messages that contain a "TLS-Required: no" header. This
can prevent TLSRPT notifications for TLSRPT notifications.
Files: smtp/smtp_connect.c, smtp_tls_policy.c.
+
+20250816
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.0, date 20140731): the
+ smtpd 'disconnect' command counts did not count malformed
+ commands with "bad syntax" and "bad UTF-8 syntax" errors.
+ File: smtpd/smtpd.c.
+
+20250819
+
+ Bugfix: the 20250717 workaround broke DBM library support
+ which is still needed on Solaris. File: util/dict_dbm.c.
+
+20250823
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.9, date 20230517):
+ posttls-finger logged a zero port number. Viktor Dukhovni.
+ File: posttls-finger/posttls-finger.c.
+
+20250829
+
+ Postfix 3.11 forward compatibility: allow a partial 'size'
+ record in maildrop queue files created with Postfix 3.11
+ or later, instead of logging an ugly warning. Files:
+ showq/showq.c, postcat/postcat.c.
+
+20250906
+
+ Workaround for an interface mis-match between the Postfix
+ SMTP client and MTA-STS policy plugins. This introduces a
+ new parameter "smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns" (default:
+ "yes"). The MTA-STS plugin configuration needs to enable
+ TLSRPT support, so that it forwards STS policy attributes
+ to Postfix. This works even if Postfix TLSRPT support is
+ disabled at build time or at runtime.
+
+ With the above two configurations, the Postfix SMTP client
+ will connect to an MX host only if its name matches any STS
+ policy MX host pattern, and will match a server certificate
+ against the MX hostname. Otherwise, the old behavior stays
+ in effect: connect to any MX host listed in DNS, and match
+ a server certificate against any STS policy MX host pattern.
+ Files: mantools/postlink, proto/postconf.proto,
+ global/mail_params.h, smtp/lmtp_params.c, smtp/smtp.c,
+ smtp/smtp.h, smtp/smtp_connect.c, smtp/smtp_params.c,
+ smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c.
+
+20250911
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.0): the Postfix SMTP
+ client's connection reuse logic did not distinguish between
+ sessions that require SMTPUTF8 support, and sessions that
+ do not. The solution is to store sessions with different
+ SMTPUTF8 requirements under distinct connection cache storage
+ keys, and to preserve the availability of SMTPUTF8 support
+ in the connection cache, so that a reused connection will
+ be stored under the same keys as it was looked up with.
+ Finally, do not cache a connection when SMTPUTF8 is
+ required but the server does not support that feature.
+ Files: smtp/smtp.h, smtp/smtp_key.c, smtp/smtp_proto.c.
+
+20250919
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.8, date 20220128): the
+ 'postconf -e' output order for new main.cf entries was no
+ longer deterministic. Problem reported by Oleksandr Natalenko,
+ diagnosis by Eray Aslan. File: postconf/postconf_edit.c.
+
+ Add missing meta_directory and shlib_directory settings to
+ the stock main.cf file. Problem diagnosed by Eray Aslan.
+ File: conf/main.cf.
+
+20240924
+
+ TLSRPT Workaround: when policies[*].policy.policy-type is
+ "no-policy-found", report the TLSRPT policy domain name as
+ the policies[*].policy.policy-domain value. This ignores
+ that TLSA policies must be reported with different policy-domain
+ values than STS policies. File: tls/tlsrpt_wrapper.c.
+
+20251021
+
+ Cleanup: the change at 20250717 could result in warnings
+ with "database X is older than source file Y". Files:
+ util/dict.c, util/dict_db.c, util/dict_dbm.c, util/dict_lmdb.c,
+ util/dict_sdbm.c.
#
readme_directory =
inet_protocols = ipv4
+shlib_directory = /usr/lib/postfix/${mail_version}
+meta_directory = /etc/postfix
Enable support for the "TLS-Required: no" message header,
defined in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8689">RFC 8689</a>.
+ Available in Postfix version 3.10.5 and later:
+
+ <b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns">smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns</a> (yes)</b>
+ Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+ an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pat-
+ tern, and match the server certificate against the MX hostname.
