abort).
+
+Fixes: 64863f4ca494 ("rxrpc: Fix unhandled errors in rxgk_verify_packet_integrity()")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423200909.3049438-4-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c
+@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_conn
+ if (ret != -ENOMEM)
+ return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, ec, ret,
+ rxgk_abort_resp_tok_dec);
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = conn->security->default_decode_ticket(conn, skb, ticket_offset,
--- /dev/null
+From 34f61a07e0cdefaecd3ec03bb5fb22215643678f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:14:30 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 34f61a07e0cdefaecd3ec03bb5fb22215643678f upstream.
+
+Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all
+circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making
+all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go
+through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all
+the releases skip on a NULL pointer.
+
+Fixes: 57af281e5389 ("rxrpc: Tidy up abort generation infrastructure")
+Fixes: ec832bd06d6f ("rxrpc: Don't retain the server key in the connection")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-2-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
+ struct rxrpc_crypt session_key;
+ struct key *server_key;
+ time64_t expiry;
+- void *ticket;
++ void *ticket = NULL;
+ u32 version, kvno, ticket_len, level;
+ __be32 csum;
+ int ret, i;
+@@ -1162,13 +1162,13 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ response = kzalloc_obj(struct rxkad_response, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!response)
+- goto temporary_error;
++ goto error;
+
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
+ response, sizeof(*response)) < 0) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_short);
+- goto protocol_error;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_short);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ version = ntohl(response->version);
+@@ -1178,62 +1178,62 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
+ trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len);
+
+ if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_version);
+- goto protocol_error;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_version);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len);
+- goto protocol_error;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt);
+- goto protocol_error;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ ticket = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!ticket)
+- goto temporary_error_free_resp;
++ goto error;
+
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(*response),
+ ticket, ticket_len) < 0) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt);
+- goto protocol_error;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, server_key, skb, ticket, ticket_len,
+ &session_key, &expiry);
+ if (ret < 0)
+- goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
++ goto error;
+
+ /* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the
+ * response */
+ ret = rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+- goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
++ goto error;
+
+ if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch ||
+ ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid ||
+ ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ csum = response->encrypted.checksum;
+ response->encrypted.checksum = 0;
+ rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response);
+ if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) {
+@@ -1241,38 +1241,38 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
+ u32 counter = READ_ONCE(conn->channels[i].call_counter);
+
+ if (call_id > INT_MAX) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (call_id < counter) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (call_id > counter) {
+ if (conn->channels[i].call) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+ rxkad_abort_resp_call_state);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ goto error;
+ }
+ conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->rxkad.nonce + 1) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq);
++ goto error;
+ }
+
+ level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level);
+ if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) {
+- rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO,
+- rxkad_abort_resp_level);
+- goto protocol_error_free;
++ ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO,
++ rxkad_abort_resp_level);
++ goto error;
+ }
+ conn->security_level = level;
+
+@@ -1280,31 +1280,12 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
+ * this the connection security can be handled in exactly the same way
+ * as for a client connection */
+ ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno);
+- if (ret < 0)
+- goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
+-
+- kfree(ticket);
+- kfree(response);
+- _leave(" = 0");
+- return 0;
+-
+-protocol_error_free:
+- kfree(ticket);
+-protocol_error:
+- kfree(response);
+- key_put(server_key);
+- return -EPROTO;
+
+-temporary_error_free_ticket:
++error:
+ kfree(ticket);
+-temporary_error_free_resp:
+ kfree(response);
+-temporary_error:
+- /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as
+- * ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we
+- * also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails.
+- */
+ key_put(server_key);
++ _leave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1f2740150f904bfa60e4bad74d65add3ccb5e7f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:14:32 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 1f2740150f904bfa60e4bad74d65add3ccb5e7f8 upstream.
+
+If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in
+rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread())
+will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to
+trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
+
+Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event()
+calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to
+that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the
+call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
+
+And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the
+pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
+
+Fixes: 2d1faf7a0ca3 ("rxrpc: Simplify skbuff accounting in receive path")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 4 ++--
+ net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 -
+ net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 24 ++----------------------
+ net/rxrpc/skbuff.c | 9 ---------
+ 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
++++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
+@@ -161,8 +161,6 @@
+ E_(rxrpc_call_poke_timer_now, "Timer-now")
+
+ #define rxrpc_skb_traces \
+- EM(rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare, "ETN unshare ") \
+- EM(rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare_nomem, "ETN unshar-nm") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_call_rx, "GET call-rx ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_conn_secured, "GET conn-secd") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_conn_work, "GET conn-work") \
+@@ -189,6 +187,7 @@
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_purge, "PUT purge ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_purge_oob, "PUT purge-oob") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_response, "PUT response ") \
++ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_response_copy, "PUT resp-cpy ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_rotate, "PUT rotate ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_unknown, "PUT unknown ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_conn_work, "SEE conn-work") \
+@@ -197,6 +196,7 @@
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_recvmsg_oob, "SEE recvm-oob") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_reject, "SEE reject ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_rotate, "SEE rotate ") \
++ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem, "SEE unshar-nm") \
+ E_(rxrpc_skb_see_version, "SEE version ")
+
+ #define rxrpc_local_traces \
+--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
++++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
+@@ -1486,7 +1486,6 @@ int rxrpc_server_keyring(struct rxrpc_so
+ void rxrpc_kernel_data_consumed(struct rxrpc_call *, struct sk_buff *);
+ void rxrpc_new_skb(struct sk_buff *, enum rxrpc_skb_trace);
+ void rxrpc_see_skb(struct sk_buff *, enum rxrpc_skb_trace);
+-void rxrpc_eaten_skb(struct sk_buff *, enum rxrpc_skb_trace);
+ void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *, enum rxrpc_skb_trace);
+ void rxrpc_free_skb(struct sk_buff *, enum rxrpc_skb_trace);
+ void rxrpc_purge_queue(struct sk_buff_head *);
+--- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
+@@ -332,7 +332,24 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc
+
+ saw_ack |= sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK;
+
+- rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb);
++ if (sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0 &&
++ skb_cloned(skb)) {
++ /* Unshare the packet so that it can be
++ * modified by in-place decryption.
++ */
++ struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
++
++ if (nskb) {
++ rxrpc_new_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared);
++ rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, nskb);
++ rxrpc_free_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx);
++ } else {
++ /* OOM - Drop the packet. */
++ rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem);
++ }
++ } else {
++ rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb);
++ }
+ rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx);
+ did_receive = true;
+ }
+--- a/net/rxrpc/io_thread.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/io_thread.c
+@@ -192,13 +192,12 @@ static bool rxrpc_extract_abort(struct s
+ /*
+ * Process packets received on the local endpoint
+ */
+-static bool rxrpc_input_packet(struct rxrpc_local *local, struct sk_buff **_skb)
++static bool rxrpc_input_packet(struct rxrpc_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct rxrpc_connection *conn;
+ struct sockaddr_rxrpc peer_srx;
+ struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
+ struct rxrpc_peer *peer = NULL;
+- struct sk_buff *skb = *_skb;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
+@@ -244,25 +243,6 @@ static bool rxrpc_input_packet(struct rx
+ return rxrpc_bad_message(skb, rxrpc_badmsg_zero_call);
+ if (sp->hdr.seq == 0)
+ return rxrpc_bad_message(skb, rxrpc_badmsg_zero_seq);
+-
+- /* Unshare the packet so that it can be modified for in-place
+- * decryption.
+- */
+- if (sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0) {
+- skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+- if (!skb) {
+- rxrpc_eaten_skb(*_skb, rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare_nomem);
+- *_skb = NULL;
+- return just_discard;
+- }
+-
+- if (skb != *_skb) {
+- rxrpc_eaten_skb(*_skb, rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare);
+- *_skb = skb;
+- rxrpc_new_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared);
+- sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+- }
+- }
+ break;
+
+ case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE:
+@@ -494,7 +474,7 @@ int rxrpc_io_thread(void *data)
+ switch (skb->mark) {
+ case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_PACKET:
+ skb->priority = 0;
+- if (!rxrpc_input_packet(local, &skb))
++ if (!rxrpc_input_packet(local, skb))
+ rxrpc_reject_packet(local, skb);
+ trace_rxrpc_rx_done(skb->mark, skb->priority);
+ rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_input);
+--- a/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
+@@ -47,15 +47,6 @@ void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Note the dropping of a ref on a socket buffer by the core.
+- */
+-void rxrpc_eaten_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
+-{
+- int n = atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs);
+- trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, 0, n, why);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+ * Note the destruction of a socket buffer.
+ */
+ void rxrpc_free_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
--- /dev/null
+From 0422e7a4883f25101903f3e8105c0808aa5f4ce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 21:09:07 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 0422e7a4883f25101903f3e8105c0808aa5f4ce9 upstream.
+
+If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end
+up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry.
+
+Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE
+packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an
+incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE;
+the server will send another CHALLENGE.
