From: Navaneeth K Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2025 16:33:08 +0000 (+0000) Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix stack buffer overflow in OnAssocReq IE parsing X-Git-Tag: v6.17.12~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=25411f5fcf5743131158f337c99c2bbf3f8477f5;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git staging: rtl8723bs: fix stack buffer overflow in OnAssocReq IE parsing commit 6ef0e1c10455927867cac8f0ed6b49f328f8cf95 upstream. The Supported Rates IE length from an incoming Association Request frame was used directly as the memcpy() length when copying into a fixed-size 16-byte stack buffer (supportRate). A malicious station can advertise an IE length larger than 16 bytes, causing a stack buffer overflow. Clamp ie_len to the buffer size before copying the Supported Rates IE, and correct the bounds check when merging Extended Supported Rates to prevent a second potential overflow. This prevents kernel stack corruption triggered by malformed association requests. Signed-off-by: Navaneeth K Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index bc980d21d50e..7d451cd5835a 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -1033,6 +1033,9 @@ unsigned int OnAssocReq(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL; goto OnAssocReqFail; } else { + if (ie_len > sizeof(supportRate)) + ie_len = sizeof(supportRate); + memcpy(supportRate, p+2, ie_len); supportRateNum = ie_len; @@ -1040,7 +1043,7 @@ unsigned int OnAssocReq(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - ie_offset); if (p) { - if (supportRateNum <= sizeof(supportRate)) { + if (supportRateNum + ie_len <= sizeof(supportRate)) { memcpy(supportRate+supportRateNum, p+2, ie_len); supportRateNum += ie_len; }