From: Kirill A. Shutemov Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 21:11:12 +0000 (+0200) Subject: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace X-Git-Tag: v2.6.32.66~7 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=036783b2427dd1dd4f3cd0a1a9e97e511bfaac0d;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream. As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Mark Seaborn Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds [mancha security: Backported to 3.10] Signed-off-by: mancha security Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings (cherry picked from commit 1ffc3cd9a36b504c20ce98fe5eeb5463f389e1ac) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau --- diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index 3b7b82a5d13f1..73db5a6e42df1 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -773,9 +773,19 @@ out: return ret; } +static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + /* do not disclose physical addresses to unprivileged + userspace (closes a rowhammer attack vector) */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return 0; +} + const struct file_operations proc_pagemap_operations = { .llseek = mem_lseek, /* borrow this */ .read = pagemap_read, + .open = pagemap_open, }; #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR */