Add check that message length to _pkcs1_sec_decrypt is valid.

* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
length is valid, for given key size.
* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.

(cherry picked from commit 7616541e6eff73353bf682c62e3a68e4fe696707)

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 29d279c3031f3eccdc19ca822fa1f567259f6f70..2538e6c5b6fd3d7c1c9ca038a2c0299982b32b91 100644 (file)
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+2021-05-06  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
+       Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+       * pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
+       length is valid, for given key size.
+       * testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
+       calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
+
 2021-05-23  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
 
        From Nicolas Mora: Implement aes key wrap and key unwrap (RFC 3394).

diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
index 4f13080e3e90385c43d72bad627c0b052d3e60cd..16833691f59ac1447ff58afd758a2e042ffaef01 100644 (file)
--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
   volatile int ok;
   size_t i, t;
 
-  assert (padded_message_length >= length);
+  /* Message independent branch */
+  if (length + 11 > padded_message_length)
+    return 0;
 
   t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
 

diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
index fb0ed3a1886007fed53fd467d60968cda5007aa8..3419322eeecb08f2ba05abfab39eeb0c279b24ef 100644 (file)
--- a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
 #endif
 
 #define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50
+#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256
 void
 test_main(void)
 {
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void)
   struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx;
 
   uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
-  uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE];
   uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
   unsigned n_size = 1024;
   mpz_t gibberish;
@@ -99,6 +100,20 @@ test_main(void)
                                     PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1);
       ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted));
 
+      ASSERT (pub.size > 10);
+      ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE);
+
+      /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest
+        valid size is pub.size - 11. */
+      ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+                                    (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+                                    pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish));
+
+      /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */
+      ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+                                    (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+                                    pub.size, decrypted, gibberish));
+
       /* bad one */
       memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE);
       nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx,