--- /dev/null
+From 3a1230e7b043c62737b05a3e9275ca83a43ad20a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
+Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:29:06 -0500
+Subject: exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()
+
+From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
+
+commit 3a1230e7b043c62737b05a3e9275ca83a43ad20a upstream.
+
+In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
+output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
+accumulated name length:
+
+ if (++order == 2)
+ uniname = p_uniname->name;
+ else
+ uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
+ len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+ name_len += len;
+ unichar = *(uniname+len);
+ *(uniname+len) = 0x0;
+
+uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
+grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
+fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is
+`name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
+name fragments lets uniname run far past the
+p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
+causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).
+
+The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
+on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
+added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
+max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
+equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
+fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
+exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.
+
+Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/exfat/dir.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/exfat/dir.c
++++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c
+@@ -1081,6 +1081,7 @@ rewind:
+
+ if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
+ unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar;
++ unsigned int offset;
+
+ if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME ||
+ name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) {
+@@ -1089,13 +1090,15 @@ rewind:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+- if (++order == 2)
+- uniname = p_uniname->name;
+- else
+- uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
+-
++ offset = (++order - 2) * EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
+ len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+ brelse(bh);
++ if (offset > MAX_NAME_LENGTH ||
++ len > MAX_NAME_LENGTH - offset) {
++ step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE;
++ continue;
++ }
++ uniname = p_uniname->name + offset;
+ name_len += len;
+
+ unichar = *(uniname+len);
--- /dev/null
+From 786d2d84416a9a1c1a47b71a68d679d886284be2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrii Kuchmenko <capyenglishlite@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 17:32:33 +0300
+Subject: module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages()
+
+From: Andrii Kuchmenko <capyenglishlite@gmail.com>
+
+commit 786d2d84416a9a1c1a47b71a68d679d886284be2 upstream.
+
+module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns
+-ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked.
+
+If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and
+info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page()
+will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling
+module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This
+results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated
+as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel
+oops.
+
+Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and
+return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every
+other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path.
+
+Fixes: b1ae6dc41eaa ("module: add in-kernel support for decompressing")
+Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
+Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Andrii Kuchmenko <capyenglishlite@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP) <chleroy@kernel.org>
+[Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.]
+Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/module/decompress.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/kernel/module/decompress.c
++++ b/kernel/module/decompress.c
+@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ int module_decompress(struct load_info *
+ */
+ n_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE) * 2;
+ error = module_extend_max_pages(info, n_pages);
++ if (error)
++ return error;
+
+ data_size = MODULE_DECOMPRESS_FN(info, buf, size);
+ if (data_size < 0) {
--- /dev/null
+From 5140f099ecd8a2f2808b7f7b720ee1bad8468974 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Benjamin Coddington <ben.coddington@hammerspace.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:02:15 -0400
+Subject: NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC
+
+From: Benjamin Coddington <ben.coddington@hammerspace.com>
+
+commit 5140f099ecd8a2f2808b7f7b720ee1bad8468974 upstream.
+
+POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that
+specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the
+O_ACCMODE access mode.
+
+nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to
+nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the
+client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the
+can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is
+derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a
+file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the
+local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is
+issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid,
+which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics.
+POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES.
+
+Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local
+check matches the access the server would have enforced.
+
+Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@kernel.org>
+Fixes: af22f94ae02a ("NFSv4: Simplify _nfs4_do_access()")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@hammerspace.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
++++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
+@@ -3275,6 +3275,8 @@ static int nfs_open_permission_mask(int
+ mask |= MAY_READ;
+ if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
++ if (openflags & O_TRUNC)
++ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ return mask;
--- /dev/null
+From fcba26efe5efc7441f5505f4ccc69791214b40be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
+Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 17:30:27 +0900
+Subject: NTB: epf: Fix request_irq() unwind in ntb_epf_init_isr()
+
+From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
+
+commit fcba26efe5efc7441f5505f4ccc69791214b40be upstream.
+
+ntb_epf_init_isr() requests multiple MSI/MSI-X vectors in a loop. If
+request_irq() fails part-way through, it jumps straight to
+pci_free_irq_vectors() without freeing already requested IRQs.
+
+Fix the error path by freeing any successfully requested IRQs before
+releasing the vectors.
+
+Fixes: 812ce2f8d14e ("NTB: Add support for EPF PCI Non-Transparent Bridge")
+Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
+Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304083028.1391068-2-den@valinux.co.jp
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c | 10 ++++------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c
++++ b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c
+@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static int ntb_epf_init_isr(struct ntb_e
+ 0, "ntb_epf", ndev);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Failed to request irq\n");
+- goto err_request_irq;
++ goto err_free_irq;
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -367,16 +367,14 @@ static int ntb_epf_init_isr(struct ntb_e
+ argument | irq);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Failed to configure doorbell\n");
+- goto err_configure_db;
++ goto err_free_irq;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+-err_configure_db:
+- for (i = 0; i < ndev->db_count + 1; i++)
++err_free_irq:
++ while (i--)
+ free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), ndev);
+-
+-err_request_irq:
+ pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
+
+ return ret;
--- /dev/null
+From f3336b48cf9d3f2d1fc78e3289c0ded2f00876ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 20:17:54 -0600
+Subject: riscv: mm: Define DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END
+
+From: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
+
+commit f3336b48cf9d3f2d1fc78e3289c0ded2f00876ee upstream.
+
+On RISC-V, the actual mappable range of physical address space is
+dependent on the current MMU mode i.e. satp_mode (See
+Documentation/arch/riscv/vm-layout.rst).
+
+Define the DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END macro based on the existing virtual
+address space layout macros to expose this information to
+get_free_mem_region(). Otherwise, it returns a region that couldn't be
+mapped, which breaks ZONE_DEVICE.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13+
+Tested-by: Han Gao <gaohan@iscas.ac.cn> # SG2044
+Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309-riscv-sparsemem-vmemmap-limits-v1-2-f40efe18e3cd@iscas.ac.cn
+Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
++++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
+@@ -86,6 +86,16 @@
+ */
+ #define vmemmap ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - vmemmap_start_pfn)
+
++/* Needed to limit get_free_mem_region() */
++#if defined(CONFIG_FLATMEM)
++#define DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END (phys_ram_base + KERN_VIRT_SIZE - 1)
++#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP)
++#define DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END \
++ ((vmemmap_start_pfn + VMEMMAP_SIZE / sizeof(struct page)) * PAGE_SIZE - 1)
++#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM)
++/* DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END is not limited by VA space assignment in this case */
++#endif
++
+ #define PCI_IO_SIZE SZ_16M
+ #define PCI_IO_END VMEMMAP_START
+ #define PCI_IO_START (PCI_IO_END - PCI_IO_SIZE)
spi-fsl-lpspi-terminate-the-rx-channel-on-tx-prepare-failure-path.patch
edac-i10nm-don-t-fail-probing-if-adxl-is-missing.patch
watchdog-apple-add-apple-t8103-wdt-compatible.patch
+tracing-prevent-out-of-bounds-read-in-glob-matching.patch
+nfsv4-include-may_write-in-open-permission-mask-for-o_trunc.patch
+riscv-mm-define-direct_map_physmem_end.patch
+module-decompress-check-return-value-of-module_extend_max_pages.patch
+exfat-bound-uniname-advance-in-exfat_find_dir_entry.patch
+ntb-epf-fix-request_irq-unwind-in-ntb_epf_init_isr.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Huihui Huang <hhhuang@smu.edu.sg>
+Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:28:46 +0800
+Subject: tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching
+
+From: Huihui Huang <hhhuang@smu.edu.sg>
+
+commit 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 upstream.
+
+String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter
+predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and
+filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match
+callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.
+
+regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called
+glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some
+string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char
+array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a
+trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of
+the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in
+glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds()
+from the xfs_lookup tracepoint.
+
+Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob()
+so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop
+is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour.
+
+Fixes: 60f1d5e3bac4 ("ftrace: Support full glob matching")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/da1aaf125fc3b63320b0c540fd6afa7c3d5b4f1a.1782836943.git.hhhuang@smu.edu.sg
+Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
+Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
+Signed-off-by: Huihui Huang <hhhuang@smu.edu.sg>
+Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
+Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/glob.h | 1 +
+ kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 6 ++----
+ lib/glob.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/glob.h
++++ b/include/linux/glob.h
+@@ -6,5 +6,6 @@
+ #include <linux/compiler.h> /* For __pure */
+
+ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str);
++bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len);
+
+ #endif /* _LINUX_GLOB_H */
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
+@@ -1056,11 +1056,9 @@ static int regex_match_end(char *str, st
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len __maybe_unused)
++static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len)
+ {
+- if (glob_match(r->pattern, str))
+- return 1;
+- return 0;
++ return glob_match_len(r->pattern, str, len) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+--- a/lib/glob.c
++++ b/lib/glob.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("glob(7) matching");
+ MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL");
+
++static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str,
++ char const *str_end);
++
+ /**
+ * glob_match - Shell-style pattern matching, like !fnmatch(pat, str, 0)
+ * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match, e.g. "*.[ch]".
+@@ -39,6 +42,29 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL");
+ */
+ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str)
+ {
++ return glob_match_str(pat, str, NULL);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match);
++
++/**
++ * glob_match_len - glob match against a length-bounded string
++ * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match.
++ * @str: String to match. Need not be NUL-terminated.
++ * @len: Number of bytes of @str that may be read.
++ *
++ * Like glob_match(), but @str is only read up to @len bytes, so it can be
++ * used on buffers that are not NUL-terminated (e.g. trace event fields).
++ * A NUL byte within @len still terminates the string.
++ */
++bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len)
++{
++ return glob_match_str(pat, str, str + len);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match_len);
++
++static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str,
++ char const *str_end)
++{
+ /*
+ * Backtrack to previous * on mismatch and retry starting one
+ * character later in the string. Because * matches all characters
+@@ -53,9 +79,11 @@ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat,
+ * on mismatch, or true after matching the trailing nul bytes.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+- unsigned char c = *str++;
++ unsigned char c = (str_end && str >= str_end) ? '\0' : *str;
+ unsigned char d = *pat++;
+
++ str++;
++
+ switch (d) {
+ case '?': /* Wildcard: anything but nul */
+ if (c == '\0')
+@@ -120,4 +148,3 @@ backtrack:
+ }
+ }
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
