From: Alan Cox Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2007 02:41:27 +0000 (+0100) Subject: aacraid: fix security hole (CVE-2007-4308) X-Git-Tag: v2.6.16.57-rc1~12 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=401ef3d54cde6967c856b8fb362a91f406750767;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git aacraid: fix security hole (CVE-2007-4308) On the SCSI layer ioctl path there is no implicit permissions check for ioctls (and indeed other drivers implement unprivileged ioctls). aacraid however allows all sorts of very admin only things to be done so should check. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk --- diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c index 2716178905625..19a4579e35787 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c @@ -539,6 +539,8 @@ static int aac_cfg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static int aac_cfg_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; return aac_do_ioctl(file->private_data, cmd, (void __user *)arg); } @@ -592,6 +594,8 @@ static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg) static long aac_compat_cfg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; return aac_compat_do_ioctl((struct aac_dev *)file->private_data, cmd, arg); } #endif