peer->ttl++;
hpoll = sys_poll;
} else {
-
- /*
- * For associations expecting a reply, the watchdog
- * counter is bumped by one if the peer has not been
- * heard since the previous poll. If the counter reaches
- * the max, the poll interval is doubled and the peer is
- * demobilized if not configured.
- */
- peer->unreach++;
- if (peer->unreach >= NTP_UNREACH) {
- hpoll++;
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) {
-
- /*
- * If nothing is likely to change in
- * future, flash the access denied bit
- * so we won't bother the dude again.
- */
- if (memcmp((char *)&peer->refid,
- "DENY", 4) == 0 ||
- memcmp((char *)&peer->refid,
- "CRYP", 4) == 0)
- peer->flash |= TEST4;
- } else {
- unpeer(peer);
- return;
- }
- }
if (peer->burst == 0) {
u_char oreach;
return;
}
}
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_IBURST)
- peer->burst = NTP_BURST;
+
+ /*
+ * If a configured association has been
+ * unreachable for a long time, double
+ * it at each poll and send a single
+ * packet instead of a burst. If not
+ * configured, off it. If it flashes
+ * authentic error, mark it
+ * cryptographically dead.
+ */
+ if (peer->unreach < NTP_UNREACH) {
+ peer->unreach++;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_IBURST &&
+ !(peer->flash & TEST5))
+ peer->burst = NTP_BURST;
+ } else if (!(peer->flags &
+ FLAG_CONFIG)) {
+ unpeer(peer);
+ return;
+ } else if (peer->flash & TEST5) {
+ peer_clear(peer, "CRYPTO");
+ peer->flash += TEST4;
+ } else {
+ hpoll++;
+ }
} else {
/*
* Here the peer is reachable. If it has
* increase it by one; otherwise, use
* the system poll interval.
*/
+ peer->unreach = 0;
if (!(peer->reach & 0x07)) {
clock_filter(peer, 0., 0.,
MAXDISPERSE);
} else {
/*
- * Source rate control. If we are restrained,
- * each burst consists of only one packet.
+ * Call-gap control. If we are restrained, each
+ * burst consists of only one packet.
*/
- if (memcmp((char *)&peer->refid, "RSTR", 4) ==
- 0)
+ if (memcmp(&peer->refid, "RSTR", 4) == 0)
peer->burst = 0;
else
peer->burst--;
key_expire(peer);
#endif /* OPENSSL */
}
- poll_update(peer, hpoll);
- if (peer->reach & ((1 << NTP_BURST) - 1))
- clock_select();
/*
* If ntpdate mode and the clock has not
*/
if (mode_ntpdate) {
peer_ntpdate--;
- if (peer_ntpdate > 0) {
- poll_update(
- peer, hpoll);
- return;
+ if (peer_ntpdate == 0) {
+ msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "no reply; clock not set");
+ exit (0);
}
- msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
- "no reply; clock not set");
- exit (0);
}
+ clock_select();
poll_update(peer, hpoll);
return;
}
peer->outdate = current_time;
/*
- * Do not transmit if in broadcast cclient mode or access has
- * been denied.
+ * Do not transmit if in broadcast client mode.
*/
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT || peer->flash & TEST4) {
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT) {
poll_update(peer, hpoll);
return;
poll_update(peer, hpoll);
return;
}
- peer_xmit(peer);
+
+ /*
+ * Do not transmit if in access-deny or crypto jail.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash & TEST4) {
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)) {
+ unpeer(peer);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ peer_xmit(peer);
+ }
poll_update(peer, hpoll);
}
* Do not respond to multicast if not configured
* as a manycast server.
*/
- if (hismode == MODE_CLIENT && !sys_manycastserver)
+ if (hismode == MODE_CLIENT &&
+ !sys_manycastserver)
return;
/*
PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) <
sys_stratum || (sys_cohort &&
PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) ==
- sys_stratum) ||
- rbufp->dstadr->addr_refid == pkt->refid)
+ sys_stratum) || rbufp->dstadr->addr_refid ==
+ pkt->refid)
return; /* manycast dropped */
}
sys_restricted++;
return; /* no trust */
}
-
if (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)
return; /* bad auth */
* Seattle. If not authentic, leave a light on and
* continue.
*/
- peer->flash = 0;
if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST) {
sys_restricted++;
if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
unpeer(peer);
return; /* no trust */
}
- if (has_mac && !is_authentic)
- peer->flash |= TEST5; /* bad auth */
break;
default:
/*
* We do a little homework. Note we can get here with an
- * authentication error. We Need to do this in order to validate
+ * authentication error. We need to do this in order to validate
* a crypto-NAK later. Note the order of processing; it is very
* important to avoid livelocks, deadlocks and lockpicks.