+
<b><a name="obsolete_starttls_controls">OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS</a></b>
The following configuration parameters exist for compatibility with
Postfix versions before 2.3. Support for these will be removed in a
Postfix 2.3 and later use <a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_security_level">smtp_tls_security_level</a> instead. </p>
+</DD>
+
+<DT><b><a name="smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns">smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns</a>
+(default: yes)</b></DT><DD>
+
+<p> Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pattern,
+and match the server certificate against the MX hostname. This
+setting takes effect only when an STS policy plugin has TLSRPT
+support enabled, so that it forwards STS policy attributes to
+Postfix. This works even if Postfix TLSRPT support is disabled at
+build time or at runtime. </p>
+
+<p> Without the above configuration settings for Postfix and STS
+plugins, the old behavior stays in effect: connect to any MX host
+listed in DNS, and match a server certificate against any STS policy
+MX host pattern. </p>
+
+<p> This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.10.5. </p>
+
+
</DD>
<DT><b><a name="smtp_tls_exclude_ciphers">smtp_tls_exclude_ciphers</a>
Enable support for the "TLS-Required: no" message header,
defined in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8689">RFC 8689</a>.
+ Available in Postfix version 3.10.5 and later:
+
+ <b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns">smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns</a> (yes)</b>
+ Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+ an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pat-
+ tern, and match the server certificate against the MX hostname.
+
<b><a name="obsolete_starttls_controls">OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS</a></b>
The following configuration parameters exist for compatibility with
Postfix versions before 2.3. Support for these will be removed in a
.PP
This feature is available in Postfix 2.2 and later. With
Postfix 2.3 and later use smtp_tls_security_level instead.
+.SH smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns (default: yes)
+Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pattern,
+and match the server certificate against the MX hostname. This
+setting takes effect only when an STS policy plugin has TLSRPT
+support enabled, so that it forwards STS policy attributes to
+Postfix. This works even if Postfix TLSRPT support is disabled at
+build time or at runtime.
+.PP
+Without the above configuration settings for Postfix and STS
+plugins, the old behavior stays in effect: connect to any MX host
+listed in DNS, and match a server certificate against any STS policy
+MX host pattern.
+.PP
+This feature is available in Postfix >= 3.10.5.
.SH smtp_tls_exclude_ciphers (default: empty)
List of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the Postfix
SMTP client cipher
.IP "\fBtls_required_enable (yes)\fR"
Enable support for the "TLS\-Required: no" message header, defined
in RFC 8689.
+.PP
+Available in Postfix version 3.10.5 and later:
+.IP "\fBsmtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns (yes)\fR"
+Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pattern,
+and match the server certificate against the MX hostname.
+.PP
.SH "OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS"
.na
.nf
s;\blmtp_tlsrpt_enable\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#lmtp_tlsrpt_enable">$&</a>;g;
s;\blmtp_tlsrpt_socket_name\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#lmtp_tlsrpt_socket_name">$&</a>;g;
s;\blmtp_tlsrpt_skip_reused_handshakes\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#lmtp_tlsrpt_skip_reused_handshakes">$&</a>;g;
+ s;\bsmtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtpd_enforce_tls\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_enforce_tls">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtpd_sasl_tls_security_options\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_tls_security_options">$&</a>;g;
s;\bsmtpd_sasl_type\b;<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_type">$&</a>;g;
<p> This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.10. </p>
+%PARAM smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns yes
+
+<p> Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pattern,
+and match the server certificate against the MX hostname. This
+setting takes effect only when an STS policy plugin has TLSRPT
+support enabled, so that it forwards STS policy attributes to
+Postfix. This works even if Postfix TLSRPT support is disabled at
+build time or at runtime. </p>
+
+<p> Without the above configuration settings for Postfix and STS
+plugins, the old behavior stays in effect: connect to any MX host
+listed in DNS, and match a server certificate against any STS policy
+MX host pattern. </p>
+
+<p> This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.10.5. </p>
+
%PARAM full_name_encoding_charset utf-8
<p> The character set name (also called "charset") that Postfix
#define DEF_LMTP_TLSRPT_SKIP_REUSED_HS DEF_SMTP_TLSRPT_SKIP_REUSED_HS
extern int var_smtp_tlsrpt_skip_reused_hs;
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT "smtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT "yes"
+#define VAR_LMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT "lmtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns"
+#define DEF_LMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT "yes"
+extern bool var_smtp_tls_enf_sts_mx_pat;
+
/*
* RFC 2047 encoding of full name info.
*/
* Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
* patchlevel; they change the release date only.
