x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation

commit c7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94 upstream.

Quoting Linus:

    I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
    the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
    agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
    because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
    but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
    that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
    space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
    accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.

Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e.
array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by:

	cmp %limit, %ptr
	sbb %mask, %mask
	and %mask, %ptr

With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.

Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Drop changes to 32-bit implementation of __get_user_8
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
index 51f1504cddd9f20fa50e010c66ec0d83da2c2215..559f676e8863f25e4f875055e486cebf642ad12e 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1)
        GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX)
        cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
        jae bad_get_user
+       sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX          /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+       and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 1:     movzb (%_ASM_AX),%edx
        xor %eax,%eax
        ret
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2)
        GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX)
        cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
        jae bad_get_user
+       sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX          /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+       and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 2:     movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx
        xor %eax,%eax
        ret
@@ -66,6 +70,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4)
        GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX)
        cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
        jae bad_get_user
+       sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX          /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+       and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 3:     mov -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx
        xor %eax,%eax
        ret
@@ -80,6 +86,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
        GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX)
        cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
        jae     bad_get_user
+       sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX          /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+       and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 4:     movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%_ASM_DX
        xor %eax,%eax
        ret