Set .fips_allowed in the following drbg alg_test_desc structs.
drbg_nopr_hmac_sha384
drbg_nopr_sha384
drbg_pr_hmac_sha384
drbg_pr_sha384
The sha384 and hmac_sha384 DRBGs with and without prediction resistance
were disallowed in an early version of the FIPS 140-3 Implementation
Guidance document. Hence, the fips_allowed flag in struct alg_test_desc
pertaining to the affected DRBGs was unset. The IG has been withdrawn
and they are allowed again.
Furthermore, when the DRBGs are configured, /proc/crypto shows that
drbg_*pr_sha384 and drbg_*pr_hmac_sha384 are fips-approved ("fips: yes")
but because their self-tests are not run (a consequence of unsetting
the fips_allowed flag), the drbgs won't load successfully with the seeming
contradictory "fips: yes" in /proc/crypto.
This series contains a single patch that sets the fips_allowed flag in
the sha384-impacted DRBGs, which restores the ability to load them in
FIPS mode.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/979f4f6f-bb74-4b93-8cbf-6ed653604f0e@jvdsn.com/
Link: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnes <jeffbarnes@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
*/
.alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha384",
.test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1
}, {
.alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512",
.test = alg_test_drbg,
/* covered by drbg_nopr_sha256 test */
.alg = "drbg_nopr_sha384",
.test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1
}, {
.alg = "drbg_nopr_sha512",
.fips_allowed = 1,
/* covered by drbg_pr_hmac_sha256 test */
.alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha384",
.test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1
}, {
.alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512",
.test = alg_test_null,
/* covered by drbg_pr_sha256 test */
.alg = "drbg_pr_sha384",
.test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1
}, {
.alg = "drbg_pr_sha512",
.fips_allowed = 1,