*/
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20250818"
-#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.10.4"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20251026"
+#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.10.5"
#ifdef SNAPSHOT
#define MAIL_VERSION_DATE "-" MAIL_RELEASE_DATE
/* Optional output (here before we update the state machine). */
if (do_print)
PRINT_RECORD(flags, offset, rec_type, STR(buffer));
+ /* Postfix 3.11 maildrop files may have preliminary SIZE record. */
+ if (strncmp(VSTREAM_PATH(fp), MAIL_QUEUE_MAILDROP "/",
+ sizeof(MAIL_QUEUE_MAILDROP)) == 0)
+ continue;
/* Read the message size/offset for the state machine optimizer. */
if (data_size >= 0 || data_offset >= 0) {
msg_warn("file contains multiple size records");
/* System library. */
#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
}
}
+/* pcf_cmp_ht_key - qsort helper for ht_info pointer array */
+
+static int pcf_cmp_ht_key(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ HTABLE_INFO **ap = (HTABLE_INFO **) a;
+ HTABLE_INFO **bp = (HTABLE_INFO **) b;
+
+ return (strcmp(ap[0]->key, bp[0]->key));
+}
+
/* pcf_edit_main - edit main.cf file */
void pcf_edit_main(int mode, int argc, char **argv)
* Generate new entries for parameters that were not found.
*/
if (mode & PCF_EDIT_CONF) {
- for (ht_info = ht = htable_list(table); *ht; ht++) {
+ ht_info = htable_list(table);
+ qsort((void *) ht_info, table->used, sizeof(*ht_info), pcf_cmp_ht_key);
+ for (ht = ht_info; *ht; ht++) {
cvalue = (struct cvalue *) ht[0]->value;
if (cvalue->found == 0)
vstream_fprintf(dst, "%s = %s\n", ht[0]->key, cvalue->value);
if (level == TLS_LEV_INVALID
|| (state->stream = connect_addr(state, addr)) == 0) {
msg_info("Failed to establish session to %s via %s:%u: %s",
- dest, HNAME(addr), addr->port,
+ dest, HNAME(addr), ntohs(state->port),
vstring_str(state->why->reason));
continue;
}
arrival_time = atol(start);
break;
case REC_TYPE_SIZE:
- if (msg_size_ok == 0) {
+ /* Postfix 3.11 maildrop files may have preliminary SIZE record. */
+ if (msg_size_ok == 0 && strcmp(queue, MAIL_QUEUE_MAILDROP) != 0) {
msg_size_ok = (start[strspn(start, "0123456789 ")] == 0
&& (msg_size = atol(start)) >= 0);
if (msg_size_ok == 0) {
smtp_key.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/scache.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
+smtp_key.o: ../../include/smtputf8.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/maps.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/match_list.h
+smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/midna_domain.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/mime_state.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/msg.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/msg_stats.h
VAR_LMTP_REQ_DEADLINE, DEF_LMTP_REQ_DEADLINE, &var_smtp_req_deadline,
VAR_LMTP_TLSRPT_ENABLE, DEF_LMTP_TLSRPT_ENABLE, &var_smtp_tlsrpt_enable,
VAR_LMTP_TLSRPT_SKIP_REUSED_HS, DEF_LMTP_TLSRPT_SKIP_REUSED_HS, &var_smtp_tlsrpt_skip_reused_hs,
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+ VAR_LMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT, DEF_LMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT, &var_smtp_tls_enf_sts_mx_pat,
+#endif
0,
};
/* .IP "\fBtls_required_enable (yes)\fR"
/* Enable support for the "TLS-Required: no" message header, defined
/* in RFC 8689.
+/* .PP
+/* Available in Postfix version 3.10.5 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtp_tls_enforce_sts_mx_patterns (yes)\fR"
+/* Transform the TLS policy from an STS policy plugin: connect to
+/* an MX host only if its name matches any STS policy MX host pattern,
+/* and match the server certificate against the MX hostname.
+/* .PP
/* OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
bool var_smtp_tls_force_tlsa;
char *var_smtp_tls_insecure_mx_policy;
bool var_smtp_tls_enable_rpk;
+bool var_smtp_tls_enf_sts_mx_pat;
#endif
extern void smtp_tls_list_init(void);
extern int smtp_tls_policy_cache_query(DSN_BUF *, SMTP_TLS_POLICY *, SMTP_ITERATOR *);
extern void smtp_tls_policy_cache_flush(void);
+extern int smtp_tls_authorize_mx_hostname(SMTP_TLS_POLICY *, const char *);
/*
* Macros must use distinct names for local temporary variables, otherwise
#define SMTP_KEY_FLAG_ADDR (1<<5) /* remote address */
#define SMTP_KEY_FLAG_PORT (1<<6) /* remote port */
#define SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL (1<<7) /* requested TLS level */
+#define SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_SMTPUTF8 (1<<8) /* SMTPUTF8 is required */
#define SMTP_KEY_MASK_ALL \
(SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SERVICE | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SENDER | \
SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_NEXTHOP | \
SMTP_KEY_FLAG_CUR_NEXTHOP | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_HOSTNAME | \
- SMTP_KEY_FLAG_ADDR | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_PORT | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL)
+ SMTP_KEY_FLAG_ADDR | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_PORT | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL | \
+ SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_SMTPUTF8)
/*
* Conditional lookup-key flags for cached connections that may be
*/
#define SMTP_KEY_MASK_SCACHE_DEST_LABEL \
(SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SERVICE | COND_SASL_SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SENDER \
- | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_NEXTHOP | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL)
+ | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_NEXTHOP | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL \
+ | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_SMTPUTF8)
/*
* Connection-cache endpoint lookup key. The SENDER, CUR_NEXTHOP, HOSTNAME,
| COND_SASL_SMTP_KEY_FLAG_CUR_NEXTHOP \
| COND_SASL_SMTP_KEY_FLAG_HOSTNAME \
| COND_TLS_SMTP_KEY_FLAG_CUR_NEXTHOP | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_ADDR | \
- SMTP_KEY_FLAG_PORT | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL)
+ SMTP_KEY_FLAG_PORT | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL \
+ | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_SMTPUTF8)
/*
* Silly little macros.
continue;
/* XXX Assume there is no code at the end of this loop. */
}
+ /* Skip MX hosts that lack authorization. */
+ if (!smtp_tls_authorize_mx_hostname(state->tls, SMTP_HNAME(addr))) {
+ continue;
+ /* XXX Assume there is no code at the end of this loop. */
+ }
/* Disable TLS when retrying after a handshake failure */
if (retry_plain) {
state->tls->level = TLS_LEV_NONE;
/* The current iterator's remote address.
/* .IP SMTP_KEY_FLAG_PORT
/* The current iterator's remote port.
+/* .IP SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL
+/* The requested TLS security level.
+/* .IP SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_SMTPUTF8
+/* Whether SMTPUTF8 support is required.
/* .RE
/* DIAGNOSTICS
/* Panic: undefined flag or zero flags. Fatal: out of memory.
* Global library.
*/
#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <smtputf8.h>
/*
* Application-specific.
*/
#include <smtp.h>
+ /* Duplicated to minimze patch footprint. */
+#define DELIVERY_REQUIRES_SMTPUTF8(request) \
+ (((request)->sendopts & SMTPUTF8_FLAG_REQUESTED) \
+ && ((request)->sendopts & SMTPUTF8_FLAG_DERIVED))
+
/*
* We use a configurable field terminator and optional place holder for data
* that is unavailable or inapplicable. We base64-encode content that
smtp_key_append_na(buffer, delim_na);
#endif
+ /*
+ * Require SMTPUTF8 support, if applicable. TODO(wietse) if a delivery
+ * request does not need SMTPUTF8, should we also search the connection
+ * cache for a connection that is known to support it? No, because the
+ * connection would be saved back under a key that does not require
+ * SMTPUTF8 support.
+ */
+ if (flags & SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_SMTPUTF8)
+ smtp_key_append_uint(buffer,
+ DELIVERY_REQUIRES_SMTPUTF8(state->request),
+ delim_na);
+ else
+ smtp_key_append_na(buffer, delim_na);
+
VSTRING_TERMINATE(buffer);
return STR(buffer);
VAR_SMTP_REQ_DEADLINE, DEF_SMTP_REQ_DEADLINE, &var_smtp_req_deadline,
VAR_SMTP_TLSRPT_ENABLE, DEF_SMTP_TLSRPT_ENABLE, &var_smtp_tlsrpt_enable,
VAR_SMTP_TLSRPT_SKIP_REUSED_HS, DEF_SMTP_TLSRPT_SKIP_REUSED_HS, &var_smtp_tlsrpt_skip_reused_hs,
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT, DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT, &var_smtp_tls_enf_sts_mx_pat,
+#endif
0,
};
* SMTPUTF8.