*/
- peer->timereceived = current_time;
peer->received++;
- if (peer->flash & TEST5)
- peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
- else
- peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
+ peer->timereceived = current_time;
+ peer->flash = 0;
+ peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
+ if (has_mac) {
+ if (is_authentic)
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
+ else if (sys_authenticate)
+ peer->flash |= TEST5; /* bad auth */
+ }
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &p_org);
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->xmt, &p_xmt);
/*
- * If the packet is an old duplicate, we let it through so the
- * extension fields will be processed.
+ * If the packet is an old duplicate, drop it.
*/
if (L_ISEQU(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) { /* test 1 */
peer->flash |= TEST1; /* dupe */
* timestamp matches the packet originate timestamp, loopback is
* confirmed. Note in symmetric modes this also happens when the
* first packet from the active peer arrives at the newly
- * mobilized passive peer. An authentication error probably
+ * mobilized passive peer. An authentication error probably
* means the server or peer restarted or rolled a new private
* value, but could be an intruder trying to stir up trouble.
- * However, if this is a crypto-NAK, we know it is authentic, so
- * dump the association and wait for the next message.
+ * However, if this is a crypto-NAK, we know it is authentic. If
+ * the server is reachable, restart the protocol; if not, ignore
+ * it and wait for timeout.
*/
} else if (L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) {
if (peer->flash & TEST5) {
- if (has_mac == 4 && pkt->exten[0] == 0) {
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
+ if (has_mac == 4 && pkt->exten[0] == 0 &&
+ peer->reach) {
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) {
peer_clear(peer, "AUTH");
- else
+ } else {
unpeer(peer);
+ }
}
return;
}
* matches the previous key ID or ultimate original key ID
* obtained from the broadcaster or symmetric peer. If no
* match, sit the dance and wait for timeout.
+ *
+ * In case of crypto error, fire the orchestra and stop dancing.
*/
if (crypto_flags && (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY)) {
peer->flash |= TEST10;
rval = crypto_recv(peer, rbufp);
if (rval != XEVNT_OK) {
- /* fall through */
-
+ peer_clear(peer, "CRYP");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* crypto error */
} else if (hismode == MODE_SERVER) {
if (skeyid == peer->keyid)
peer->flash &= ~TEST10;
peer->ppoll = pkt->ppoll;
poll_update(peer, 0);
}
-
- /*
- * If the return code from extension field processing is
- * not okay, we scrub the association and start over.
- */
- if (rval != XEVNT_OK) {
-
- /*
- * If the return code is bad, the crypto machine
- * may be jammed or an intruder may lurk. First,
- * we demobilize the association, then see if
- * the error is recoverable.
- */
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
- peer_clear(peer, "CRYP");
- else
- unpeer(peer);
-#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug)
- printf("packet: bad exten %x\n", rval);
-#endif
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * If TEST10 is lit, the autokey sequence has broken,
- * which probably means the server has refreshed its
- * private value. We reset the poll interval to the
- & minimum and scrub the association clean.
- */
- if (peer->flash & TEST10 && peer->crypto &
- CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO) {
- poll_update(peer, peer->minpoll);
-#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug)
- printf(
- "packet: bad auto %03x\n",
- peer->flash);
-#endif
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
- peer_clear(peer, "AUTO");
- else
- unpeer(peer);
- return;
- }
}
#endif /* OPENSSL */
/*
- * We have survived the gaunt. Forward to the packet routine. If
- * a symmetric passive association has been mobilized and the
- * association doesn't deserve to live, it will die in the
- * transmit routine if not reachable after timeout. However, if
- * either symmetric mode and the crypto code has something
- * urgent to say, we expedite the response.
+ * The dance is complete and the flash bits have been lit. Toss
+ * the packet over the fence for processing, which may light up
+ * more flashers.
*/
process_packet(peer, pkt, &rbufp->recv_time);
+
+ /*
+ * Well, that was nice. If TEST4 is lit, either the crypto
+ * machine jammed or a kiss-o'-death packet flew in, either of
+ * which is fatal.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash & TEST4) {
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "receive: fatal error %03x for %s",
+ peer->flash, stoa(&peer->srcadr));
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG))
+ unpeer(peer);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If TEST10 is lit, the autokey sequence has broken, which
+ * probably means the server has refreshed its private value.
+ * Not to worry, reset and wait for the next time.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash & TEST10 && peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "receive: bad auto %03x\n", peer->flash);
+#endif
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
+ peer_clear(peer, "AUTO");
+ else
+ unpeer(peer);
+ }
}
p_org = peer->rec;
pstratum = PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum);
+ /*
+ * Test for kiss-o'death packet (DENY or CRYP)
+ */
+ if (pleap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC && pstratum == STRATUM_UNSPEC) {
+ if (memcmp(&pkt->refid, "DENY", 4) == 0) {
+ peer_clear(peer, "DENY");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* access deny */
+ } else if (memcmp(&pkt->refid, "CRYP", 4) == 0) {
+ peer_clear(peer, "CRYP");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* crypto error */
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Test for unsynchronized server.
