From: Luca Boccassi Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 18:18:53 +0000 (+0000) Subject: man: clarify requirements around creds null sealing X-Git-Tag: v260-rc3~85 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=240675efebe5a09e2df1f523cfea055311769c48;p=thirdparty%2Fsystemd.git man: clarify requirements around creds null sealing --- diff --git a/man/systemd-creds.xml b/man/systemd-creds.xml index 60ded421932..a35e534bfa1 100644 --- a/man/systemd-creds.xml +++ b/man/systemd-creds.xml @@ -339,8 +339,9 @@ where credentials shall be generated. Note that decryption of such credentials is refused on systems that have a TPM2 chip and where UEFI SecureBoot is enabled (this is done so that such a locked down system cannot be tricked into loading a credential generated this way that lacks authentication - information). If set to auto-initrd a TPM2 key is used if a TPM2 is found. If not - a fixed zero length key is used, equivalent to null mode. This option is + information. If either UEFI SecureBoot or a TPM2 are not available, then loading such credentials is + allowed by default). If set to auto-initrd a TPM2 key is used if a TPM2 is found. + If not, a fixed zero length key is used, equivalent to null mode. This option is particularly useful to generate credentials files that are encrypted/authenticated against TPM2 where available but still work on systems lacking support for this. The special value help may be used to list supported key types. @@ -424,7 +425,9 @@ - Allow decrypting credentials that use a null key. By default decryption of credentials encrypted/authenticated with a null key is only allowed if UEFI SecureBoot is off. + Allow decrypting credentials that use a null key. By default decryption of + credentials encrypted/authenticated with a null key is only allowed if UEFI SecureBoot is off or if + a TPM2 is not available. @@ -432,7 +435,8 @@ - Refuse decrypting credentials that use a null key, regardless of the UEFI SecureBoot state (see above). + Refuse decrypting credentials that use a null key, regardless of the UEFI SecureBoot + state or TPM2 availability (see above).