*
* Fix 20140706: moved this before negotiating TLS, AUTH, and so on.
+ *
+ * Fix 20250911: do not cache this session because it does not satisfy the
+ * requirement expressed in the cache storage key.
*/
if ((session->features & SMTP_FEATURE_SMTPUTF8) == 0
- && DELIVERY_REQUIRES_SMTPUTF8)
+ && DELIVERY_REQUIRES_SMTPUTF8) {
+ DONT_CACHE_THIS_SESSION;
return (smtp_mesg_fail(state, DSN_BY_LOCAL_MTA,
SMTP_RESP_FAKE(&fake, "5.6.7"),
"SMTPUTF8 is required, "
"but was not offered by host %s",
session->namaddr));
+ }
/*
* Fix 20140706: don't do silly things when the remote server announces
/* SMTP_TLS_POLICY *tls;
/*
/* void smtp_tls_policy_cache_flush()
+/*
+/* int smtp_tls_authorize_mx_hostname(tls, qname)
+/* SMTP_TLS_POLICY *tls;
+/* const char *qname;
/* DESCRIPTION
/* smtp_tls_list_init() initializes lookup tables used by the TLS
/* policy engine.
/* When any required table or DNS lookups fail, the TLS level
/* is set to TLS_LEV_INVALID, the "why" argument is updated
/* with the error reason and the result value is zero (false).
+/* When var_smtp_tls_enf_sts_mx_pat is not null, and a policy plugin
+/* specifies a policy_type "sts" plus one or more mx_host_pattern
+/* instances, transform the policy as follows: allow only MX hosts
+/* that an match mx_host_pattern instance, and match a server
+/* certificate against the server hostname.
/*
/* smtp_tls_policy_dummy() initializes a trivial, non-cached,
/* policy with TLS disabled.
/* smtp_tls_policy_cache_flush() destroys the TLS policy cache
/* and contents.
/*
+/* smtp_tls_authorize_mx_hostname() authorizes an MX host if the
+/* name used for host lookup satisfies a TLS policy MX name
+/* constraint (for example, an STS policy MX pattern), or if the
+/* TLS policy has no name constraint.
+/*
/* Arguments:
/* .IP why
/* A pointer to a DSN_BUF which holds error status information when
#include <valid_hostname.h>
#include <valid_utf8_hostname.h>
#include <ctable.h>
+#include <midna_domain.h>
/* Global library. */
static MAPS *tls_policy; /* lookup table(s) */
static MAPS *tls_per_site; /* lookup table(s) */
+/* match_sts_mx_host_pattern - match hostname against STS policy MX pattern */
+
+static int match_sts_mx_host_pattern(const char *pattern, const char *qname)
+{
+ const char *first_dot_in_qname;
+
+ /* Caller guarantees that inputs are in ASCII form. */
+ return (strcasecmp(qname, pattern) == 0
+ || (pattern[0] == '*' && pattern[1] == '.' && pattern[2] != 0
+ && (first_dot_in_qname = strchr(qname, '.')) != 0
+ && first_dot_in_qname > qname
+ && strcasecmp(first_dot_in_qname + 1, pattern + 2) == 0));
+}
+
+/* smtp_tls_authorize_mx_hostname - enforce applicable MX hostname policy */
+
+int smtp_tls_authorize_mx_hostname(SMTP_TLS_POLICY *tls, const char *name)
+{
+
+#define SAFE_FOR_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT(tls) (var_smtp_tls_enf_sts_mx_pat \
+ && (tls)->ext_policy_type != 0 \
+ && strcasecmp((tls)->ext_policy_type, "sts") == 0 \
+ && (tls)->matchargv != 0 && (tls)->ext_mx_host_patterns != 0)
+
+ /* Enforce STS policy MX patterns. */
+ if (SAFE_FOR_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT(tls)) {
+ const char *aname;
+ char **pattp;
+
+#ifndef NO_EAI
+ if (!allascii(name) && (aname = midna_domain_to_ascii(name)) != 0) {
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("%s asciified to %s", name, aname);
+ } else
+#endif
+ aname = name;
+ for (pattp = tls->ext_mx_host_patterns->argv; *pattp; pattp++)
+ if (match_sts_mx_host_pattern(*pattp, aname))
+ return (1);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* No applicable policy name patterns. */
+ return (1);
+}
+
/* smtp_tls_list_init - initialize per-site policy lists */
void smtp_tls_list_init(void)
INVALID_RETURN(tls->why, site_level);
}
}
+ if (SAFE_FOR_SMTP_TLS_ENF_STS_MX_PAT(tls)) {
+ argv_truncate(tls->matchargv, 0);
+ argv_add(tls->matchargv, "hostname", (char *) 0);
+ }
FREE_RETURN;
}
{0,},
};
+ /*
+ * In addition to counting unknown commands, the last table element also
+ * counts malformed commands (which aren't looked up in the command table).
