From: Arjun Shankar Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2015 12:06:31 +0000 (+0200) Subject: CVE-2015-1781: resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c buffer overflow [BZ#18287] X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=19250b9c8d4aec32b7a6ddfb97cc6e61d4e91208;p=thirdparty%2Fglibc.git CVE-2015-1781: resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c buffer overflow [BZ#18287] Conflicts: NEWS resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c --- diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index fc104eb85b7..d287261023a 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +2015-04-21 Arjun Shankar + + [BZ #18287] + * resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c (getanswer_r): Adjust buffer length + based on padding. (CVE-2015-1781) + 2015-03-10 Adhemerval Zanella * sysdeps/ieee754/dbl-64/Makefile (CFLAGS-e_pow.c): Add diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index 3af0fb6461d..fbd25a119c4 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -12,7 +12,14 @@ Version 2.19.1 15946, 16545, 16574, 16617, 16618, 16683, 16689, 16695, 16701, 16706, 16707, 16739, 16815, 16619, 16740, 16878, 16882, 16885, 16916, 16932, 16943, 16958, 17031, 17048, 17069, 17137, 17153, 17187, 17213, 17263, - 17325, 17555, 17625, 17630, 18104. + 17325, 17555, 17625, 17630, 18104, 18287. + +* A buffer overflow in gethostbyname_r and related functions performing DNS + requests has been fixed. If the NSS functions were called with a + misaligned buffer, the buffer length change due to pointer alignment was + not taken into account. This could result in application crashes or, + potentially arbitrary code execution, using crafted, but syntactically + valid DNS responses. (CVE-2015-1781) * CVE-2104-7817 The wordexp function could ignore the WRDE_NOCMD flag under certain input conditions resulting in the execution of a shell for diff --git a/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c b/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c index f0b4b17b065..f36d28bd707 100644 --- a/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c +++ b/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c @@ -615,7 +615,8 @@ getanswer_r (const querybuf *answer, int anslen, const char *qname, int qtype, int have_to_map = 0; uintptr_t pad = -(uintptr_t) buffer % __alignof__ (struct host_data); buffer += pad; - if (__builtin_expect (buflen < sizeof (struct host_data) + pad, 0)) + buflen = buflen > pad ? buflen - pad : 0; + if (__builtin_expect (buflen < sizeof (struct host_data), 0)) { /* The buffer is too small. */ too_small: