In mm_cid_fixup_cpus_to_tasks(), when rq->curr has the target mm and
mm_cid.active is set, the CID is checked with cid_in_transit() before
setting the transition bit. In per-CPU mode a newly forked or exec'd
task can be running with mm_cid.cid == MM_CID_UNSET because CIDs are
assigned lazily on schedule-in. With cid_in_transit() the guard passes
for MM_CID_UNSET (no transit bit), converts it to MM_CID_UNSET |
MM_CID_TRANSIT and stores it back; later mm_cid_schedout() feeds this
to clear_bit() with MM_CID_UNSET as the bit number, triggering an
out-of-bounds write.
Symptoms: this is genuine memory corruption, but a bounded out-of-bounds
write, not an arbitrary one. MM_CID_UNSET is the fixed sentinel BIT(31),
so once the bad value reaches mm_cid_schedout() the cid_from_transit_cid()
strip leaves MM_CID_UNSET, which fails the "cid < max_cids" convergence
test and falls into mm_drop_cid() -> clear_bit(MM_CID_UNSET,
mm_cidmask(mm)). The cid bitmap is embedded in the mm_struct slab object
(after cpu_bitmap and mm_cpus_allowed) and is only num_possible_cpus()
bits wide, so clearing bit 31 is a deterministic OOB bit-clear at a
fixed offset of 2^31 / 8 == 256 MiB past the bitmap base. The address is
not attacker-influenced (fixed sentinel -> fixed offset) and the op only
clears a single bit; what sits 256 MiB further along the direct map is
whatever kernel object happens to live there, so this corrupts one bit of
unpredictable kernel memory -- it is not an arbitrary-address or
arbitrary-value write.
It triggers only in per-CPU CID mode, when a CPU is running an active
task of the target mm whose cid is still MM_CID_UNSET -- the
fork()/execve() window before that task's next schedule-in assigns it a
real CID -- and a per-CPU -> per-task fixup walks over it (the mode
fallback driven by a thread exit, sched_mm_cid_exit(), or by the deferred
max_cids recompute in mm_cid_work_fn()).
In practice syzkaller surfaced it as a KASAN use-after-free reported in
__schedule -> mm_cid_switch_to, where the offending clear_bit() is inlined
via mm_cid_schedout() -> mm_drop_cid().
Guard the transition-bit assignment against MM_CID_UNSET, in addition to
the existing cid_in_transit() check, so the bit is only set on a genuine
task-owned CID. A CPU-owned (MM_CID_ONCPU) CID of a running active task
is handled by the cid_on_cpu(pcp->cid) branch above and never reaches
this path, so excluding MM_CID_UNSET (and the already-transitioning case)
is sufficient.
Fixes: fbd0e71dc370 ("sched/mmcid: Provide CID ownership mode fixup functions")
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 syzkaller
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616203818.1516263-1-riel@surriel.com
} else if (rq->curr->mm == mm && rq->curr->mm_cid.active) {
unsigned int cid = rq->curr->mm_cid.cid;
- /* Ensure it has the transition bit set */
- if (!cid_in_transit(cid)) {
+ /*
+ * Set the transition bit only on a genuine task-owned
+ * CID. A running active task can legitimately have
+ * MM_CID_UNSET here: in per-CPU mode CIDs are assigned
+ * lazily on schedule-in, so the fork()/execve() window
+ * leaves the task active with no owned CID. Setting the
+ * transition bit on MM_CID_UNSET would later feed
+ * clear_bit() an out-of-bounds bit number via
+ * mm_cid_schedout(), so exclude it. A CPU-owned
+ * (MM_CID_ONCPU) CID is handled by the cid_on_cpu()
+ * branch above and never reaches here.
+ */
+ if (cid != MM_CID_UNSET && !cid_in_transit(cid)) {
cid = cid_to_transit_cid(cid);
rq->curr->mm_cid.cid = cid;
pcp->cid = cid;