KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

commit ea740059ecb37807ba47b84b33d1447435a8d868 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8bee2faf04dc1914798eb3b77565660d70527cee..730b3beeda6ae8c3eb20bb19a4321b06aad7cc13 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -801,9 +801,11 @@ static void kvm_update_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static int __kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
 {
+       size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
        switch (dr) {
        case 0 ... 3:
-               vcpu->arch.db[dr] = val;
+               vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)] = val;
                if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
                        vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val;
                break;
@@ -848,9 +850,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_dr);
 
 static int _kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val)
 {
+       size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
        switch (dr) {
        case 0 ... 3:
-               *val = vcpu->arch.db[dr];
+               *val = vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)];
                break;
        case 4:
                if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_DE))