I don't think this can happen on correct records,
due to the way that the root zone is. But we've seen
this assertion happen in real life, and attackers
might be able to misuse it to cause crashes.
- DoS: fix a rare segfault in `resolve` function (!1717)
Someone controlling the DNS traffic might be able
to trigger this crash intentionally and too often.
+- DoS: drop a wrong assertion/crash (!1718)
+ Someone controlling the DNS traffic will most likely be able
+ to trigger this crash intentionally and too often.
Bugfixes
--------
*
* @param tgt Target buffer to write domain name into.
* @param name Name to be added to the asterisk.
- * @return Size of the resulting name or error code.
+ * @return error code or something positive
*/
static int prepend_asterisk(uint8_t *tgt, size_t maxlen, const knot_dname_t *name)
{
int ret = prepend_asterisk(wildcard, sizeof(wildcard), encloser);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- kr_require(ret >= 3);
return nodata_find(pkt, section_id, wildcard, stype);
}