SECURITY.txt: Drop "exploitable" in reference to hardening issues

The "exploitable vulnerability" may lead to a misunderstanding that
missed hardening issues are considered vulnerabilities, just that
they're not exploitable.  This is not true, since while hardening bugs
may be security-relevant, the absence of hardening does not make a
program any more vulnerable to exploits than without.

Drop the "exploitable" word to make it clear that missed hardening is
not considered a vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@gotplt.org>
ChangeLog:

	* SECURITY.txt: Drop "exploitable" in the hardening section.

diff --git a/SECURITY.txt b/SECURITY.txt
index b3e2bbfda9092c428a5575c1316cd3787cf9914d..126603d4c228742227a31a5d3a55e179c4944eef 100644 (file)
--- a/SECURITY.txt
+++ b/SECURITY.txt
@@ -155,10 +155,10 @@ Security features implemented in GCC
     GCC implements a number of security features that reduce the impact
     of security issues in applications, such as -fstack-protector,
     -fstack-clash-protection, _FORTIFY_SOURCE and so on.  A failure of
-    these features to function perfectly in all situations is not an
-    exploitable vulnerability in itself since it does not affect the
-    correctness of programs.  Further, they're dependent on heuristics
-    and may not always have full coverage for protection.
+    these features to function perfectly in all situations is not a
+    vulnerability in itself since it does not affect the correctness of
+    programs.  Further, they're dependent on heuristics and may not
+    always have full coverage for protection.
 
     Similarly, GCC may transform code in a way that the correctness of
     the expressed algorithm is preserved, but supplementary properties