From: Simon Josefsson Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2005 09:45:57 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Add. X-Git-Tag: gnutls_1_2_9~49 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=3c1d06b17cea46ae5cc15d2dfeb80ec862743a09;p=thirdparty%2Fgnutls.git Add. --- diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index ae00fc66f7..dde2f8f6c7 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -5,16 +5,15 @@ See the end for copying conditions. * Version 1.2.9 - MD2 is now supported. -- MD2 and MD5 as X.509 certificate signing algorithms are now disabled - by default. Verifying untrusted certificates signed with these - hashes will now fail with a GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM - verification output. For applications that must remain - interoperable, you can use the GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD2 or - GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5 flags when verifying certificates. - Naturally, this is not recommended to be the default behaviour. - For example, call gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags with these - flags to change the verification mode used by - gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2. +- Due to cryptographic advances, verifying untrusted X.509 + certificates signed with MD2 or MD5 will now fail with a + GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM verification output. For + applications that must remain interoperable, you can use the + GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD2 or GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5 + flags when verifying certificates. Naturally, this is not + recommended to be the default behaviour. For example, call + gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags with these flags to change the + verification mode used by gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2. - Make it possible to send empty data through gnutls_record_send, to align with the send API. - The (experimental) low-level crypto alternative to libgcrypt used diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO index d4aaa25b5b..addcbfbffc 100644 --- a/doc/TODO +++ b/doc/TODO @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ Current list: - Support non-blocking gnutls_{dh,rsa}_params_generate2 for when there is not enough entropy available. - Implement Datagram-TLS (DTLS). +- Short-cut the certificate verification algorithm before the + root if a middle-CA is trusted. (+) Means high priority (*) Means medium priority