+ */
+#define LAST_TABLE_PTR(table) ((table) + sizeof(table)/sizeof(*(table)) - 1)
+static SMTPD_CMD *smtpd_cmdp_unknown = LAST_TABLE_PTR(smtpd_cmd_table);
+
static STRING_LIST *smtpd_noop_cmds;
static STRING_LIST *smtpd_forbid_cmds;
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad UTF-8 syntax");
state->error_count++;
+ state->where = SMTPD_CMD_UNKNOWN;
+ smtpd_cmdp_unknown->total_count += 1;
continue;
}
/* Move into smtpd_chat_query() and update session transcript. */
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad syntax");
state->error_count++;
+ state->where = SMTPD_CMD_UNKNOWN;
+ smtpd_cmdp_unknown->total_count += 1;
continue;
}
/* Ignore smtpd_noop_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
if (state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
state->error_count++;
+ /* XXX We can't count these. */
continue;
}
for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; cmdp->name != 0; cmdp++)
/* policies[].policy.policy-string[]. Ignored if the tls_policy_type
/* value is TLSRPT_NO_POLICY_FOUND.
/* .IP tls_policy_domain (may be null)
-/* policies[].policy.policy-domain.
+/* policies[].policy.policy-domain. If null, this defaults to the
+/* TLSRPT policy domain.
/* .IP mx_host_patterns (may be null)
/* policies[].policy.mx-host[]. Ignored if the tls_policy_type
/* value is TLSRPT_NO_POLICY_FOUND.
PSTR_OR_NULL(mx_host_patterns));
trw->tls_policy_type = tls_policy_type;
+ if (tls_policy_domain == 0)
+ tls_policy_domain = trw->rpt_policy_domain;
MYFREE_IF_SET_AND_COPY(trw->tls_policy_domain, tls_policy_domain);
if (tls_policy_type == TLSRPT_NO_POLICY_FOUND) {
ARGV_FREE_IF_SET_AND_CLEAR(trw->tls_policy_strings);
- ARGV_FREE_IF_SET_AND_CLEAR(trw->tls_policy_strings);
+ ARGV_FREE_IF_SET_AND_CLEAR(trw->mx_host_patterns);
} else {
ARGV_FREE_IF_SET_AND_COPY(trw->tls_policy_strings, tls_policy_strings);
ARGV_FREE_IF_SET_AND_COPY(trw->mx_host_patterns, mx_host_patterns);
* the source file changed only seconds ago.
*/
if ((dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) != 0
+ && open_flags == O_RDONLY
&& stat(path, &st) == 0
&& st.st_mtime > dict_db->dict.mtime
&& st.st_mtime < time((time_t *) 0) - 100)
msg_fatal("open database %s: cannot support GDBM", path);
if (fstat(dict_dbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
msg_fatal("dict_dbm_open: fstat: %m");
- if (open_mode == O_RDONLY)
+ if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
dict_dbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
dict_dbm->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
dict_dbm->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
* the source file changed only seconds ago.
*/
if ((dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) != 0
+ && open_flags == O_RDONLY
&& stat(path, &st) == 0
&& st.st_mtime > dict_dbm->dict.mtime
&& st.st_mtime < time((time_t *) 0) - 100)
* the source file changed only seconds ago.
*/
if ((dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) != 0
+ && open_flags == O_RDONLY
&& stat(path, &st) == 0
&& st.st_mtime > dict_lmdb->dict.mtime
&& st.st_mtime < time((time_t *) 0) - 100)
* the source file changed only seconds ago.
*/
if ((dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) != 0
+ && open_flags == O_RDONLY
&& stat(path, &st) == 0
&& st.st_mtime > dict_sdbm->dict.mtime
&& st.st_mtime < time((time_t *) 0) - 100)