record_raw_stats cleanup

bk: 5a477e76kdRF-xzOcIWVqspiLwd6Ow

diff --git a/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
index 86444c5a01a4546057cf4c26688ee3b4b2d10e9d..41bafcba191c2949a8b992e03e67ee3a00d350a9 100644 (file)
--- a/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
+++ b/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
@@ -607,6 +607,13 @@ receive(
        static unsigned char zero_key[16];
 #endif /* HAVE_NTP_SIGND */
 
+       /*
+        * Note that there are many places we do not call record_raw_stats().
+        *
+        * We only want to call it *after* we've sent a response, or perhaps
+        * when we've decided to drop a packet.
+        */
+
        /*
         * Monitor the packet and get restrictions. Note that the packet
         * length for control and private mode packets must be checked
@@ -1048,6 +1055,8 @@ receive(
         * an ordinary client, simply toss a server mode packet back
         * over the fence. If a manycast client, we have to work a
         * little harder.
+        *
+        * There are cases here where we do not call record_raw_stats().
         */
        case AM_FXMIT:
 
@@ -1056,6 +1065,21 @@ receive(
                 * send a crypto-NAK.
                 */
                if (!(rbufp->dstadr->flags & INT_MCASTOPEN)) {
+                       /* HMS: would be nice to log FAST_XMIT|BADAUTH|RESTRICTED */
+                       record_raw_stats(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+                           &rbufp->dstadr->sin,
+                           &p_org, &p_rec, &p_xmt, &rbufp->recv_time,
+                           PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+                           PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+                           PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+                           PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum),
+                           pkt->ppoll,
+                           pkt->precision,
+                           FPTOD(NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdelay)),
+                           FPTOD(NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdisp)),
+                           pkt->refid,
+                           rbufp->recv_length - MIN_V4_PKT_LEN, (u_char *)&pkt->exten);
+
                        if (AUTH(restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST,
                           is_authentic)) {
                                fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid,
@@ -1067,6 +1091,7 @@ receive(
                        } else {
                                sys_restricted++;
                        }
+
                        return;                 /* hooray */
                }
 
@@ -1106,9 +1131,24 @@ receive(
                 * Respond only if authentication succeeds. Don't do a
                 * crypto-NAK, as that would not be useful.
                 */
-               if (AUTH(restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST, is_authentic))
+               if (AUTH(restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST, is_authentic)) {
+                       record_raw_stats(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+                           &rbufp->dstadr->sin,
+                           &p_org, &p_rec, &p_xmt, &rbufp->recv_time,
+                           PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+                           PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+                           PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+                           PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum),
+                           pkt->ppoll,
+                           pkt->precision,
+                           FPTOD(NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdelay)),
+                           FPTOD(NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdisp)),
+                           pkt->refid,
+                           rbufp->recv_length - MIN_V4_PKT_LEN, (u_char *)&pkt->exten);
+
                        fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid,
                            restrict_mask);
+               }
                return;                         /* hooray */
 
        /*
@@ -1129,6 +1169,8 @@ receive(
         * There is an implosion hazard at the manycast client, since
         * the manycast servers send the server packet immediately. If
         * the guy is already here, don't fire up a duplicate.
+        *
+        * There are cases here where we do not call record_raw_stats().
         */
        case AM_MANYCAST:
 
@@ -1195,6 +1237,8 @@ receive(
         * the packet is authentic and we are enabled as broadcast
         * client, mobilize a broadcast client association. We don't
         * kiss any frogs here.
+        *
+        * There are cases here where we do not call record_raw_stats().
         */
        case AM_NEWBCL:
 
@@ -1316,6 +1360,8 @@ receive(
         * This is the first packet received from a symmetric active
         * peer. If the packet is authentic and the first he sent,
         * mobilize a passive association. If not, kiss the frog.
+        *
+        * There are cases here where we do not call record_raw_stats().
         */
        case AM_NEWPASS:
 
@@ -1402,6 +1448,8 @@ receive(
 
        /*
         * Process regular packet. Nothing special.
+        *
+        * There are cases here where we do not call record_raw_stats().
         */
        case AM_PROCPKT:
 
@@ -1676,7 +1724,8 @@ receive(
         * should 'aorg' be all-zero because this really was the original
         * transmit timestamp, we'll ignore this reply.  There is a window
         * of one nanosecond once every 136 years' time where this is
-        * possible.  We currently ignore this situation.
+        * possible.  We currently ignore this situation, as a completely
+        * zero timestamp is (quietly?) disallowed.
         *
         * Otherwise, check for bogus packet in basic mode.
         * If it is bogus, switch to interleaved mode and resynchronize,
@@ -2203,8 +2252,8 @@ process_packet(
        /*
         * Capture the header values in the client/peer association..
         */
-       record_raw_stats(&peer->srcadr, peer->dstadr ?
-           &peer->dstadr->sin : NULL,
+       record_raw_stats(&peer->srcadr,
+           peer->dstadr ? &peer->dstadr->sin : NULL,
            &p_org, &p_rec, &p_xmt, &peer->dst,
            pleap, pversion, pmode, pstratum, pkt->ppoll, pkt->precision,
            p_del, p_disp, pkt->refid,