From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@amutable.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2026 12:12:26 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: dissect-image: measure Verity before making use of them
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=32f405074a3aa221982ad92a7f61560b9f6a2b03;p=thirdparty%2Fsystemd.git

dissect-image: measure Verity before making use of them

Let's hook up the dissection logic with the new measurement infra, and
issue the measurement after successfully unlock an image, but before
returning to the caller.

Note that ideally we'd do this measurement in the kernel, so that we can
place it after authenticating the root hash, but before activating the
medium. One day we should be able to do that via eBPF based on userspace
policies, but for now, this would require too much kernel rework.

Let's however make sure our measurements only contain data that the
kernel could know too, so that we hopefully can move these measurements
to the kernel without changing their formatting.
---

diff --git a/src/shared/dissect-image.c b/src/shared/dissect-image.c
index ec9247b0480..41569037744 100644
--- a/src/shared/dissect-image.c
+++ b/src/shared/dissect-image.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include "openssl-util.h"
 #include "os-util.h"
 #include "path-util.h"
+#include "pcrextend-util.h"
 #include "pidref.h"
 #include "proc-cmdline.h"
 #include "process-util.h"
@@ -3219,13 +3220,13 @@ static int do_crypt_activate_verity(
                 DissectImageFlags flags,
                 PartitionPolicyFlags policy_flags) {
 
-        bool check_signature;
-        int r, k;
+        int r;
 
         assert(cd);
         assert(name);
         assert(verity);
 
+        bool check_signature;
         if (iovec_is_set(&verity->root_hash_sig) && FLAGS_SET(policy_flags, PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED)) {
                 r = secure_getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_SIGNATURE");
                 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
@@ -3235,7 +3236,10 @@ static int do_crypt_activate_verity(
         } else
                 check_signature = false;
 
+        bool measure_signature;
         if (check_signature) {
+                int k;
+
                 /* First, if we have support for signed keys in the kernel, then try that first. */
                 r = sym_crypt_activate_by_signed_key(
                                 cd,
@@ -3247,7 +3251,8 @@ static int do_crypt_activate_verity(
                                 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
                 if (r >= 0) {
                         log_debug("Verity activation via kernel signature logic worked.");
-                        return 0;
+                        measure_signature = true;
+                        goto done;
                 }
 
                 log_debug_errno(r, "Validation of dm-verity signature failed via the kernel, trying userspace validation instead: %m");
@@ -3280,9 +3285,13 @@ static int do_crypt_activate_verity(
 
                 /* Otherwise let's see what signature-less activation results in. */
 
+                measure_signature = true;
+
         } else if (!FLAGS_SET(policy_flags, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY))
                 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERFKILL),
                                        "No-signature activation of Verity volume not allowed by policy, refusing.");
+        else
+                measure_signature = false;
 
         r = sym_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
                         cd,
@@ -3294,6 +3303,12 @@ static int do_crypt_activate_verity(
                 return log_debug_errno(r, "Activation of Verity via root hash failed: %m");
 
         log_debug("Activation of Verity via root hash succeeded.");
+
+done:
+        (void) pcrextend_verity_now(
+                        name,
+                        &verity->root_hash,
+                        measure_signature ? &verity->root_hash_sig : NULL);
         return 0;
 }