/*
* Simultaneous authentication of equals
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
}
+static struct crypto_bignum *
+get_rand_1_to_p_1(const u8 *prime, size_t prime_len, size_t prime_bits,
+ int *r_odd)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ struct crypto_bignum *r;
+ u8 tmp[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+
+ if (random_get_bytes(tmp, prime_len) < 0)
+ break;
+ if (prime_bits % 8)
+ buf_shift_right(tmp, prime_len, 8 - prime_bits % 8);
+ if (os_memcmp(tmp, prime, prime_len) >= 0)
+ continue;
+ r = crypto_bignum_init_set(tmp, prime_len);
+ if (!r)
+ break;
+ if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(r)) {
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 0);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ *r_odd = tmp[prime_len - 1] & 0x01;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
+ const u8 *prime, size_t bits,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr)
+{
+ struct crypto_bignum *r, *num;
+ int r_odd, check, res = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Use the blinding technique to mask y_sqr while determining
+ * whether it is a quadratic residue modulo p to avoid leaking
+ * timing information while determining the Legendre symbol.
+ *
+ * v = y_sqr
+ * r = a random number between 1 and p-1, inclusive
+ * num = (v * r * r) modulo p
+ */
+ r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
+ if (!r)
+ return -1;
+
+ num = crypto_bignum_init();
+ if (!num ||
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(y_sqr, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (r_odd) {
+ /*
+ * num = (num * qr) module p
+ * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
+ */
+ if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+ check = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * num = (num * qnr) module p
+ * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
+ */
+ if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+ check = -1;
+ }
+
+ res = crypto_bignum_legendre(num, sae->tmp->prime);
+ if (res == -2) {
+ res = -1;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ res = res == check;
+fail:
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(num, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 1);
+ return res;
+}
+
+
static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
- struct crypto_ec_point *pwe)
+ const u8 *prime,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
+ struct crypto_bignum **ret_x_cand)
{
- u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN], prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
- struct crypto_bignum *x;
- int y_bit;
+ u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
+ int res;
size_t bits;
- if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime),
- sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0)
- return -1;
+ *ret_x_cand = NULL;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
return 0;
- y_bit = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01;
-
- x = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
- if (x == NULL)
+ x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ if (!x_cand)
+ return -1;
+ y_sqr = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x_cand);
+ if (!y_sqr) {
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
return -1;
- if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec, pwe, x, y_bit) < 0) {
- crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 0);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: No solution found");
- return 0;
}
- crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 0);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found");
+ res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1);
+ if (res <= 0) {
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
+ return res;
+ }
+ *ret_x_cand = x_cand;
return 1;
}
}
+static int get_random_qr_qnr(const u8 *prime, size_t prime_len,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *prime_bn,
+ size_t prime_bits, struct crypto_bignum **qr,
+ struct crypto_bignum **qnr)
+{
+ *qr = NULL;
+ *qnr = NULL;
+
+ while (!(*qr) || !(*qnr)) {
+ u8 tmp[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ struct crypto_bignum *q;
+ int res;
+
+ if (random_get_bytes(tmp, prime_len) < 0)
+ break;
+ if (prime_bits % 8)
+ buf_shift_right(tmp, prime_len, 8 - prime_bits % 8);
+ if (os_memcmp(tmp, prime, prime_len) >= 0)
+ continue;
+ q = crypto_bignum_init_set(tmp, prime_len);
+ if (!q)
+ break;
+ res = crypto_bignum_legendre(q, prime_bn);
+
+ if (res == 1 && !(*qr))
+ *qr = q;
+ else if (res == -1 && !(*qnr))
+ *qnr = q;
+ else
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(q, 0);
+ }
+
+ return (*qr && *qnr) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
size_t password_len)
u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
- int found = 0;
- struct crypto_ec_point *pwe_tmp;
+ int pwd_seed_odd = 0;
+ u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ size_t prime_len;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr, *qnr;
+ size_t bits;
+ int res;
- if (sae->tmp->pwe_ecc == NULL) {
- sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec);
- if (sae->tmp->pwe_ecc == NULL)
- return -1;
- }
- pwe_tmp = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec);
- if (pwe_tmp == NULL)
+ prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len;
+ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime),
+ prime_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->tmp->ec);
+
+ /*
+ * Create a random quadratic residue (qr) and quadratic non-residue
+ * (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop.
+ */
+ if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits,
+ &qr, &qnr) < 0)
return -1;
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
* attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required
* in the loop.
*/
- for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) {
+ for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !x; counter++) {
u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
- int res;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x_cand;
if (counter > 200) {
/* This should not happen in practice */
if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, addr, len,
pwd_seed) < 0)
break;
+
res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed,
- found ? pwe_tmp :
- sae->tmp->pwe_ecc);
+ prime, qr, qnr, &x_cand);
if (res < 0)
- break;
- if (res == 0)
- continue;
- if (found) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Ignore this PWE (one was "
- "already selected)");
- } else {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
- found = 1;
+ goto fail;
+ if (res > 0 && !x) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "SAE: Selected pwd-seed with counter %u",
+ counter);
+ x = x_cand;
+ pwd_seed_odd = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01;
+ os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed));
+ } else if (res > 0) {
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
}
}
- crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe_tmp, 1);
+ if (!x) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE");
+ res = -1;
+ goto fail;
+ }
- return found ? 0 : -1;
+ if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc)
+ sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec);
+ if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc)
+ res = -1;
+ else
+ res = crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec,
+ sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, x,
+ pwd_seed_odd);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ /*
+ * This should not happen since we already checked that there
+ * is a result.
+ */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not solve y");
+ }
+
+fail:
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0);
+
+ return res;
}