From: Nick Mathewson Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2003 04:30:35 +0000 (+0000) Subject: s/web server/webserver/ X-Git-Tag: tor-0.0.2pre14~78 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=1520e93c148f6271dfebc608b3991c88012317ce;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git s/web server/webserver/ svn:r772 --- diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index e1192f0c67..c0bf9e8842 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by implicating exit servers for their abuse. Also, applications that commonly -use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or web servers) +use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or webservers) can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate at the exit OR. @@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ need for this approach, when the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to all of their nodes \cite{jap-backdoor}. -\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary +\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a webserver, an adversary trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. This can greatly facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce