--- /dev/null
+From c903985bf7e772e2d08275c1a95c8a55ab011577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 08:57:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] credential_format(): also encode <host>[:<port>]
+
+An upcoming change wants to sanitize the credential password prompt
+where a URL is displayed that may potentially come from a `.gitmodules`
+file. To this end, the `credential_format()` function is employed.
+
+To sanitize the host name (and optional port) part of the URL, we need a
+new mode of the `strbuf_add_percentencode()` function because the
+current mode is both too strict and too lenient: too strict because it
+encodes `:`, `[` and `]` (which should be left unencoded in
+`<host>:<port>` and in IPv6 addresses), and too lenient because it does
+not encode invalid host name characters `/`, `_` and `~`.
+
+So let's introduce and use a new mode specifically to encode the host
+name and optional port part of a URI, leaving alpha-numerical
+characters, periods, colons and brackets alone and encoding all others.
+
+This only leads to a change of behavior for URLs that contain invalid
+host names.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/c903985bf7e772e2d08275c1a95c8a55ab011577]
+CVE: CVE-2024-50349
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ credential.c | 3 ++-
+ strbuf.c | 4 +++-
+ strbuf.h | 1 +
+ t/t0300-credentials.sh | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
+index f32011343f9400..572f1785da7d3e 100644
+--- a/credential.c
++++ b/credential.c
+@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ static void credential_format(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out)
+ strbuf_addch(out, '@');
+ }
+ if (c->host)
+- strbuf_addstr(out, c->host);
++ strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->host,
++ STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT);
+ if (c->path) {
+ strbuf_addch(out, '/');
+ strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->path, 0);
+diff --git a/strbuf.c b/strbuf.c
+index c383f41a3c5ccc..756b96c56157c3 100644
+--- a/strbuf.c
++++ b/strbuf.c
+@@ -492,7 +492,9 @@ void strbuf_add_percentencode(struct strbuf *dst, const char *src, int flags)
+ unsigned char ch = src[i];
+ if (ch <= 0x1F || ch >= 0x7F ||
+ (ch == '/' && (flags & STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH)) ||
+- strchr(URL_UNSAFE_CHARS, ch))
++ ((flags & STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT) ?
++ !isalnum(ch) && !strchr("-.:[]", ch) :
++ !!strchr(URL_UNSAFE_CHARS, ch)))
+ strbuf_addf(dst, "%%%02X", (unsigned char)ch);
+ else
+ strbuf_addch(dst, ch);
+diff --git a/strbuf.h b/strbuf.h
+index f6dbb9681ee768..f9f8bb0381b3c5 100644
+--- a/strbuf.h
++++ b/strbuf.h
+@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ size_t strbuf_expand_dict_cb(struct strbuf *sb,
+ void strbuf_addbuf_percentquote(struct strbuf *dst, const struct strbuf *src);
+
+ #define STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH 1
++#define STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT 2
+
+ /**
+ * Append the contents of a string to a strbuf, percent-encoding any characters
+diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+index c66d91e82d8bc7..cb91be1427f1d2 100755
+--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
++++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+@@ -514,6 +514,19 @@ test_expect_success 'match percent-encoded values in username' '
+ EOF
+ '
+
++test_expect_success 'match percent-encoded values in hostname' '
++ test_config "credential.https://a%20b%20c/.helper" "$HELPER" &&
++ check fill <<-\EOF
++ url=https://a b c/
++ --
++ protocol=https
++ host=a b c
++ username=foo
++ password=bar
++ --
++ EOF
++'
++
+ test_expect_success 'fetch with multiple path components' '
+ test_unconfig credential.helper &&
+ test_config credential.https://example.com/foo/repo.git.helper "verbatim foo bar" &&
--- /dev/null
+From 7725b8100ffbbff2750ee4d61a0fcc1f53a086e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2024 13:26:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] credential: sanitize the user prompt
+
+When asking the user interactively for credentials, we want to avoid
+misleading them e.g. via control sequences that pretend that the URL
+targets a trusted host when it does not.
+
+While Git learned, over the course of the preceding commits, to disallow
+URLs containing URL-encoded control characters by default, credential
+helpers are still allowed to specify values very freely (apart from Line
+Feed and NUL characters, anything is allowed), and this would allow,
+say, a username containing control characters to be specified that would
+then be displayed in the interactive terminal prompt asking the user for
+the password, potentially sending those control characters directly to
+the terminal. This is undesirable because control characters can be used
+to mislead users to divulge secret information to untrusted sites.
