cn: verify msg->len before making callback

commit a30cfa475d1a26c18f1998ba1e034a4e2ab4c7a8 upstream.

The struct cn_msg len field comes from userspace and needs to be
validated.  More logical to do so here where the cn_msg pointer is
pulled out of the sk_buff than the callback which is passed cn_msg *
and might assume no validation is needed.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
Signed-off-by: David Fries <David@Fries.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

diff --git a/drivers/connector/connector.c b/drivers/connector/connector.c
index a36749f1e44a869418e1bcab6481334948618391..fb1bad083aa9193cbb5012d5012a4da4d028dab6 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/connector/connector.c
+++ b/drivers/connector/connector.c
@@ -122,12 +122,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cn_netlink_send);
  */
 static int cn_call_callback(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+       struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
        struct cn_callback_entry *i, *cbq = NULL;
        struct cn_dev *dev = &cdev;
        struct cn_msg *msg = nlmsg_data(nlmsg_hdr(skb));
        struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp = &NETLINK_CB(skb);
        int err = -ENODEV;
 
+       /* verify msg->len is within skb */
+       nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+       if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN + sizeof(struct cn_msg) + msg->len)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        spin_lock_bh(&dev->cbdev->queue_lock);
        list_for_each_entry(i, &dev->cbdev->queue_list, callback_entry) {
                if (cn_cb_equal(&i->id.id, &msg->id)) {