Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc.
Updates: 4033, 4034, 4035, 5155 D. Blacka
(if approved) VeriSign, Inc.
-Intended status: Standards Track March 8, 2010
-Expires: September 9, 2010
+Intended status: Standards Track November 10, 2010
+Expires: May 14, 2011
Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis
- draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-10
+ draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12
Abstract
Status of this Memo
- This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
+ This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
- Drafts.
+ Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
+ working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
+ Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2010.
+ This Internet-Draft will expire on May 14, 2011.
Copyright Notice
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
-
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
- described in the BSD License.
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
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Table of Contents
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Important Additions to DNSSSECbis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. NSEC3 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2.2. SHA-256 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3. Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3.2. Validating Responses to an ANY Query . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 3.3. Check for CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 3.4. Insecure Delegation Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4. Interoperability Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4.1. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4.2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 4.3. Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 4.4. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs . . . . . . 7
- 4.5. Key Tag Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 4.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 4.7. Setting the AD Bit on Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.8. Setting the AD Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.9. Setting the CD bit on Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.10. Nested Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.10.1. Closest Encloser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 4.10.2. Accept Any Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 4.10.3. Preference Based on Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5. Minor Corrections and Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.1. Finding Zone Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.3. Errors in Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.4. Errors in RFC 5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+ 2.2. SHA-2 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 3. Scaling Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 3.1. Implement a BAD cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 4. Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 4.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 4.2. Validating Responses to an ANY Query . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 4.3. Check for CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 4.4. Insecure Delegation Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 5. Interoperability Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 5.1. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 5.2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 5.3. Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 5.4. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs . . . . . . 7
+ 5.5. Key Tag Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 5.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 5.7. Setting the AD Bit on Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 5.8. Setting the AD Bit on Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 5.9. Handling Queries With the CD Bit Set . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 5.10. Nested Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 5.10.1. Closest Encloser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 5.10.2. Accept Any Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 5.10.3. Preference Based on Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6. Minor Corrections and Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6.1. Finding Zone Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 6.3. Errors in Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 6.4. Errors in RFC 5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction and Terminology
Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10.
Note that the algorithm identifiers defined in RFC5155 (DSA-NSEC3-
- SHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1) signal that a zone MAY be using NSEC3,
- rather than NSEC. The zone MAY indeed be using either and validators
- supporting these algorithms MUST support both NSEC3 and NSEC
+ SHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1) and RFC5702 (RSASHA256 and RSASHA512)
+ signal that a zone MAY be using NSEC3, rather than NSEC. The zone
+ MAY indeed be using either and validators supporting these algorithms
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- responses.
+ MUST support both NSEC3 and NSEC responses.
-2.2. SHA-256 Support
+2.2. SHA-2 Support
[RFC4509] describes the use of SHA-256 as a digest algorithm in
Delegation Signer (DS) RRs. [RFC5702] describes the use of the
- RSASHA256 algorithm in DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs. Validator
- implementations are strongly encouraged to include support for this
- algorithm for DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG records.
+ RSASHA256 and RSASHA512 algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs.
+ Validator implementations are strongly encouraged to include support
+ for these algorithms for DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG records.
Both [RFC4509] and [RFC5702] should also be considered part of the
DNS Security Document Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10.
-3. Security Concerns
+3. Scaling Concerns
+
+3.1. Implement a BAD cache
+
+ Section 4.7 of RFC4035 permits security-aware resolvers to implement
+ a BAD cache. Because of scaling concerns not discussed in this
+ document, that guidance has changed: security-aware resolvers SHOULD
+ implement a BAD cache, as described in RFC4035.
+
+
+4. Security Concerns
This section provides clarifications that, if overlooked, could lead
to security issues.
-3.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs
+4.1. Clarifications on Non-Existence Proofs
[RFC4035] Section 5.4 under-specifies the algorithm for checking non-
existence proofs. In particular, the algorithm as presented would
that (original) owner name other than DS RRs, and all RRs below that
owner name regardless of type.
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Similarly, the algorithm would also allow an NSEC RR at the same
owner name as a DNAME RR, or an NSEC3 RR at the same original owner
name as a DNAME, to prove the non-existence of names beneath that
to assume the non-existence of any subdomain of that NSEC/NSEC3 RR's
(original) owner name.
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-3.2. Validating Responses to an ANY Query
+4.2. Validating Responses to an ANY Query
[RFC4035] does not address how to validate responses when QTYPE=*.
As described in Section 6.2.2 of [RFC1034], a proper response to
To be clear, a validator must not expect to receive all records at
the QNAME in response to QTYPE=*.
-3.3. Check for CNAME
+4.3. Check for CNAME
Section 5 of [RFC4035] says little about validating responses based
on (or that should be based on) CNAMEs. When validating a NOERROR/
type. Without this check, an attacker could successfully transform a
positive CNAME response into a NOERROR/NODATA response.
-3.4. Insecure Delegation Proofs
+4.4. Insecure Delegation Proofs
[RFC4035] Section 5.2 specifies that a validator, when proving a
delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS
not signed.
-4. Interoperability Concerns
+5. Interoperability Concerns
-4.1. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List
- When canonicalizing DNS names, DNS names in the RDATA section of NSEC
- and RRSIG resource records are not downcased.
-
- [RFC4034] Section 6.2 item 3 has a list of resource record types for
- which DNS names in the RDATA are downcased for purposes of DNSSEC
- canonical form (for both ordering and signing). That list
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+5.1. Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List
+
+ When canonicalizing DNS names, DNS names in the RDATA section of NSEC
+ and RRSIG resource records are not downcased.
+
+ [RFC4034] Section 6.2 item 3 has a list of resource record types for
+ which DNS names in the RDATA are downcased for purposes of DNSSEC
+ canonical form (for both ordering and signing). That list
erroneously contains NSEC and RRSIG. According to [RFC3755], DNS
names in the RDATA of NSEC and RRSIG should not be downcased.
Since HINFO records contain no domain names, they are not subject to
downcasing.
-4.2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms
+5.2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms
Section 5.2 of [RFC4035] includes rules for how to handle delegations
to zones that are signed with entirely unsupported public key
disregards any DS records using unknown or unsupported message digest
algorithms.
-4.3. Private Algorithms
+5.3. Private Algorithms
As discussed above, section 5.2 of [RFC4035] requires that validators
make decisions about the security status of zones based on the public
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key algorithms shown in the DS records for those zones. In the case
of private algorithms, as described in [RFC4034] Appendix A.1.1, the
eight-bit algorithm field in the DS RR is not conclusive about what
If no private algorithms appear in the DS set or if any supported
algorithm appears in the DS set, no special processing will be
needed. In the remaining cases, the security status of the zone
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depends on whether or not the resolver supports any of the private
algorithms in use (provided that these DS records use supported hash
- functions, as discussed in Section 4.2). In these cases, the
+ functions, as discussed in Section 5.2). In these cases, the
resolver MUST retrieve the corresponding DNSKEY for each private
algorithm DS record and examine the public key field to determine the
algorithm in use. The security-aware resolver MUST ensure that the
This clarification facilitates the broader use of private algorithms,
as suggested by [RFC4955].
-4.4. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs
+5.4. Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs
When multiple RRSIGs cover a given RRset, [RFC4035] Section 5.3.3
suggests that "the local resolver security policy determines whether
method described in section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC4641] might not work
reliably.
-4.5. Key Tag Calculation
+5.5. Key Tag Calculation
[RFC4034] Appendix B.1 incorrectly defines the Key Tag field
calculation for algorithm 1. It correctly says that the Key Tag is
the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the
public key modulus. However, [RFC4034] then goes on to incorrectly
say that this is 4th to last and 3rd to last octets of the public key
- modulus. It is, in fact, the 3rd to last and 2nd to last octets.
-4.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies
- As stated in [RFC3225], the DO bit of the query MUST be copied in the
- response. At least one implementation has done something different,
- so it may be wise for resolvers to be liberal in what they accept.
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+ modulus. It is, in fact, the 3rd to last and 2nd to last octets.
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+5.6. Setting the DO Bit on Replies
+ As stated in [RFC3225], the DO bit of the query MUST be copied in the
+ response. At least one implementation has done something different,
+ so it may be wise for resolvers to be liberal in what they accept.
-4.7. Setting the AD Bit on Queries
+5.7. Setting the AD Bit on Queries
The use of the AD bit in the query was previously undefined. This
document defines it as a signal indicating that the requester
response. This allows a requestor to indicate that it understands
the AD bit without also requesting DNSSEC data via the DO bit.
-4.8. Setting the AD Bit on Replies
+5.8. Setting the AD Bit on Replies
Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4035] describes under which conditions a
validating resolver should set or clear the AD bit in a response. In
conditions listed in RFC 4035, section 3.2.3, and the request
contained either a set DO bit or a set AD bit.
-4.9. Setting the CD bit on Requests
+5.9. Handling Queries With the CD Bit Set
When processing a request with the CD bit set, a resolver SHOULD
attempt to return all responsive data, even data that has failed
up to five minutes.) In these cases, a new query with the CD bit set
is required.
- For efficiency, a validator may wish to set the CD bit on all
- upstream queries when it has a trust anchor at or above the QNAME
- (and thus can reasonably expect to be able to validate the response).
+ For efficiency, a validator SHOULD set the CD bit on upstream queries
+ when it has a trust anchor at or above the QNAME (and thus can
+ reasonably expect to be able to validate the response).
+
+
+
-4.10. Nested Trust Anchors
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+5.10. Nested Trust Anchors
A DNSSEC validator may be configured such that, for a given response,
more than one trust anchor could be used to validate the chain of
When the validator is asked to validate a response to
"www.sub.zone.example.", either trust anchor could apply.
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When presented with this situation, DNSSEC validators have a choice
of which trust anchor(s) to use. Which to use is a matter of
implementation choice. It is possible and perhaps advisable to
expose the choice of policy as a configuration option. The rest of
this section discusses some possible policies. As a default, we
suggest that validators implement the "Accept Any Success" policy
- described below in Section 4.10.2 while exposing other policies as
+ described below in Section 5.10.2 while exposing other policies as
configuration options.
-4.10.1. Closest Encloser
+5.10.1. Closest Encloser
One policy is to choose the trust anchor closest to the QNAME of the
response. In our example, that would be the "zone.example." trust
trust anchor. With the "closest encloser" policy, the validator gets
validation failures.
-4.10.2. Accept Any Success
+5.10.2. Accept Any Success
Another policy is to try all applicable trust anchors until one gives
a validation result of Secure, in which case the final validation
or more trust anchors lead to a Bogus result and there is no Secure
result, then the final validation result is Bogus.
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This has the advantage of causing the fewer validation failures,
which may deliver a better user experience. If one trust anchor is
out of date (as in our above example), the user may still be able to
This policy has the disadvantage of making the validator subject to
compromise of the weakest of these trust anchors while making its
relatively painless to keep old trust anchors configured in
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perpetuity.
-4.10.3. Preference Based on Source
+5.10.3. Preference Based on Source
When the trust anchors have come from different sources (e.g.
automated updates ([RFC5011]), one or more DLV registries
configured trust anchors.
-5. Minor Corrections and Clarifications
+6. Minor Corrections and Clarifications
-5.1. Finding Zone Cuts
+6.1. Finding Zone Cuts
Appendix C.8 of [RFC4035] discusses sending DS queries to the servers
for a parent zone. To do that, a resolver may first need to apply
and in some situations the resolver may also need to apply special
rules to locate the name servers for the parent zone if the resolver
does not already have the parent's NS RRset. Section 4.2 of
- [RFC4035] specifies a mechanism for doing that.
-5.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage
- Questions of the form "can I use a different DNSKEY for signing this
- RRset" have occasionally arisen.
- The short answer is "yes, absolutely". You can even use a different
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+6.2. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage
+ Questions of the form "can I use a different DNSKEY for signing this
+ RRset" have occasionally arisen.