+
+To prevent such an attack vector, let's add a `git_prompt()` that forces
+the displayed text to be sanitized, i.e. displaying question marks
+instead of control characters.
+
+Note: While this commit's diff changes a lot of `user@host` strings to
+`user%40host`, which may look suspicious on the surface, there is a good
+reason for that: this string specifies a user name, not a
+<username>@<hostname> combination! In the context of t5541, the actual
+combination looks like this: `user%40@127.0.0.1:5541`. Therefore, these
+string replacements document a net improvement introduced by this
+commit, as `user@host@127.0.0.1` could have left readers wondering where
+the user name ends and where the host name begins.
+
+Hinted-at-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/7725b8100ffbbff2750ee4d61a0fcc1f53a086e8]
+CVE: CVE-2024-50349
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Documentation/config/credential.txt | 6 ++++++
+ credential.c | 7 ++++++-
+ credential.h | 4 +++-
+ t/t0300-credentials.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh | 6 +++---
+ t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh | 14 +++++++-------
+ t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 7 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/config/credential.txt b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+index 512f318..fd8113d 100644
+--- a/Documentation/config/credential.txt
++++ b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ credential.useHttpPath::
+ or https URL to be important. Defaults to false. See
+ linkgit:gitcredentials[7] for more information.
+
++credential.sanitizePrompt::
++ By default, user names and hosts that are shown as part of the
++ password prompt are not allowed to contain control characters (they
++ will be URL-encoded by default). Configure this setting to `false` to
++ override that behavior.
++
+ credential.username::
+ If no username is set for a network authentication, use this username
+ by default. See credential.<context>.* below, and
+diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
+index 195556d..a071ead 100644
+--- a/credential.c
++++ b/credential.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ static int credential_config_callback(const char *var, const char *value,
+ }
+ else if (!strcmp(key, "usehttppath"))
+ c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
++ else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
++ c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -177,7 +179,10 @@ static char *credential_ask_one(const char *what, struct credential *c,
+ struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT;
+ char *r;
+
+- credential_describe(c, &desc);
++ if (c->sanitize_prompt)
++ credential_format(c, &desc);
++ else
++ credential_describe(c, &desc);
+ if (desc.len)
+ strbuf_addf(&prompt, "%s for '%s': ", what, desc.buf);
+ else
+diff --git a/credential.h b/credential.h
+index f430e77..222bbf1 100644
+--- a/credential.h
++++ b/credential.h
+@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ struct credential {
+ configured:1,
+ quit:1,
+ use_http_path:1,
+- username_from_proto:1;
++ username_from_proto:1,
++ sanitize_prompt:1;
+
+ char *username;
+ char *password;
+@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct credential {
+
+ #define CREDENTIAL_INIT { \
+ .helpers = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, \
++ .sanitize_prompt = 1, \
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize a credential structure, setting all fields to empty. */
+diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+index c13be4f..9e27499 100755
+--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
++++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ test_expect_success 'setup helper scripts' '
+ test -z "$pass" || echo password=$pass
+ EOF
+
++ write_script git-credential-cntrl-in-username <<-\EOF &&
++ printf "username=\\007latrix Lestrange\\n"
++ EOF
++
+ PATH="$PWD:$PATH"
+ '
+
+@@ -731,4 +735,20 @@ test_expect_success 'credential config with partial URLs' '
+ test_i18ngrep "skipping credential lookup for key" stderr
+ '
+
++BEL="$(printf '\007')"
++
++test_expect_success 'interactive prompt is sanitized' '
++ check fill cntrl-in-username <<-EOF
++ protocol=https
++ host=example.org
++ --
++ protocol=https
++ host=example.org
++ username=${BEL}latrix Lestrange
++ password=askpass-password
++ --
++ askpass: Password for ${SQ}https://%07latrix%20Lestrange@example.org${SQ}:
++ EOF
++'
++
+ test_done
+diff --git a/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh b/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
+index 8ca50f8..66e7da0 100755
+--- a/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
++++ b/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
+@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push over smart http with auth' '
+ git push "$HTTPD_URL"/auth/smart/test_repo.git &&
+ git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/test_repo.git" \
+ log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+
+@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push to auth-only-for-push repo' '
+ git push "$HTTPD_URL"/auth-push/smart/test_repo.git &&
+ git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/test_repo.git" \
+ log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push into half-auth-complete requires password' '
+ git push "$HTTPD_URL/half-auth-complete/smart/half-auth.git" &&
+ git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/half-auth.git" \
+ log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+
+diff --git a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
+index 2592039..fed22e5 100755
+--- a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
++++ b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
+@@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth can use user/pass in URL' '
+ test_expect_success 'http auth can use just user in URL' '
+ set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
+ git clone "$HTTPD_URL_USER/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-pass &&
+- expect_askpass pass user@host
++ expect_askpass pass user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'http auth can request both user and pass' '
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ git clone "$HTTPD_URL/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-both &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host
