/*
* We need to be very careful about honking uncivilized time.
- * Never transmit if in broadcast client mode. If in broadcast
- * mode, transmit only if synchronized to a valid source.
+ * Never transmit if in broadcast client mode or access denied.
+ * If in broadcast mode, transmit only if synchronized to a
+ * valid source.
*/
if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT || peer->flash & TEST4) {
return;
* the restriction routine. Note the careful distinctions here
* between a packet with a format error and a packet that is
* simply discarded without prejudice. Some restrictions have to
- * be handled later in order to generate a Kiss-of-Death packet.
+ * be handled later in order to generate a kiss-of-death packet.
*/
ntp_monitor(rbufp);
restrict_mask = restrictions(&rbufp->recv_srcadr);
ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), restrict_mask);
#endif
if (restrict_mask & RES_IGNORE) {
- return; /* no amything */
+ return; /* no anything */
}
pkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) == NTP_VERSION) {
*/
peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd,
hismode, &retcode);
-
- /*
- * A Kiss-of-Death (KoD) packet is returned by a server in case
- * the client is denied access. It consists of the client
- * request packet with the leap bits indicating never
- * synchronized, stratum zero and reference ID field the ASCII
- * string "DENY". If the KoD packet matches an association and
- * the packet originate timestamp matches the association
- * transmit timestamp the KoD is legitimate and the association
- * disabled.
- */
- if (PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode) == LEAP_NOTINSYNC &&
- pkt->stratum == 0 && memcmp(&pkt->refid, "DENY", 4) == 0) {
- if (peer != NULL) {
- NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &p_org);
- if (peer->leap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC &&
- L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) {
- peer->stratum = 0;
- peer->flash = TEST4;
- memcpy(&peer->refid, &pkt->refid, 4);
- msyslog(LOG_INFO, "access denied %s\n",
- ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
-#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug)
- printf(
- "receive: access denied %s\n",
- ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
-#endif
-
- }
- }
- return;
- }
is_authentic = 0;
dstadr_sin = &rbufp->dstadr->sin;
if (has_mac == 0) {
case AM_PROCPKT:
/*
- * Happiness and nothing broke. Earn some revenue, but
- * only if unrestricted.
+ * Happiness and nothing broke. Earn some revenue.
*/
- if (restrict_mask & (RES_DONTSERVE | RES_LIMITED))
- return;
break;
default:
else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE))
report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer);
}
+
+ /*
+ * A kiss-of-death (kod) packet is returned by a server in case
+ * the client is denied access. It consists of the client
+ * request packet with the leap bits indicating never
+ * synchronized, stratum zero and reference ID field the ASCII
+ * string "DENY". If the packet originate timestamp matches the
+ * association transmit timestamp the kod is legitimate. If the
+ * peer leap bits indicate never synchronized, this must be
+ * access deny and the association is disabled; otherwise this
+ * must be a limit reject. In either case a naughty message is
+ * forced to the system log.
+ */
+ if (PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode) == LEAP_NOTINSYNC &&
+ pkt->stratum == 0 && memcmp(&pkt->refid, "DENY", 4) == 0) {
+ NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &p_org);
+ if (L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) {
+ if (peer->leap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC) {
+ peer->stratum = 0;
+ peer->flash |= TEST4;
+ memcpy(&peer->refid, &pkt->refid, 4);
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "access denied %s\n",
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
+ } else {
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "limit reject %s\n",
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
+ }
+ }
+ }
if (peer->flash) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("receive: bad auth %03x\n",
+ printf("receive: bad auth/deny %03x\n",
peer->flash);
#endif
return;
)
{
struct pkt xpkt; /* transmit packet */
- int sendlen, pktlen;
+ int sendlen, authlen;
keyid_t xkeyid; /* transmit key ID */
l_fp xmt_tx;
get_systime(&peer->xmt);
L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
- pktlen = sendlen + authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
- sendlen);
+ authlen = authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ if (authlen == 0) {
+ msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "transmit: no encryption key found");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4 | TEST5;
+ return;
+ }
+ sendlen += authlen;
#ifdef AUTOKEY
if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(xkeyid, 0);
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
get_systime(&xmt_tx);
- if (pktlen > sizeof(xpkt)) {
- msyslog(LOG_ERR, "buffer overflow %u", pktlen);
+ if (sendlen > sizeof(xpkt)) {
+ msyslog(LOG_ERR, "buffer overflow %u", sendlen);
exit(-1);
}
- sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, peer->dstadr, peer->ttl, &xpkt, pktlen);
+ sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, peer->dstadr, peer->ttl, &xpkt, sendlen);
/*
* Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
"transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d index %d\n",
current_time, ntoa(&peer->dstadr->sin),
ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->hmode, xkeyid, sendlen,
- pktlen - sendlen, peer->keynumber);
+ authlen, peer->keynumber);
#endif
#else
#ifdef DEBUG
"transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d\n",
current_time, ntoa(&peer->dstadr->sin),
ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->hmode, xkeyid, sendlen,
- pktlen - sendlen);
+ authlen);
#endif
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
}
struct pkt *rpkt; /* receive packet structure */
l_fp xmt_ts; /* transmit timestamp */
l_fp xmt_tx; /* transmit timestamp after authent */
- int sendlen, pktlen;
+ int sendlen, authlen;
/*
* Initialize transmit packet header fields from the receive
rbufp->dstadr = findinterface(&rbufp->recv_srcadr);
/*
- * If the caller is restricted, return a Kiss-of-Death packet;
+ * If the caller is restricted, return a kiss-of-death packet;
* otherwise, smooch politely.
*/
if (mask & (RES_DONTSERVE | RES_LIMITED)) {
/*
* If the received packet contains a MAC, the transmitted packet
* is authenticated and contains a MAC. If not, the transmitted
- * packet is not authenticated. If the packet came in a
- * multicast interface, make sure it goes out the wildcard
- * interface.
+ * packet is not authenticated.
*/
sendlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
if (rbufp->recv_length == sendlen) {
get_systime(&xmt_ts);
L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay);
HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
- pktlen = sendlen + authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
- sendlen);
+ authlen = authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ sendlen += authlen;
#ifdef AUTOKEY
if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(xkeyid, 0);
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
get_systime(&xmt_tx);
- if (pktlen > sizeof(xpkt)) {
- msyslog(LOG_ERR, "buffer overflow %u", pktlen);
+ if (sendlen > sizeof(xpkt)) {
+ msyslog(LOG_ERR, "buffer overflow %u", sendlen);
exit(-1);
}
- sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, 0, &xpkt, pktlen);
+ sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, 0, &xpkt, sendlen);
/*
* Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over the
"transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d\n",
current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->dstadr->sin),
ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), xmode, xkeyid, sendlen,
- pktlen - sendlen);
+ authlen);
#endif
}
projects / thirdparty / ntp.git / commitdiff
