static int nested_vmx_check_tpr_shadow_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
+ gpa_t vtpr_gpa = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr + APIC_TASKPRI;
+ u32 vtpr;
+
if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
return 0;
if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) && vmcs12->tpr_threshold >> 4))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Do the illegal vTPR vs. TPR Threshold consistency check if and only
+ * if KVM is configured to WARN on missed consistency checks, otherwise
+ * it's a waste of time. KVM needs to rely on hardware to fully detect
+ * an illegal combination due to the vTPR being writable by L1 at all
+ * times (it's an in-memory value, not a VMCS field). I.e. even if the
+ * check passes now, it might fail at the actual VM-Enter.
+ *
+ * If reading guest memory fails, skip the check as KVM's de facto ABI
+ * for VMX instruction accesses to non-existent memory is to provide
+ * PCI Bus Error semantics (reads return 0xFFs), in which case the vTPR
+ * is guaranteed to greater than or equal to the threshold.
+ *
+ * Note! Deliberately use the VM-scoped API when reading guest memory,
+ * to ensure the read doesn't hit SMRAM when restoring L2 state on RSM,
+ * and only perform the check when in KVM_RUN, to avoid a false failure
+ * if userspace hasn't yet configured memslots during state restore.
+ */
+ if (warn_on_missed_cc && vcpu->wants_to_run &&
+ nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
+ !nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) &&
+ !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) &&
+ !kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, vtpr_gpa, &vtpr, sizeof(vtpr)) &&
+ CC((vmcs12->tpr_threshold & GENMASK(3, 0)) > ((vtpr >> 4) & GENMASK(3, 0))))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
-static int nested_vmx_check_controls_late(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
-{
- void *vapic = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
- u32 vtpr = vapic ? (*(u32 *)(vapic + APIC_TASKPRI)) >> 4 : 0;
-
- /*
- * Don't bother with the consistency checks if KVM isn't configured to
- * WARN on missed consistency checks, as KVM needs to rely on hardware
- * to fully detect an illegal vTPR vs. TRP Threshold combination due to
- * the vTPR being writable by L1 at all times (it's an in-memory value,
- * not a VMCS field). I.e. even if the check passes now, it might fail
- * at the actual VM-Enter.
- *
- * Keying off the module param also allows treating an invalid vAPIC
- * mapping as a consistency check failure without increasing the risk
- * of breaking a "real" VM.
- */
- if (!warn_on_missed_cc)
- return 0;
-
- if ((exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
- nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
- !nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) &&
- !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) &&
- (CC(!vapic) ||
- CC((vmcs12->tpr_threshold & GENMASK(3, 0)) > (vtpr & GENMASK(3, 0)))))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static int nested_vmx_check_address_space_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
return NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- if (nested_vmx_check_controls_late(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
- vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
- return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL;
- }
-
if (nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12,
&entry_failure_code)) {
exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;