++ expect_askpass both user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'http auth respects credential helper config' '
+@@ -119,14 +119,14 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth can get username from config' '
+ test_config_global "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username" user@host &&
+ set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
+ git clone "$HTTPD_URL/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-user &&
+- expect_askpass pass user@host
++ expect_askpass pass user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'configured username does not override URL' '
+ test_config_global "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username" wrong &&
+ set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
+ git clone "$HTTPD_URL_USER/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-user2 &&
+- expect_askpass pass user@host
++ expect_askpass pass user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'set up repo with http submodules' '
+@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes to submodule via clone' '
+ set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
+ git -c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
+ clone --recursive super super-clone &&
+- expect_askpass pass user@host
++ expect_askpass pass user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule via fetch' '
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule via fetch' '
+ git -C super-clone \
+ -c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
+ fetch --recurse-submodules &&
+- expect_askpass pass user@host
++ expect_askpass pass user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule update' '
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule update' '
+ git -C super-clone \
+ -c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
+ submodule update &&
+- expect_askpass pass user@host
++ expect_askpass pass user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'fetch changes via http' '
+diff --git a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
+index f92c79c..53a21f6 100755
+--- a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
++++ b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
+@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from password-protected repository' '
+ echo two >expect &&
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" smart-auth &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+ git --git-dir=smart-auth log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from auth-only-for-objects repository' '
+ echo two >expect &&
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth-fetch/smart/repo.git" half-auth &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+ git --git-dir=half-auth log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+@@ -185,14 +185,14 @@ test_expect_success 'redirects send auth to new location' '
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ git -c credential.useHttpPath=true \
+ clone $HTTPD_URL/smart-redir-auth/repo.git repo-redir-auth &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host auth/smart/repo.git
++ expect_askpass both user%40host auth/smart/repo.git
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'GIT_TRACE_CURL redacts auth details' '
+ rm -rf redact-auth trace &&
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ GIT_TRACE_CURL="$(pwd)/trace" git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" redact-auth &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+
+ # Ensure that there is no "Basic" followed by a base64 string, but that
+ # the auth details are redacted
+@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ test_expect_success 'GIT_CURL_VERBOSE redacts auth details' '
+ rm -rf redact-auth trace &&
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ GIT_CURL_VERBOSE=1 git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" redact-auth 2>trace &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+
+ # Ensure that there is no "Basic" followed by a base64 string, but that
+ # the auth details are redacted
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ test_expect_success 'GIT_TRACE_CURL does not redact auth details if GIT_TRACE_RE
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ GIT_TRACE_REDACT=0 GIT_TRACE_CURL="$(pwd)/trace" \
+ git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" redact-auth &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+
+ grep -i "Authorization: Basic [0-9a-zA-Z+/]" trace
+ '
+@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth remembers successful credentials' '
+ # the first request prompts the user...
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ git ls-remote "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" >/dev/null &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host &&
++ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
+
+ # ...and the second one uses the stored value rather than
+ # prompting the user.
+@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth forgets bogus credentials' '
+ # us to prompt the user again.
+ set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
+ git ls-remote "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" >/dev/null &&
+- expect_askpass both user@host
++ expect_askpass both user%40host
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success 'client falls back from v2 to v0 to match server' '
+--
+2.25.1
+
--- /dev/null
+From b01b9b81d36759cdcd07305e78765199e1bc2060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2024 14:48:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] credential: disallow Carriage Returns in the protocol by
+ default
+
+While Git has documented that the credential protocol is line-based,
+with newlines as terminators, the exact shape of a newline has not been
+documented.
+
+From Git's perspective, which is firmly rooted in the Linux ecosystem,
+it is clear that "a newline" means a Line Feed character.
+
+However, even Git's credential protocol respects Windows line endings
+(a Carriage Return character followed by a Line Feed character, "CR/LF")
+by virtue of using `strbuf_getline()`.
+
+There is a third category of line endings that has been used originally
+by MacOS, and that is respected by the default line readers of .NET and
+node.js: bare Carriage Returns.