+
+Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423200909.3049438-3-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 -
+ net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 14 ++------------
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
++++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
+@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@
+ EM(rxrpc_conn_put_unidle, "PUT unidle ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_conn_put_work, "PUT work ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_challenge, "QUE chall ") \
+- EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_retry_work, "QUE retry-wk") \
+ EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_rx_work, "QUE rx-work ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_conn_see_new_service_conn, "SEE new-svc ") \
+ EM(rxrpc_conn_see_reap_service, "SEE reap-svc") \
+--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
+@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ again:
+ static void rxrpc_do_process_connection(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+- int ret;
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CONN_EV_CHALLENGE, &conn->events))
+ rxrpc_secure_connection(conn);
+@@ -398,17 +397,8 @@ static void rxrpc_do_process_connection(
+ * connection that each one has when we've finished with it */
+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&conn->rx_queue))) {
+ rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_conn_work);
+- ret = rxrpc_process_event(conn, skb);
+- switch (ret) {
+- case -ENOMEM:
+- case -EAGAIN:
+- skb_queue_head(&conn->rx_queue, skb);
+- rxrpc_queue_conn(conn, rxrpc_conn_queue_retry_work);
+- break;
+- default:
+- rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_work);
+- break;
+- }
++ rxrpc_process_event(conn, skb);
++ rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_work);
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From def304aae2edf321d2671fd6ca766a93c21f877e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:14:31 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit def304aae2edf321d2671fd6ca766a93c21f877e upstream.
+
+Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle
+non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the
+WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can
+still be emitted).
+
+Fixes: f93af41b9f5f ("rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-3-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 +
+ net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
++++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata, "rxkad1-short-encdata") \
+ EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_header, "rxkad1-short-hdr") \
+ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_check, "rxkad2-short-check") \
++ EM(rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned, "rxkad2-crypto-unaligned") \
+ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_data, "rxkad2-short-data") \
+ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_header, "rxkad2-short-hdr") \
+ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_len, "rxkad2-short-len") \
+--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+@@ -510,6 +510,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct
+ return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
+ rxkad_abort_2_short_header);
+
++ /* Don't let the crypto algo see a misaligned length. */
++ sp->len = round_down(sp->len, 8);
++
+ /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
+ * directly into the target buffer.
+ */
+@@ -543,8 +546,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct
+ if (sg != _sg)
+ kfree(sg);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+- WARN_ON_ONCE(ret != -ENOMEM);
+- return ret;
++ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
++ return ret;
++ return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
++ rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned);
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the decrypted packet length */
--- /dev/null
+From 55b2984c96c37f909bbfe8851f13152693951382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 21:09:06 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 55b2984c96c37f909bbfe8851f13152693951382 upstream.
+
+Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets and not ACK,
+ABORT, etc..
+
+And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the
+pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
+
+Fixes: 1f2740150f90 ("rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure")
+Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423200909.3049438-2-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
+@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc
+
+ saw_ack |= sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK;
+
+- if (sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0 &&
++ if (sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA &&
++ sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0 &&
+ skb_cloned(skb)) {
+ /* Unshare the packet so that it can be
+ * modified by in-place decryption.
alsa-pcmtest-fix-resource-leaks-in-module-init-error-paths.patch
iio-adc-ad7768-1-fix-one-shot-mode-data-acquisition.patch
iio-adc-ad7768-1-remove-switch-to-one-shot-mode.patch
+rxrpc-fix-potential-uaf-after-skb_unshare-failure.patch
+rxrpc-fix-memory-leaks-in-rxkad_verify_response.patch
+rxrpc-fix-conn-level-packet-handling-to-unshare-response-packets.patch
+rxrpc-fix-rxkad-crypto-unalignment-handling.patch
+rxrpc-fix-error-handling-in-rxgk_extract_token.patch
+rxrpc-fix-re-decryption-of-response-packets.patch
+rxrpc-fix-rxrpc_input_call_event-to-only-unshare-data-packets.patch
+edac-versalnet-fix-memory-leak-in-remove-and-probe-error-paths.patch
+tools-accounting-handle-truncated-taskstats-netlink-messages.patch
+net-txgbe-fix-rtnl-assertion-warning-when-remove-module.patch
--- /dev/null
+From cc82b3dcc6a8fa259fbda12ab00d6fc00908a49e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yiyang Chen <cyyzero16@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 03:00:41 +0800
+Subject: tools/accounting: handle truncated taskstats netlink messages
+
+From: Yiyang Chen <cyyzero16@gmail.com>
+
+commit cc82b3dcc6a8fa259fbda12ab00d6fc00908a49e upstream.
+
+procacct and getdelays use a fixed receive buffer for taskstats generic
+netlink messages. A multi-threaded process exit can emit a single
+PID+TGID notification large enough to exceed that buffer on newer kernels.
+
+Switch to recvmsg() so MSG_TRUNC is detected explicitly, increase the
+message buffer size, and report truncated datagrams clearly instead of
+misparsing them as fatal netlink errors.