*/
if (peer->flash) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("packet: bad data %03x from address: %s\n",
+ printf("packet: bad data %03x from %s\n",
peer->flash, stoa(&peer->srcadr));
#endif
return;
peer->timereachable = current_time;
}
peer->reach |= 1;
- peer->unreach = 0;
poll_update(peer, 0);
/*
*
* It is very important to respect the hazards of overflow. The
* only permitted operation on raw timestamps is subtraction,
- * where the result is a signed quantity spanning from 68 years in
- * the past to 68 years in the future. To avoid loss of precision,
- * these calculations are done using 64-bit integer arithmetic.
- * However, the offset and delay calculations are sums and
- * differences of these first-order differences, which if done
- * using 64-bit integer arithmetic, would be valid over only half
- * that span. Since the typical first-order differences are
- * usually very small, they are converted to 64-bit doubles and
- * all remaining calculations done in floating-point arithmetic.
- * This preserves the accuracy while retaining the 68-year span.
+ * where the result is a signed quantity spanning from 68 years
+ * in the past to 68 years in the future. To avoid loss of
+ * precision, these calculations are done using 64-bit integer
+ * arithmetic. However, the offset and delay calculations are
+ * sums and differences of these first-order differences, which
+ * if done using 64-bit integer arithmetic, would be valid over
+ * only half that span. Since the typical first-order
+ * differences are usually very small, they are converted to 64-\v * bit doubles and all remaining calculations done in floating-
+ * point arithmetic. This preserves the accuracy while retaining
+ * the 68-year span.
*
* Let t1 = p_org, t2 = p_rec, t3 = p_xmt, t4 = peer->rec:
*/
return;
}
clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, p_disp);
- if (peer->burst == 0)
+ if (peer->burst == 0 || sys_leap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
clock_select();
record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer),
peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
} else if (peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) {
if (sys_survivors >= sys_minclock || peer->ttl >=
sys_ttlmax)
- peer->kpoll = (u_char) (peer->hpoll + 3);
+ peer->kpoll = (u_char)(peer->hpoll + 3);
else
peer->kpoll = peer->hpoll;
peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(peer->kpoll);
/*
- * clear - clear peer filter registers. See Section 3.4.8 of the spec.
+ * peer_clear - clear peer filter registers. See Section 3.4.8 of the spec.
*/
void
peer_clear(
* intervals.
*/
peer->nextdate = peer->update = peer->outdate = current_time;
- peer->burst = 0;
if (oreach)
poll_update(peer, 0);
else if (initializing)
peer->nextdate = current_time + peer_associations;
else
- peer->nextdate = current_time + (u_int)RANDOM %
- peer_associations;
+ peer->nextdate = current_time + max((u_int)RANDOM %
+ peer_associations, BURST_DELAY);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf("peer_clear: at %ld assoc ID %d refid %s\n",
* consider the update a popcorn spike and ignore it.
*/
if (m > 1 && etemp > CLOCK_SGATE * dtemp &&
- (long)(peer->filter_epoch[k] - peer->epoch) < (1 << (sys_poll +
- 1))) {
+ (long)(peer->filter_epoch[k] - peer->epoch) < (1 <<
+ (sys_poll + 1))) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf("clock_filter: popcorn %.6f %.6f\n",
#endif
src = ntoa(&sys_peer->srcadr);
NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
- msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronized to %s, stratum=%d", src,
- sys_peer->stratum);
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronized to %s, stratum %d",
+ src, sys_peer->stratum);
}
clock_update();
}
l_fp xmt_tx;
/*
- * Initialize transmit packet header fields.
+ * Initialize the transmit packet header fields.
*/
xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap, peer->version,
peer->hmode);
#ifdef OPENSSL
if (crypto_flags && (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY)) {
struct exten *exten; /* extension field */
- u_int opcode;
/*
* The Public Key Dance (PKD): Cryptographic credentials
key_expire(peer);
}
peer->keyid = xkeyid;
+ exten = NULL;
switch (peer->hmode) {
/*
else
exten = crypto_args(peer, CRYPTO_ASSOC |
CRYPTO_RESP, NULL);
- sendlen += crypto_xmit(&xpkt, &peer->srcadr,
- sendlen, exten, 0);
- free(exten);
break;
/*
*/
case MODE_ACTIVE:
case MODE_PASSIVE:
- if (peer->cmmd != NULL) {
- peer->cmmd->associd =
- htonl(peer->associd);
- sendlen += crypto_xmit(&xpkt,
- &peer->srcadr, sendlen, peer->cmmd,
- 0);
- free(peer->cmmd);
- peer->cmmd = NULL;
- }
- exten = NULL;
if (!peer->crypto)
exten = crypto_args(peer, CRYPTO_ASSOC,
sys_hostname);
* deadlock when the passive peer is walking the
* certificate trail. Awesome.
