From: Oleh Konko Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 11:52:13 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state X-Git-Tag: v7.0-rc7~28^2~15^2~1 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=20756fec2f0108cb88e815941f1ffff88dc286fe;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH. That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing flow actually achieved. For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result. This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code, which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated. Fixes: fff3490f4781 ("Bluetooth: Fix setting correct authentication information for SMP STK") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleh Konko Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index deb8dd244b77..98f1da4f5f55 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -1018,10 +1018,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); - if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) - auth = 1; - else - auth = 0; + auth = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags) ? 1 : 0; /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator