EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm

The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.

Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.

Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>

diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 66bd5d2e91792448365222271ca872f2da20072e..3189105406df3dcebf7d2362e233f3ccbc89c2c8 100644 (file)
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
        BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
        EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
        int res = 0;
+       size_t prime_len, order_len;
 
        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
 
+       prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+       order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+       if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+                          (unsigned int) payload_len,
+                          (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+               goto fin;
+       }
+
        if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
            ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
            ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
        u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
        int offset;
 
+       if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+                          "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+                          (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+               goto fin;
+       }
+
        /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
        grp = htons(data->group_num);
        ptr = (u8 *) &cs;