*/
- else if ((opcode = crypto_ident(peer)) != 0)
- exten = crypto_args(peer, opcode, NULL);
+ else if (!(peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY))
+ exten = crypto_args(peer,
+ crypto_ident(peer), NULL);
else if (sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC &&
!(peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_SIGN))
exten = crypto_args(peer, CRYPTO_SIGN,
!(peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_LEAP))
exten = crypto_args(peer, CRYPTO_TAI,
NULL);
- if (exten != NULL) {
- sendlen += crypto_xmit(&xpkt,
- &peer->srcadr, sendlen, exten, 0);
- free(exten);
- }
break;
/*
* the parameters but the server does not.
*/
case MODE_CLIENT:
- if (peer->cmmd != NULL) {
- peer->cmmd->associd =
- htonl(peer->associd);
- sendlen += crypto_xmit(&xpkt,
- &peer->srcadr, sendlen, peer->cmmd,
- 0);
- free(peer->cmmd);
- peer->cmmd = NULL;
- }
- exten = NULL;
if (!peer->crypto)
exten = crypto_args(peer, CRYPTO_ASSOC,
sys_hostname);
peer->issuer);
/*
- * Identity.
+ * Identity
*/
- else if ((opcode = crypto_ident(peer)) != 0)
- exten = crypto_args(peer, opcode, NULL);
+ else if (!(peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY))
+ exten = crypto_args(peer,
+ crypto_ident(peer), NULL);
/*
* Autokey
!(peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_LEAP))
exten = crypto_args(peer, CRYPTO_TAI,
NULL);
- if (exten != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Build the extension fields if available. If an error
+ * occured, the crypto machinery broke or was
+ * misconfigured, so plaint the log and douse the
+ * boiler.
+ */
+ if (peer->cmmd != NULL) {
+ peer->cmmd->associd = htonl(peer->associd);
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit(&xpkt, &peer->srcadr,
+ sendlen, peer->cmmd, 0);
+ free(peer->cmmd);
+ peer->cmmd = NULL;
+ }
+ if (exten != NULL) {
+ if (exten->opcode != 0) {
sendlen += crypto_xmit(&xpkt,
&peer->srcadr, sendlen, exten, 0);
- free(exten);
+ } else {
+ peer_clear(peer, "CRYP");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* crypto error */
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "transmit: crypto error for %s",
+ stoa(&peer->srcadr));
}
- break;
+ free(exten);
}
/*
* If extension fields are present, we must use a
- * private value of zero and force min poll interval.
- * Most intricate.
+ * private cookie value of zero. Most intricate.
*/
if (sendlen > LEN_PKT_NOMAC)
session_key(&peer->dstadr->sin, &peer->srcadr,
xkeyid, 0, 2);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL */
+
+ /*
+ * If something broke go directly to jail without sending the
+ * packet.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash & TEST4)
+ return;
+
xkeyid = peer->keyid;
get_systime(&peer->xmt);
L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
authlen = authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
if (authlen == 0) {
- msyslog(LOG_INFO,
- "transmit: encryption key %d not found", xkeyid);
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
- peer_clear(peer, "NKEY");
- else
- unpeer(peer);
+ peer_clear(peer, "NKEY");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* no key found */
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "transmit: key %u not found for %s",
+ xkeyid, stoa(&peer->srcadr));
return;
}
sendlen += authlen;
/*
* Initialize transmit packet header fields from the receive
* buffer provided. We leave some fields intact as received. If
- * the gazinta was from a multicast address, the gazouta must go
- * out another way.
+ * the gazinta was from a multicast address, the gazoutta must
+ * go out another way.
*/
rpkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
if (rbufp->dstadr->flags & INT_MULTICAST)
}
/*
- * Here we light up a kiss-of-death packet. Note the
- * rate limit on these packets. Once a second initialize
- * a bucket counter. Every packet sent decrements the
- * counter until reaching zero. If the counter is zero,
- * drop the kod.
+ * Here we light up a kiss-of-death (KoD) packet. KoD
+ * packets have leap bits unsynchronized, stratum zero
+ * and reference ID the four-character error code. Note
+ * the rate limit on these packets. Once a second
+ * initialize a bucket counter. Every packet sent
+ * decrements the counter until reaching zero. If the
+ * counter is zero, drop the kod.
*/
if (sys_kod == 0 || !(mask & RES_DEMOBILIZE))
return;
* Log this error.
*/
msyslog(LOG_INFO,
- "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
- item, value);
+ "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld", item,
+ value);
}
}
projects / thirdparty / ntp.git / commitdiff