+
+Also print the taskstats version in debug output to make version
+mismatches easier to diagnose while inspecting taskstats traffic.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/520308bb4cbbaf8dc2c7296b5f60f11e12fb30a5.1774810498.git.cyyzero16@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen <cyyzero16@gmail.com>
+Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
+Cc: Dr. Thomas Orgis <thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de>
+Cc: Fan Yu <fan.yu9@zte.com.cn>
+Cc: Wang Yaxin <wang.yaxin@zte.com.cn>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ tools/accounting/getdelays.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ tools/accounting/procacct.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/tools/accounting/getdelays.c
++++ b/tools/accounting/getdelays.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ int print_task_context_switch_counts;
+ }
+
+ /* Maximum size of response requested or message sent */
+-#define MAX_MSG_SIZE 1024
++#define MAX_MSG_SIZE 2048
+ /* Maximum number of cpus expected to be specified in a cpumask */
+ #define MAX_CPUS 32
+
+@@ -115,6 +115,32 @@ error:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++static int recv_taskstats_msg(int sd, struct msgtemplate *msg)
++{
++ struct sockaddr_nl nladdr;
++ struct iovec iov = {
++ .iov_base = msg,
++ .iov_len = sizeof(*msg),
++ };
++ struct msghdr hdr = {
++ .msg_name = &nladdr,
++ .msg_namelen = sizeof(nladdr),
++ .msg_iov = &iov,
++ .msg_iovlen = 1,
++ };
++ int ret;
++
++ ret = recvmsg(sd, &hdr, 0);
++ if (ret < 0)
++ return -1;
++ if (hdr.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) {
++ errno = EMSGSIZE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
+
+ static int send_cmd(int sd, __u16 nlmsg_type, __u32 nlmsg_pid,
+ __u8 genl_cmd, __u16 nla_type,
+@@ -633,12 +659,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+
+ do {
+- rep_len = recv(nl_sd, &msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
++ rep_len = recv_taskstats_msg(nl_sd, &msg);
+ PRINTF("received %d bytes\n", rep_len);
+
+ if (rep_len < 0) {
+- fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
+- errno);
++ if (errno == EMSGSIZE)
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "dropped truncated taskstats netlink message, please increase MAX_MSG_SIZE\n");
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
++ errno);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (msg.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR ||
+@@ -680,6 +710,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ printf("TGID\t%d\n", rtid);
+ break;
+ case TASKSTATS_TYPE_STATS:
++ PRINTF("version %u\n",
++ ((struct taskstats *)
++ NLA_DATA(na))->version);
+ if (print_delays)
+ print_delayacct((struct taskstats *) NLA_DATA(na));
+ if (print_io_accounting)
+--- a/tools/accounting/procacct.c
++++ b/tools/accounting/procacct.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int print_task_context_switch_counts;
+ }
+
+ /* Maximum size of response requested or message sent */
+-#define MAX_MSG_SIZE 1024
++#define MAX_MSG_SIZE 2048
+ /* Maximum number of cpus expected to be specified in a cpumask */
+ #define MAX_CPUS 32
+
+@@ -121,6 +121,32 @@ error:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++static int recv_taskstats_msg(int sd, struct msgtemplate *msg)
++{
++ struct sockaddr_nl nladdr;
++ struct iovec iov = {
++ .iov_base = msg,
++ .iov_len = sizeof(*msg),
++ };
++ struct msghdr hdr = {
++ .msg_name = &nladdr,
++ .msg_namelen = sizeof(nladdr),
++ .msg_iov = &iov,
++ .msg_iovlen = 1,
++ };
++ int ret;
++
++ ret = recvmsg(sd, &hdr, 0);
++ if (ret < 0)
++ return -1;
++ if (hdr.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) {
++ errno = EMSGSIZE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
+
+ static int send_cmd(int sd, __u16 nlmsg_type, __u32 nlmsg_pid,
+ __u8 genl_cmd, __u16 nla_type,
+@@ -239,6 +265,8 @@ void handle_aggr(int mother, struct nlat
+ PRINTF("TGID\t%d\n", rtid);
+ break;
+ case TASKSTATS_TYPE_STATS:
++ PRINTF("version %u\n",
++ ((struct taskstats *)NLA_DATA(na))->version);
+ if (mother == TASKSTATS_TYPE_AGGR_PID)
+ print_procacct((struct taskstats *) NLA_DATA(na));
+ if (fd) {
+@@ -347,12 +375,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+
+ do {
+- rep_len = recv(nl_sd, &msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
++ rep_len = recv_taskstats_msg(nl_sd, &msg);
+ PRINTF("received %d bytes\n", rep_len);
+
+ if (rep_len < 0) {
+- fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
+- errno);
++ if (errno == EMSGSIZE)
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "dropped truncated taskstats netlink message, please increase MAX_MSG_SIZE\n");
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
++ errno);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (msg.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR ||
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
