From: Matt Caswell Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 15:36:54 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Fix OCSP_basic_verify signer certificate validation X-Git-Tag: openssl-3.2.0-alpha1~2721 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=21f89f542d745adbf1131338929ae538e200d50d;p=thirdparty%2Fopenssl.git Fix OCSP_basic_verify signer certificate validation The function `OCSP_basic_verify` validates the signer certificate on an OCSP response. The internal function, ocsp_verify_signer, is responsible for this and is expected to return a 0 value in the event of a failure to verify. Unfortunately, due to a bug, it actually returns with a postive success response in this case. In the normal course of events OCSP_basic_verify will then continue and will fail anyway in the ocsp_check_issuer function because the supplied "chain" value will be empty in the case that ocsp_verify_signer failed to verify the chain. This will cause OCSP_basic_verify to return with a negative result (fatal error). Normally in the event of a failure to verify it should return with 0. However, in the case of the OCSP_NOCHECKS flag being used, OCSP_basic_verify will return with a positvie result. This could lead to callers trusting an OCSP Basic response when it should not be. CVE-2022-1343 Fixes #18053 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell --- diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index ceefafc2a61..e70602184fe 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -59,9 +59,10 @@ static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, int response, ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (ret <= 0) { - ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR, - "Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret)); + "Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); goto end; } if (chain != NULL)