+
+Git cannot handle those, and what is worse: Git's remedy against
+CVE-2020-5260 does not catch when credential helpers are used that
+interpret bare Carriage Returns as newlines.
+
+Git Credential Manager addressed this as CVE-2024-50338, but other
+credential helpers may still be vulnerable. So let's not only disallow
+Line Feed characters as part of the values in the credential protocol,
+but also disallow Carriage Return characters.
+
+In the unlikely event that a credential helper relies on Carriage
+Returns in the protocol, introduce an escape hatch via the
+`credential.protectProtocol` config setting.
+
+This addresses CVE-2024-52006.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/b01b9b81d36759cdcd07305e78765199e1bc2060]
+CVE: CVE-2024-52006
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Documentation/config/credential.txt | 5 +++++
+ credential.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
+ credential.h | 4 +++-
+ t/t0300-credentials.sh | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/config/credential.txt b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+index fd8113d..9cadca7 100644
+--- a/Documentation/config/credential.txt
++++ b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ credential.sanitizePrompt::
+ will be URL-encoded by default). Configure this setting to `false` to
+ override that behavior.
+
++credential.protectProtocol::
++ By default, Carriage Return characters are not allowed in the protocol
++ that is used when Git talks to a credential helper. This setting allows
++ users to override this default.
++
+ credential.username::
+ If no username is set for a network authentication, use this username
+ by default. See credential.<context>.* below, and
+diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
+index a071ead..b427d55 100644
+--- a/credential.c
++++ b/credential.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ static int credential_config_callback(const char *var, const char *value,
+ c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
+ else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
+ c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
++ else if (!strcmp(key, "protectprotocol"))
++ c->protect_protocol = git_config_bool(var, value);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -255,7 +257,8 @@ int credential_read(struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
++static void credential_write_item(const struct credential *c,
++ FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
+ int required)
+ {
+ if (!value && required)
+@@ -264,16 +267,20 @@ static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
+ return;
+ if (strchr(value, '\n'))
+ die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
++ if (c->protect_protocol && strchr(value, '\r'))
++ die("credential value for %s contains carriage return\n"
++ "If this is intended, set `credential.protectProtocol=false`",
++ key);
+ fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
+ }
+
+ void credential_write(const struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
+ {
+- credential_write_item(fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
+- credential_write_item(fp, "host", c->host, 1);
+- credential_write_item(fp, "path", c->path, 0);
+- credential_write_item(fp, "username", c->username, 0);
+- credential_write_item(fp, "password", c->password, 0);
++ credential_write_item(c, fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
++ credential_write_item(c, fp, "host", c->host, 1);
++ credential_write_item(c, fp, "path", c->path, 0);
++ credential_write_item(c, fp, "username", c->username, 0);
++ credential_write_item(c, fp, "password", c->password, 0);
+ }
+
+ static int run_credential_helper(struct credential *c,
+diff --git a/credential.h b/credential.h
+index 222bbf1..b4b837c 100644
+--- a/credential.h
++++ b/credential.h
+@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ struct credential {
+ quit:1,
+ use_http_path:1,
+ username_from_proto:1,
+- sanitize_prompt:1;
++ sanitize_prompt:1,
++ protect_protocol:1;
+
+ char *username;
+ char *password;
+@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ struct credential {
+ #define CREDENTIAL_INIT { \
+ .helpers = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, \
+ .sanitize_prompt = 1, \
++ .protect_protocol = 1, \
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize a credential structure, setting all fields to empty. */
+diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+index 9e27499..ca158fe 100755
+--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
++++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+@@ -626,6 +626,22 @@ test_expect_success 'url parser rejects embedded newlines' '
+ test_cmp expect stderr
+ '
+
++test_expect_success 'url parser rejects embedded carriage returns' '
++ test_config credential.helper "!true" &&
++ test_must_fail git credential fill 2>stderr <<-\EOF &&
++ url=https://example%0d.com/
++ EOF
++ cat >expect <<-\EOF &&
++ fatal: credential value for host contains carriage return
++ If this is intended, set `credential.protectProtocol=false`
++ EOF
++ test_cmp expect stderr &&
++ GIT_ASKPASS=true \
++ git -c credential.protectProtocol=false credential fill <<-\EOF
++ url=https://example%0d.com/
++ EOF
++'
++
+ test_expect_success 'host-less URLs are parsed as empty host' '
+ check fill "verbatim foo bar" <<-\EOF
+ url=cert:///path/to/cert.pem
+--
+2.25.1
+
projects / thirdparty / openembedded / openembedded-core-contrib.git / commitdiff