+ The short answer is "yes, absolutely". You can even use a different
DNSKEY for each RRset in a zone, subject only to practical limits on
the size of the DNSKEY RRset. However, be aware that there is no way
to tell resolvers what a particularly DNSKEY is supposed to be used
possible to use a single DNSKEY, with or without the SEP bit set, to
sign the entire zone, including the DNSKEY RRset itself.
-5.3. Errors in Examples
+6.3. Errors in Examples
The text in [RFC4035] Section C.1 refers to the examples in B.1 as
"x.w.example.com" while B.1 uses "x.w.example". This is painfully
the reference to "a.z.w.w.example" should instead be "a.z.w.example",
as in the previous line.
-5.4. Errors in RFC 5155
+6.4. Errors in RFC 5155
A NSEC3 record that matches an Empty Non-Terminal effectively has no
type associated with it. This NSEC3 record has an empty type bit
map. Section 3.2.1 of [RFC5155] contains the statement:
+
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Blocks with no types present MUST NOT be included.
However, the same section contains a regular expression:
The plus sign in the regular expression indicates that there is one
or more of the preceding element. This means that there must be at
least one window block. If this window block has no types, it
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contradicts with the first statement. Therefore, the correct text in
RFC 5155 3.2.1 should be:
Type Bit Maps Field = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap )*
-6. IANA Considerations
+7. IANA Considerations
This document specifies no IANA Actions.
-7. Security Considerations
+8. Security Considerations
This document adds two cryptographic features to the core DNSSEC
protocol. Additionally, it addresses some ambiguities and omissions
in the core DNSSEC documents that, if not recognized and addressed in
implementations, could lead to security failures. In particular, the
- validation algorithm clarifications in Section 3 are critical for
+ validation algorithm clarifications in Section 4 are critical for
preserving the security properties DNSSEC offers. Furthermore,
- failure to address some of the interoperability concerns in Section 4
+ failure to address some of the interoperability concerns in Section 5
could limit the ability to later change or expand DNSSEC, including
adding new algorithms.
-8. References
+9. References
-8.1. Normative References
+9.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
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RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
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[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
October 2009.
-8.2. Informative References
+9.2. Informative References
[RFC3755] Weiler, S., "Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation
Signer (DS)", RFC 3755, May 2004.
finding errors and omissions in the DNSSECbis document set, have
provided text suitable for inclusion in this document.
- The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as
- described in Section 4.3, and the lack of specificity in handling ANY
- queries, as described in Section 3.2, were discovered by David
- Blacka.
- The error in algorithm 1 key tag calculation, as described in
- Section 4.5, was found by Abhijit Hayatnagarkar. Donald Eastlake
- contributed text for Section 4.5.
- The bug relating to delegation NSEC RR's in Section 3.1 was found by
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+ The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as
+ described in Section 5.3, and the lack of specificity in handling ANY
+ queries, as described in Section 4.2, were discovered by David
+ Blacka.
+ The error in algorithm 1 key tag calculation, as described in
+ Section 5.5, was found by Abhijit Hayatnagarkar. Donald Eastlake
+ contributed text for Section 5.5.
+ The bug relating to delegation NSEC RR's in Section 4.1 was found by
Roy Badami. Roy Arends found the related problem with DNAME.
The errors in the [RFC4035] examples were found by Roy Arends, who
- also contributed text for Section 5.3 of this document.
+ also contributed text for Section 6.3 of this document.
The editors would like to thank Alfred Hoenes, Ed Lewis, Danny Mayer,
- Olafur Gudmundsson, Suzanne Woolf, and Scott Rose for their
- substantive comments on the text of this document.
+ Olafur Gudmundsson, Suzanne Woolf, Rickard Bellgrim, Mike St. Johns,
+ and Scott Rose for their substantive comments on the text of this
+ document.
Authors' Addresses
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-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
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-
-Weiler & Blacka Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 14]
+Weiler & Blacka Expires May 14, 2011 [Page 14]
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