ChangeLog, Makefile.am, Makefile.in, ntp_crypto.c, ntp_proto.c:

  * ElectricFence/Makefile.am (check-local): Don't run the tests if
  we didn't build the programs...

bk: 396fb013fud-66_9WPW-098z308VFA

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 032a71b17fde359fd751edfd64c835938be84913..bd1c8b3c05555bf02ee8d8404d127c21f255245d 100644 (file)
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 2000-07-14  Harlan Stenn  <stenn@whimsy.udel.edu>
 
+       * ElectricFence/Makefile.am (check-local): Don't run the tests if
+       we didn't build the programs...
+
        * ElectricFence/page.c: #include config.h if it's there.
        Properly handle the sys_errlist declaration.
 

diff --git a/ElectricFence/Makefile.am b/ElectricFence/Makefile.am
index 95d55bb3dbcffa27e7fcf7c070cd7065b3bb2c26..f243d7e92a2804db6baa3abcdbb4a23c8f2a93df 100644 (file)
--- a/ElectricFence/Makefile.am
+++ b/ElectricFence/Makefile.am
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ LDADD = libefence.a
 # CFLAGS= -g -Bstatic -DPAGE_PROTECTION_VIOLATED_SIGNAL=SIGBUS
 
 check-local:
-       ./eftest
-       ./tstheap 3072
+       [ -f eftest] && ./eftest
+       [ -f tstheap ] && ./tstheap 3072

diff --git a/ElectricFence/Makefile.in b/ElectricFence/Makefile.in
index 5c76701ad9717595078ec20407619f45faee9dbb..3fec188ecdfd25dd09288c663902fada51b4c308 100644 (file)
--- a/ElectricFence/Makefile.in
+++ b/ElectricFence/Makefile.in
@@ -376,8 +376,8 @@ maintainer-clean-generic clean mostlyclean distclean maintainer-clean
 # CFLAGS= -g -Bstatic -DPAGE_PROTECTION_VIOLATED_SIGNAL=SIGBUS
 
 check-local:
-       ./eftest
-       ./tstheap 3072
+       [ -f eftest] && ./eftest
+       [ -f tstheap ] && ./tstheap 3072
 
 # Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
 # Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.

diff --git a/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c b/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c
index e291373bf818e001f6bb7297b6ebd96a3cfbef02..07a5d445bbb534cf0d11532eeebd9ec6c2a1b394 100644 (file)
--- a/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c
+++ b/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 
                /*
                 * Install association ID. This is used in multicast
-                * client mode only only.
+                * client mode only.
                 */
                case CRYPTO_ASSOC | CRYPTO_RESP:
                        if (ntohl(pkt[i + 1]) != 0 && peer->flags &
@@ -345,14 +345,18 @@ crypto_recv(
 
                /*
                 * Install autokey values in broadcast client and
-                * symmetric modes.
+                * symmetric modes. Tricky here - discard old
+                * timestamps, but don't discard duplicate timestamps if
+                * the authentic bit is not set. 
                 */
                case CRYPTO_AUTO | CRYPTO_RESP:
                        ap = (struct autokey *)&pkt[i + 2];
 #ifdef PUBKEY
                        temp = ntohl(ap->siglen);
                        kp = (R_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY *)peer->pubkey;
-                       if (tstamp <= peer->recauto.tstamp) {
+                       if (tstamp < peer->recauto.tstamp || (tstamp ==
+                           peer->recauto.tstamp && peer->flags &
+                           FLAG_AUTOKEY)) {
                                rval = RV_TSP;
                        } else if (!crypto_flags) {
                                rval = RV_OK;
@@ -367,7 +371,9 @@ crypto_recv(
                                    (u_char *)ap->pkt, temp, kp);
                        }
 #else /* PUBKEY */
-                       if (tstamp <= peer->recauto.tstamp)
+                       if (tstamp <= peer->recauto.tstamp || (tstamp ==
+                           peer->recauto.tstamp && peer->flags &
+                           FLAG_AUTOKEY))
                                rval = RV_TSP;
                        else
                                rval = RV_OK;
@@ -392,7 +398,9 @@ crypto_recv(
                        break;
 
                /*
-                * Install session cookie in client and symmetric modes.
+                * Install session cookie in client mode. Use this also
+                * in symmetric modes when rsaref20 has not been
+                * installed for test.
                 */
                case CRYPTO_PRIV:
                        peer->cmmd = ntohl(pkt[i]);
@@ -494,6 +502,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 #endif
                        if (rval != RV_OK || temp == 0)
                                break;
+                       peer->flash &= ~TEST10;
 
                        /*
                         * Initialize Diffie-Hellman parameters and
@@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 #endif
                        if (rval != RV_OK || temp == 0)
                                break;
+                       peer->flash &= ~TEST10;
 
                        /*
                         * Initialize TAI leapsecond table and extension

diff --git a/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
index 4ab7ee8d2845d2a60346e9caa29593d6a084ac65..2680e212e70d70bc63efb6951a586d91c15df4d4 100644 (file)
--- a/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
+++ b/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ transmit(
                                peer->flags &= ~FLAG_BURST;
                                peer->hmode = MODE_BCLIENT;
 #ifdef AUTOKEY
-                               peer->pcookie.tstamp = 0;
                                key_expire(peer);
 #endif /* AUTOKEY */
                        }
@@ -751,12 +750,18 @@ receive(
 #ifdef PUBKEY
                /*
                 * If the autokey boogie fails, the server may be bogus
-                * or worse. Raise an alarm and rekey this thing.
+                * or worse. Raise an alarm and retrieve the autokey
+                * values again. If the server has in fact come up with
+                * new autokey values, this saves a timeout and general
+                * reset. On the other hand, an intruder could replay at
+                * speed packets from old associations with different
+                * cookies, which would cause needless server requests
+                * and burdensome responses. Since victim client sends a
+                * message only at poll intervals and victim server
+                * burns no PKI cycles, the attack doesn't do much harm.
                 */
-               if (peer->flash & TEST10) {
+               if (peer->flash & TEST10)
                        peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTOKEY;
-                       peer->recauto.tstamp = 0;
-               }
                if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTOKEY))
                        peer->flash |= TEST11;
 
@@ -1969,8 +1974,7 @@ peer_xmit(
                                    CRYPTO_RESP, peer->hcookie,
                                    peer->associd);
                        if (!crypto_flags && peer->pcookie.tstamp ==
-                           0 && peer->recauto.tstamp != 0 &&
-                           sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
+                           0 && sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
                                sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
                                    sendlen, CRYPTO_PRIV, peer->hcookie,
                                    peer->assoc);
@@ -1983,8 +1987,7 @@ peer_xmit(
                                    sendlen, CRYPTO_DHPAR,
                                    peer->hcookie, peer->assoc);
                        else if (crypto_flags && peer->pcookie.tstamp ==
-                           0 && peer->recauto.tstamp != 0 &&
-                           sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
+                           0 && sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
                                sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
                                    sendlen, CRYPTO_DH, peer->hcookie,
                                    peer->assoc);
@@ -1994,8 +1997,7 @@ peer_xmit(
                                    sendlen, (peer->cmmd >> 16) |
                                    CRYPTO_RESP, peer->hcookie,
                                    peer->associd);
-                       if (peer->pcookie.tstamp == 0 &&
-                           peer->recauto.tstamp != 0 && sys_leap !=
+                       if (peer->pcookie.tstamp == 0 && sys_leap !=
                            LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
                                sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
                                    sendlen, CRYPTO_PRIV, peer->hcookie,