then perform DNSKEY query) if that DNSKEY query fails servfail,
perform the x8 lameness retry fallback.
+* keep a list of guilty IP addresses in the qstate, which contains both
+ the child side guilty IPs and the parent guilty IPs. Valid signed DSes
+ are not made guilty in the global cache. The child IP is made guilty
+ in the global cache.
+* Retry to higher trust anchors.
+ * option not to retry to higher from this ta.
+ * keep longest must-be-secure name. Do no accept insecure above this point.
+ * if failed ta, blame all lower tas for their DNSKEY (get IP from cached
+ rrset), if failure is insecure - nothing, if at bogus - blame that too.
+
Retry harder to get valid DNSSEC data.
Triggered by a trust anchor or by a signed DS record for a zone.
* If data is fetched and validation fails for it
with good signature is not marked as problematic.
Perhaps mark the IPorigin of the DS as problematic on a failed applicated
DS as well.
- * domain is sold, but decomission is faster than the setup of new server.
+ * domain is sold, but decommission is faster than the setup of new server.
Unbound does exponential backoff, if new setup is fast, it'll pickup the
new data fast.
* key rollover failed. The zone has bad keys. Like it was bogus signed.